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Philosophy
Ethical N aturalism  (EN) is the position that m oral reasoning, perception, 
and behavior are na tu ra l processes that m ake no use of transcendental 
features of reality or of hum an nature. EN holds that m orality is a situated, 
em bodied skill possessed by social anim als of sufficient complexity, not a body 
of laws or facts gleaned from  context-independent sources.
In Chapter One, EN is defended against attacks directed at it by Virginia Held 
in  her paper, "Whose Agenda?" It is argued  that H eld caricatures the sciences 
from  w hich EN draw s, exaggerates EN’s dependence on those sciences, 
im properly isolates m oral theory from  em pirical disciplines, and  draw s too 
sharp a division betw een facts and values. The conclusion is that H eld offers 
no compelling reason to fear or reject EN.
In C hapter Two, an  application of EN is described, that of Paul Churchland's 
m oral netw ork  theory (MNT). Connectionist m odels of cognitive science are 
described, and  their implications for the structure of concepts are explained. 
Churchland 's application of connectionism  to m oral reasoning is explicated. 
The chapter concludes w ith a defense of EN and MNT against some 
philosophical objections.
In Chapter Three, the implications of EN are discussed. First, EN implies 
that m oral train ing ought to be m oved back to the center of m oral life, in 
contrast to K antian and  utilitarian theories that cast m oral behavior purely as 
a product of the will. M oral training is a holistic affair that takes place in  the 
total environm ent th rough  exposure to various exem plars and  feedback w ith 
regard to m oral perform ance. It involves a significant degree of luck. Second, 
EN im plies that m oral theory can not do the norm ative w ork expected of it by 
m odern m oral philosophers. EN suggests that m oral philosophy can m ake 
significant m etaethical contributions, describing the conditions under which 
effective m oral reasoning takes place, bu t that it holds no privileged place in 
the norm ative activities of evaluation and recom m endation. N orm ative 
debate is d istributed  throughout society, and  cannot be settled by philosophers 
through recourse to unique philosophical tools, m ethods, or facts. In the 
m oral conversation of hum anity, philosophy is bu t one voice in  the chorus, 
not the conductor.
Preface and  A cknow ledgm ents
Contem porary academ ic philosophy is almost entirely isolated from 
the larger com m unity that surrounds it. It is virtually invisible outside the 
academy, and consists prim arily in professors w riting to other professors.
This came as som ewhat of a shock to me. As an undergraduate, I turned to 
philosophy precisely because I was concerned w ith the pressing problem s 
facing my culture: the paucity of political debate, the continuing degradation 
of the environm ent, the shrill and seem ingly irresolvable clashes betw een 
cultures and subcultures. U.S. culture has become centered around  m aterial 
and technical progress, stum bling blindly into the future at a breakneck pace, 
and that the project of situating our lives in  the fram ew ork of a larger, 
m eaningful narrative has been all b u t abandoned as hopeless.
But w hen I im m ersed m yself in  (analytic) philosophy, I found a 
discourse seem ingly oblivious to broad  cultural problem s. Logical questions 
are scrupulously dissected, logical protocols scrupulously observed. The only 
acceptable philosophical form is "argum ent," construed as conclusions 
derived from  uncontroversial prem ises. The shape of analytic philosophy 
w as cem ented by the logical positivists, w ho believed that "conceptual 
analysis" w ould lead to clarity about philosophical problems. Today, we have 
abandoned m ost of the positivist tenets that gave the belief substance, but no 
one seems to know  where to go from  here, so most philosophers continue to 
write in the pinched language of logical argum entation. As a result, the large, 
vague, and messy questions that grip  us in  our daily lives are invisible in 
analytic philosophy — its form dictates that only the m ost small, tidy, and 
clearly delim ited problems be addressed. Analytic philosophy endlessly draw s 
distinctions w ith in  distinctions until any subject becomes a landscape of such
complexity that only "expert" philosophers can navigate it; each subfield has a 
cadre of philosophical technicians whose only job, seemingly, is to further 
complicate their shared intellectual dom ain. This m akes dialogue w ith  the 
larger culture virtually impossible. Little progress is m ade, for we are no 
longer sure in  w hat progress consists, so argum ents become their ow n 
w arrant, carrying on w ithout m uch hope of resolution or sense of w hat 
w ould follow if resolution were achieved. Perhaps w orst of all, analytic 
philosophy is aesthetically unappealing. It is boring.
I expected the same of ethics, and, in  my lim ited exposure, found w hat 
I expected. The tradition  of m odern m oral philosophy casts m orality as an 
autonom ous dom ain, different in  k ind  from  the w orkaday practical dom ain. 
O ur course in  the m oral dom ain is to be charted by reference to formulaic 
principles, w hich apply (or fail to apply) regardless of particular or 
idiosyncratic circumstances. In any situation, a course can be "derived" from  
the proper rule. (Of course, in  practice, the rules and principles offered by 
Kantian and utilitarian  theories are hopelessly rem ote from  our situated 
experience and can be fleshed out in  a host of incom patible ways.) M orality is 
the province of the philosophical technician, whose task is to instruct non­
philosophers as to the correct rules and their scope. Philosophy is thus cast as 
the privileged judge and arbitrator of practices, intellectual, political, and 
cultural. Today, we find a situation parallel to that described above: we have 
abandoned the m etaphysical tenets that gave rule-based m orality its w arrant, 
bu t m ainstream  philosophy carries on th rough  sheer m om entum , unable or 
unw illing to release its grip on its illusory privilege.
O n closer inspection, however, I find reason to hope in ethics. The 
resurgence of virtue theory has begun to tu rn  the focus away from  the 
Rational A gent and back to real people, w ith  real traits and dispositions,
acting in  the context of real traditions. While virtue theory has its own 
problem s, it is a step in the righ t direction. My ow n return  to ethics is 
inspired by my exposure to tw o related m ovem ents gaining popularity  in 
contem porary philosophy: pragm atism  and naturalism . Pragm atism  tells us 
that our reasoning should be focused on im proving practice rather than 
divining ultim ate Truths; naturalism  tells us that we are biological creatures, 
that reason is a natural capacity developed in and conditioned by the long 
course of evolution. My purpose in w riting this paper is to defend a 
pragm atic, naturalist vision of m orality and m oral philosophy. I hope to 
contribute to the project of return ing  ethics to its p roper place, intertw ined 
w ith other areas of inquiry and w ith experience as a whole. It is only through 
such a retu rn  that m oral philosophy can regain relevance and a place in the 
contem porary cultural conversation.
If I succeed, the reader will be gripped as I have been by the notion that 
ethics is a feature of animal life — the life of the hum an anim al. It is a 
contingent practice w ith no transcendental foundations and  no assurance of 
success or even progress. O ur m oral task is not to find a point or a principle 
that transcends practice, one that can establish w ith  certainty w hat practices 
are legitim ate and illegitimate. Rather, our task is to im prove practice from 
within. In this task, we have no tools other than situated, fallible reasoning 
and debate. Morality is a practical skill, a m atter of continuing practice and 
experimentation, not a body of transcendent facts. Only by acknowledging 
this fact can we turn  w ith clear eyes to the task of encouraging and im proving 
the m oral skills of those in ou r community.
We are engaged in  a vast experiment, designing a life together in 
which we can all flourish. There is no certainty to be found, bu t m uch w ork 
to be done, and philosophy has stood on the sidelines for too long.
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There are several people to thank for their help in the developm ent of 
this paper, though none of them, it should be em phasized, are responsible for 
its undoubtedly  copious faults. First, I w ant to sing the praises of John Dewey, 
who, in  my carefully considered opinion, w as right about just about 
everything. O n reading Dewey, I consistently find myself echoing the 
sentim ent of Oliver W endell Holmes: "So m ethought God w ould  have 
spoken had He been inarticulate but keenly desirous to tell you  how it was." 1 
In addition, I w ant to acknowledge my considerable debt to O w en Flanagan, 
w hose book Varieties of Moral Personality opened my eyes to the possibilities 
of m oral philosophy, a discipline in  w hich I had  largely lost hope. His 
careful, level-headed, judicious substantiation of the claim that ethics ought 
to take account of psychology convinced me that m oral experience and moral 
philosophy need not proceed in ignorance of one another. Dewey and 
Flanagan have been, in different ways, my guiding intellectual lights.
The production  of this paper, my MA thesis, was aided in innum erable 
ways, direct and indirect, by my thesis committee: A ndrew  Light, Albert 
Borgm ann, and Bill Chaloupka. Though none are likely to agree w ith 
everything I have said here, each has, in  his or her ow n way, provided me 
w ith  a m oral and philosophical exem plar. Professor Chaloupka deserves 
special thanks for his heroic last m inute efforts. A ndrew , the chair of my 
committee, has been particularly helpful throughout my stay at the 
U niversity of M ontana, providing m e w ith  a steady supply of professional 
advice and assistance w ithout which I w ould (still) be thoroughly adrift.
Finally, I w ant to thank my family. My MA studies w ould have been 
im possible w ithout several generous grants from  that m ost flexible and 
forgiving of charitable foundations: my parents. I disagree w ith  m y parents, 
Larry and Leslie Roberts, on almost every explicit tenet of m oral (not to
m ention political, economic... n)  theory, yet I am  continually aw ed, educated, 
and pu t to shame by the exem plary virtue w ith w hich they conduct their 
lives. I have learned m ore from  their behavior than  I could from  any set of 
argum ents or texts. Jeff and Daniel, my brothers and best friends, are 
endlessly both sources of support and reasons for pride; they are mystified by 
w hat I do, bu t their respective excellences (medicine and music) have 
inform ed my thoughts on m orality more than they know. W hat follows is 
dedicated to my family; it is a w an and inadequate attem pt to do justice to 
their m oral example.
Chapter One
The Is-O ught D istinction: Two K inds of O bjections to Ethical N aturalism
Before I begin, I should clarify w hat I will be defending in  this paper as 
"ethical naturalism " (EN). M uch of the latter portion of the paper will be 
devoted to clarifying my vision of a productively naturalized m oral 
philosophy and psychology; for now, it is enough to sketch the outlines, to say 
som ething about w hat I do no t  mean. There are two basic kinds of EN: 
norm ative and  m etaethical. N orm ative EN attem pts to answ er m oral 
questions on the basis of how  people actually perceive, reason, judge, and act. 
In its m ost radical form, it claims that m oral questions are exhaustively 
answ ered by scientific know ledge draw n from biology, psychology, 
anthropology, sociology, and so on. It unabashedly and straightforw ardly 
deduces ought from is, or claims to. Radical norm ative ethical naturalists are 
rare, bu t norm ative EN certainly has historical proponents. Bentham 's 
utilitarianism , a target of G. E. M oore's original attacks, is a form  of 
norm ative EN -  it claims that hum ans d o seek pleasure and avoid pain, thus 
pleasure is the good and pain the bad, thus we ought to act to m axim ize the 
form er and  m inim ize that latter.
M etaethical naturalism , on the other hand, m akes claims about how 
we ought to conceive of m orality, w hat m oral reasoning consists in, and  what 
conditions are conducive to the effective practice of m oral perception and 
behavior. Like any type of metaethics, it makes claims about how  m oral 
theories ought to be constructed and  w hat their scope should  or can be. What 
makes it a distinctive form  of m etaethics is that it d raw s heavily on empirical 
research about how effective reasoning takes place. Also, it d raw s on 
em pirical research to se broad lim its and establish criteria that any m oral
1
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theory should meet. A good example is O w en Flanagan's Principal of 
M inimal Psychological Realism (PMPR): "M ake sure w hen constructing a 
m oral theory or projecting a m oral ideal that the character, decision 
processing, and behavior prescribed are possible, or are perceived to be 
possible, for creatures like us."3 As Flanagan is quick to adm it, this principal 
is "not rem otely sufficient to fix the right m oral theory" (VM P  32); however, 
it does set limits on the shape a m oral theory m ay take. For instance, it rules 
out the m ore radical forms of act utilitarianism , since it is impossible to 
envision a hum an being who finds it psychologically possible to com pute the 
sum  total of the effects of her actions at each and every possible moral 
juncture (33-34).
Simplistic and radical versions of norm ative EN are rightfully scorned. 
They m ake the m istake of ignoring the fact that a large part of hum an life is 
speculation, im agination, and recom m endation about future forms of life. 
They ignore that w hat is reflects only a m inuscule fraction of w hat could be. 
As H eidegger noted, hum an beings are future-looking. We think, plan, and 
dream  about w hat could be, w hat is possible for us, and moral theory is one 
way that we guide our efforts. To construct m oral theory simply on the basis 
of how  present hum an beings think and act is grossly parochial, conservative, 
and  unim aginative.
The EN that I defend in  this paper is prim arily metaethical. It is first 
and forem ost a theory about w hat m orality and m oral reasoning are. 
However, a robust metaethics will issue, I w ill argue, in changed practices; 
thus, w hile my version of EN avoids the reductive conservatism  of 
straightforw ardly  norm ative naturalism , it is not w ithout norm ative 
consequences (see Chap. 3, sec. II).
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The prospect of naturalizing ethics raises hackles across a broad 
spectrum  of philosophical positions and for a variety of reasons.
Nevertheless, the objections of EN's opponents tend  to cluster around one 
concept: the "is-ought" or "fact-value" distinction. The distinction betw een 
statem ents of fact and valuative claims about w hat ought to be is also indexed 
as the difference betw een description and prescription, description and 
evaluation, and explanation and justification. (There are im portant 
differences among these ways of form ulating the distinction, but for now, it 
suffices that they be considered synonymous, at least in spirit.)
I. The "Logical Fallacy" O bjection
There are two general types of objection based on the distinction 
betw een the descriptive and  the norm ative. The first, m ade famous by G.E. 
Moore in his Principia Ethica,4 accuses EN of the "naturalistic fallacy;" as the 
w ord "fallacy" indicates, this accusation is m eant to expose a logical error. As 
Kant fam ously asserted, in any logical deduction the conclusion m ust be 
contained in the prem ises, and  presum ably, descriptive prem ises do not 
"contain" anything norm ative, m aking the deduction  of a norm ative 
conclusion illicit. According to Moore, virtually every m oral philosopher 
p rio r to Moore had m ade this error. The com m ission of the naturalistic 
fallacy rendered (most) prior m oral theories not just flaw ed or incomplete, 
said Moore, but flatly false. The notion of the naturalistic fallacy is predicated 
on the assum ption that states of affairs in the w orld  and moral properties are 
different in kind. In M oore's notoriously suspect form ulation, the good is 
"real" but not "natural" -  it is "non-natural." To d raw  a conclusion about a
4
non-natural property  from  prem ises about natural facts is, on this 
form ulation, a logical error.
T hough few contem porary philosophers subscribe to M oore's 
intuitionism  or his characterization of m oral facts as non-natural, his legacy 
nevertheless lives on, as evidenced by the fact that m uch philosophical 
discussion of the is-ought distinction rem ains centered around logic. There is 
still (in some quarters) thought to be a difference in logical kind betw een 
descriptive and norm ative assertions. If the logical objection is accepted at 
face value, it is very difficult to argue against, though there have been m any 
attem pts. One recent rejoinder, for instance, appears in an article by Oswald 
H anfling entitled " 'Is ', 'O ught' and the Voluntaristic Fallacy," w hich attem pts 
to circum vent the logical objection w ith a point about the relationship am ong 
term s in  the prem ises and term s in the conclusions of allegedly fallacious is- 
ought deductions.5 His central example is the following:
(1) W hat they are doing is evil.
(2) Therefore, they ought not to do it. (IOVF 537)
The conclusion follows, Hanfling says, sim ply because "ought not" is analytic 
to "evil," that is to say, "evil" contains "ought not" in the same way that 
"bachelor" contains "unm arried man." In  other w ords, to m ake the 
deduction we do not have to consult the w orld or our m oral intuitions; we 
sim ply have to note the m eanings of w ords in our language. In a sim ilar 
way, "m urder," "stealing," "lying," etc. are analytic to "ought not."
W hat if the prem ises are rephrased so that any reference to, say, 
"m urder" is taken out? It is irrelevant, says Hanfling; "killed w ith 
prem editation and not in self-defense" is analytic to "m urder," "m urder" to 
"ought not," and the conclusion still follows from  m eanings alone (539). 
N orm ative judgm ents are "built into" the m eanings of w ords that we use to
5
describe factual situations because values are "built into" the fabric of 
language.
Philosophers have failed to notice the significance of this fact due to 
the "voluntaristic fallacy" referred to in the title of the essay. The fallacy is 
that a language-user "assents" to using a language the w ay she assents to 
playing a game, .that she voluntarily decides to accept the rules of the game 
and thus is free to refuse to accept particular rules (for instance, the rule that 
"m urder" carries valuative meaning). But this is a mistake, according to 
Hanfling; there is no "decision" to use the proper m eanings of w ords (545). 
The language user finds herself in  a situation in  w hich m eanings are 
established, in w hich she f in d s  values w oven into language, how ever she 
m ight choose to critique those values. Thus, norm ative m eanings can be 
deduced from  certain descriptive words, because these descriptive words 
already contain norm ative m eaning.
I do not th ink that H anfling 's argum ent works, for several reasons.
One is that, thanks to Quine, the notion of analyticity has been rendered 
extremely problem atic. A nother is that the values in any social fabric (or, to 
m irror H anfling 's appropriation of W ittgenstein, "form  of life") are various, 
am biguous, and frequently contradictory; these qualities reflect themselves in  
language. Therefore it seems unlikely that teasing a norm ative conclusion 
from  descriptive premises, if it is indeed possible, will often or ever be a 
m atter of simple deduction, because words, particularly w ords w ith valuative 
connotations, are rarely crystal clear in their meanings. N atural language 
contains an inelim inable element of am biguity, and thus there is indeed a 
degree of voluntary, conscious deliberation involved in  the process of is-to- 
ought inference.
6
H anfling is not to be faulted in  particular, though. I do not believe 
that the logical objection can be met w ith  logical rebuttal. In fact, I th ink  that 
the logic-centered debate over the is-ought principle is degenerate; it has not 
been and  will not be philosophically fruitful. I suspect that phrasing the 
problem  in  term s of logic is w hat has m ade it, in principle, unsolvable. 
H ow ever, it is not my intention to argue that point here.6 Instead, I w ant to 
tu rn  to the second type of objection based on the is-ought distinction, one that 
I think reflects m ore legitimate worries and is a more open and fruitful topic 
of discussion.
II. The "Bad Idea" O bjection
The second type of objection that I have in  m ind is pragm atic. That is 
to say, rather than  characterizing EN as involving a logical fallacy, it simply 
claims that naturalizing  ethics is ill- advised, a bad idea. It claims that 
naturalizing ethics w ill have undesirable effects on hum an practices. As a 
pragm atist, it is my view  that this is w here the battle should be fought.
The fear is that EN 's willful fudging of the distinction betw een is and 
ought in  effect threatens the ought. It is claimed that m oral philosophy has a 
unique role -  recom m endation -  whose character is in danger of being 
corrupted by the invasion of naturalism 's descriptive focus. This fear is 
w idespread. I w ill focus here on an essay that reflects many common 
sentim ents against EN: Virginia H eld 's "W hose Agenda? Ethics versus 
Cognitive Science."7 The essay appears in  a collection of essays called M in d  
and Morals that is nom inally on the grow ing conversation betw een ethics 
and cognitive science, but in fact strays m uch w ider; H eld 's argum ent, for 
instance, is clearly directed not only at cognitive science, but at EN in general.
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H er aversion to EN is m otivated by the fear that in  "the culture in which we 
live and work, the norm ative is constantly in danger of becom ing sw allowed 
by the empirical, not just in  the social sciences them selves bu t even w ithin  
philosophy" (WA 69). Rather than more closely allying itself w ith the 
hum an and  social sciences, H eld urges, "[t]he im portan t task for m oral 
philosophy in  relation to these other areas seems to be to keep the 
distinctively norm ative alive and well.... W hat ethics should  not do is lose 
sight of the distinctive and prim arily  norm ative and evaluative agenda for 
which it should continue to press" (70). I will argue tha t H eld 1) 
m isrepresents the scientific disciplines that she sees as threatening moral 
philosophy, particularly cognitive science and m oral psychology, 2) 
m isrepresents EN and its relation to these scientific disciplines, 3) 
m isrepresents m oral philosophy, and as a result, 4) portrays too large a chasm 
betw een description and recom m endation in  ethics. These four m istakes are 
characteristic of those who fear the naturalization of ethics.
Causality, Science, and Subjectivity
H eld m akes m uch of science's search for causal explanation. She lays 
out her general attitude tow ards the causal m odels of science in her 1993 book 
Feminist Morality .8 The repeated them e of her discussions of science is that 
scientific accounts, or "causal accounts" more generally, are incom patible 
w ith subjective experience. The im plication seems to be that the sciences -  
cognitive science, psychology economics, sociology, anthropology -  to the 
extent that they are indeed sciences, cannot adequately explain hum an 
behavior. She gives the exam ple of a girl seeing an autom obile 
advertisem ent w ith  a tall, beautiful w om an draped  over the car. After seeing
8
the advertisem ent, the girl begins to w orry more than she w ould have about 
her appearance. But, says Held,
the image doesn 't cause her to do so in a way the m odel of causal 
explanation can well handle. Further, if the same w om an discusses 
w ith  other w om en how those who pay for the advertisem ents of a 
commercial culture use the images of women for their ow n gain and 
in  the process dam age the aspirations of girls and wom en, this w om an 
can come to be less influenced by the advertising that surrounds her. 
Again, this change in her consciousness and activity cannot well be 
dealt w ith in the causal explanations developed for the sciences. (FM 8) 
H eld gives no explanation for w hy a causal account is im possible here. On a 
surface reading, w hat she says is flatly false. The logical positivists w ould 
have said that the entire series of incidents can be exhaustively explained at 
the level of physics. However, this radical reductionism  no longer univocally 
characterizes the philosophical view  of science. The non-reductivist 
philosopher of science w ould happily  adm it that one can not capture the 
relevant causal m echanisms unless one rises to a higher level of explanation. 
W hat that level w ould be is som ew hat controversial. Patricia Churchland 
m ight say that neurobiology is sufficient, bu t even that degree of 
reductionism  is hotly contested. More likely, to fully account for the girl's 
behavior, cognitive psychological and sociological explanations w ill have to 
be offered. But these will still be causal accounts. W hat can H eld mean?
She is obviously not positing any unm oved m overs or uncaused 
events. Rather, it seems that H eld 's  antipathy tow ards science arises from  the 
fact that it doesn 't provide the k in d  of understanding that she is after. This is 
consonant w ith  her other rem arks, which retu rn  again and again to the 
notion of subjectivity. Indeed, she concludes the example w ith  these words:
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"Subjectivity m ust be taken seriously in hum an experience" (FM  9). W hat 
she is after in  the example, then, is an understanding  of the g irl's action from  
the point-of-view  of the subject, of the girl (or, perhaps more broadly, the 
folk-psychological point-of-view).
Discussing m oral experience, she m akes reference to Kant's antinom y 
betw een "on the one hand, the freedom  we m ust assume to m ake sense of 
m oral responsibility, and explanation and prediction in  term s of the causal 
laws of nature" (WA 72). M oral theory, she says, m ust make the subjective, 
the view  from  w hich we are free to make choices, central. Science, w ith its 
objective, th ird-person point-of-view, can not account for or explain away 
subjectivity, though it has tried  (or rather, philosophy of m ind has tried  on its 
behalf). O n this score H eld refers, both in her book and in her essay, to 
Thomas N agel's account of the unbridgeable gap betw een the third- and first- 
person perspectives (WA 73; FM  34).
The debate over N agel's characterization is long and complex, and  I do 
not w ant to attem pt a position here. Rather, I w ill briefly examine two 
particular areas of science that Held targets, areas that will play a non-trivial 
role in EN: cognitive science and moral psychology. In  particular, I w ant to 
index some (relatively) recent developm ents in  those fields that H eld either 
w illfully ignores or of which she is simply ignorant. The developm ents w ork 
against the claim that these disciplines have nothing to say about experience 
and against H eld 's characterization of them  (and science in general) as 
interested only in w hat is "reducible to the properties of individual entities 
that can be observed by an outsider and m apped into a causal scientific 
fram ew ork" (FM 8). In general, they work against H eld 's implicit picture of 
all science as cold, positivistic, behavioristic, and  w edded to a simplistic 
"billiard ball" m odel of causation. Furtherm ore, the developm ents serve to
10
m ake cognitive science and  m oral psychology increasingly amenable to use in 
ethical reflection.
1. Cognitive Science
H eld seeks a conception of m ind that is compatible w ith experience, 
and  she thinks that philosophy of m ind "that has grow n out of or is 
com patible w ith cognitive science" (WA 73) is bankrupt on that score. In fact, 
despite the context of her article, this is about her only reference to cognitive 
science as such, apart from  repeated references to (and gross generalizations 
about) "adherents of the view  that cognitive science can advance m oral 
inquiry" (71). After slipping from  cognitive science to philosophy of mind, 
she proceeds, w ithout acknowledging or defending the strategy, to equate 
philosophy of m ind entirely w ith  functionalism. Functionalism  does indeed 
focus on "properties of indiv idual entities," and it has indeed characterized 
m uch philosophy of m ind, bu t its relationship to cognitive science is not as 
clear or univocal. I will leave that to one side, however, and sim ply discuss 
some recent developm ents in cognitive science.
Traditionally, cognitive scientists sought after the form al features of 
cognition, problem  solving, etc., and tried to abstract away, to the extent 
possible, from  contingencies of environm ents and particu lar situations. This 
led them  to focus alm ost exclusively on an inner, com putational and 
representational theory of cognition, m odeled after the central processing 
units and stored m em ory characteristic of computers. Interaction w ith the 
w orld  was seen as "low -bandw idth," lim ited to input (the data of perception) 
and output (afferent signals to the muscles, etc.). M eaning was located in 
sem antical representations stored in  memory. (John H augeland argues that
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this presupposition -  that the m ind is an independent realm  that can be 
understood in  abstraction from  the w orld -  is part of Descartes' lingering 
legacy.9) Recently, m any cognitive scientists have em braced connectionism, 
w hich abandons the m etaphor of the central processor and its attendant 
stored m em ory. Connectionism describes intelligence as d istributed  
throughout the brain via a web of neural connections of varying weights. 
Representations, on this model, are not explicit but rather im plicit in  the 
w eight d istribution am ong connections, or more generally, in the b rain 's 
cognitive structu re .10
A recent and growing m ovem ent in  cognitive science that postdates 
connectionism  (and whose relation to it is controversial) is referred to by 
various nam es, generally "em bedded cognition."11 The outline of this new 
m ovem ent is described in H augeland 's essay, "Mind Em bodied and 
Em bedded."12 It is characterized first by its rejection of the view  that m ind, 
body, and w orld are functionally separable (that is, the functionalist view  that 
cognition could be preserved if the physical body were rem oved and replaced 
with, say, a com puter or a robot), that m ind produces m eaning, and that 
m eaning is alw ays in the form  of semantic representation. The details of this 
view are too complex to deal, w ith adequately here; I w ill only touch on three 
theses that H augeland extracts from this statem ent by H ubert Dreyfus:
W hen we are at hom e in the w orld, the m eaningful objects em bedded 
in their context of references am ong which we live are not a m odel of 
the w orld  stored in  our m ind or brain: they are the world itself, (qtd. in 
MEE 27)
The first thesis is that the locus of m eaning is not only in the head, as not 
only traditional cognitive science but m uch traditional philosophy has had  it, 
bu t in the w orld as well, in the natural and  hum an-m ade artifacts and
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situations w ith  w hich we are surrounded. The m eaning in  the w orld  is not 
derivative, assigned by hum an m inds, bu t original; in  other w ords, 
"intelligence itself abides 'ou t' in the w orld, not just 'inside '..." (28). The 
second thesis is that not all m eaning is representational. M eaning, in a broad 
sense, inheres in "objects em bedded in  their context of reference." As 
H augeland puts it:
A ham m er, for instance, is significant beyond itself in  term s of w hat i f  s 
for: driving nails into wood, by being w ielded in  a certain way, in order 
to build  som ething, and so on. The nails, the wood, the project, and 
the carpenter him  or herself, are likewise caught up  in this "web of 
significance," in their respective ways. These are the m eaningful 
objects that are the w orld itself; and  none of them  is a representation. 
(29)
Thus, m eaning extends beyond w hat can be captured in  linguistic formulas. 
The th ird  thesis is that we live and act w ithin  m eaning; that is, that 
intelligent behavior is not an output of the brain  but an interaction or 
collaboration w ith  the environm ent, w ith the m eaning em bedded there. 
H augeland gives the example of taking the highw ay to San Jose. Traditional 
cognitive science w ould postulate an internal m ap representing the route and 
a CPU sending out instructions on how  to get there; rather, H augeland says, 
we should consider the behavior a collaboration betw een ourselves and the 
road. The road itself, on this model, is an  integral part of the intelligent 
system ; the intelligent behavior is a collaboration (31).
These are but sketches, but their relevance to H eld 's w orries should be 
clear. The m ovem ent tow ard .em bedded cognition turns away from  a focus 
on the "properties of ind iv idual entities" in favor of theorizing a n e tw o rk  of 
m eaning through w hich the property  of intelligence is distributed. This
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conception offers intelligent action as an em ergent feature of complex, "wide- 
bandw idth" interactions betw een persons and their environm ents — an 
indefinite num ber of recursive, reciprocal causal strands, not a linear series of 
billiard-balls colliding. Furtherm ore, unlike traditional cognitive science, this 
conception does not abstract from  situated action to form al features of 
cognition; rather, it conceives of situated, em bedded action as the site and 
necessary precondition of cognition. It focuses on the integral, or as 
H augeland puts it, "intim ate" implication of m ind in w orld. In  other words, 
it studies em bodied experience. The encounter of H eld 's girl w ith  images of 
fem inine beauty and the m eaning it represents, as well as her subsequent 
appropriation  and response to that m eaning, are not outside its purview , nor 
are her interactions w ith  the supportive w om en in  her environm ent.
Indeed, H augeland 's cognitive science will have m uch to say about the 
process that H eld 's example represents.
2. Moral Psychology
W hat of m oral psychology? Held says som ewhat less about this 
discipline, bu t her worries seem  m uch the same: 'T h e  search for causal 
explanation dom inates in... m oral psychology as usually pursued" (WA 70). 
Again, her complaint about this branch of science seems to be that it is a 
branch of science. It is difficult to know  w hat to make of H eld 's antipathy 
tow ards causal explanation, other than to interpret it as a m isguided 
expression of her more legitim ate antipathy tow ards the social sciences, 
which have, like most areas of society, historically been insensitive to the 
concerns and experience of wom en. All explanations, it seems to me, are 
causal in  some way or another -  for instance, how m ight we explain the
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exclusion of fam ily-centered ethical concerns from  m ainstream  m oral 
philosophy/ a topic central to H eld 's work, other than by saying, "it happened 
due to (i.e., because of) factors x, y... n"? Indeed, H eld herself does m uch of 
this type of explaining. She states repeatedly that causal explanation is 
sharply distinct from  norm ative recom mendation, a subject I w ill address in  
subsequent sections; however, while this m ight explain her desire to 
d istinguish  these disciplines from  m oral philosophy, it does not explain her 
evident antipathy tow ards them.
Again, it is best to focus on H eld 's more implicit background concerns, 
w hich are m ore particular and more legitimate. These are, again, that science 
works on a narrow  m odel of causality that factors in  only the "properties of 
individual entities" and that it is incapable of taking account of or speaking to 
subjective experience.
O n the first score, it m ight be argued that m oral psychology doesn't 
actually do m uch causal explaining. The general m odus operandi of the 
discipline is to conduct experim ents and point out regularities in the 
responses of subjects. For instance, in the third part of Varieties of Moral 
Personality Flanagan points out several regularities that have em erged from 
psychological research. Here are a few examples:
The Law of Social Impact: "the intensity of social im pact is a function of 
the strength  (S) -  that is, the power, status, persuasiveness, and so on -  
of those creating a force; the immediacy (I) -  that is, the proxim ity in 
space and time -  of the force; and the num ber (N ) of people presenting 
the force. More formally, intensity of social impact =f(SIN)" (VMP  
301).
Corollaries: The Principle o f the Decreasing Marginal 
Effectiveness of Adding Numbers over Two "says that the effect
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of adding  num bers to the source of social im pact increases at a 
decreasing rate" (ibid), and the Principle o f the Diffusion of 
Social Impact "says that the intensity of im pact is (experienced 
as) diffused over, possibly sim ply divided by, the num ber of 
persons at w hom  it is directed" (ibid).
Fundamental A ttribution Tendency "involves an  inclination to 
overestim ate the im pact of dispositional factors and  to underestim ate 
situational ones" in producing behavior (306).
Corollaries: Agent-Ob server Divergence "involves a tendency of 
observers to attribute actions of others to standing dispositions 
in  them, even w here in  their ow n case they attribute such 
actions to situational variables" (307), and Self-Serving Bias 
"involves attributing desirable actions to standing dispositions 
in oneself and undesirable acts to external factors" (310).
This is but a sm all sample of the tentative results of psychological 
experiments, bu t a few things are already clear. First, these are not "laws" in 
the strict sense, of the kind we find in  physics; they do not posit causal forces, 
they sim ply point out regularities in  behavior.13 Of course, some of them  
conform well to w hat we w ould expect through folk psychology, w here we do 
frequently phrase such m atters in  causal term s. Some of them , however, are 
quite counterintuitive. For instance, folk psychology w ould  predict that the 
chance of someone helping a victim  at an  auto accident w ould  increase as 
more people show ed up (after all, w ith m ore people, the chances of an expert 
appearing in the crowd increase). However, f(S IN )  reveals that the chance of 
som eone helping actually decreases w ith  the grow ing num ber of onlookers.
Regardless, these results bear little resem blance to H eld 's picture of 
science: they are highly tentative and probabilistic, they are not exclusively
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focused on the "properties of individual entities" (groups of varying sizes 
play in  integral explanatory role), and they are not fram ed in term s of a strict, 
billiard-ball m odel of causation.
W hat about the role of subjectivity? H eld 's belief that moral 
psychology takes no account of subjectivity is just false. In the early part of 
the century, to be sure, psychology was dom inated by behaviorism, which 
took p ride  in its ability to explain behavior w ithout reference to the subject's 
point-of-view. Even as behaviorism  waned, psychologists still took for 
granted that m orality w as easily defined and explicable in  term s of 
reinforcem ent or "internalized anxiety." However, this changed decisively in 
the latter pa rt of the century. In a paper on philosophy's influence on 
psychology, Augusto Blasi traces the turning poin t to the sem inal dissertation 
of Lawrence Kholberg.14 Blasi writes, "Kholberg... consciously split w ith this 
tradition... by assum ing the necessity of a cognitive phenom enological 
perspective: m orality m ust be defined by the ind iv idual's beliefs; these are 
constructed by the indiv idual himself in interaction w ith  his social world....
It was as if psychology were finally attem pting to deal w ith  morality as people 
experience it" (HSP 39). Blasi calls this the "assum ption of phenom enalism ," 
w hich proceeds "by considering the indiv idual's judgm ent and intention as 
necessary to define the m oral phenom enon" (57). This "program m atic 
em phasis on the subject's perspective" seems to fly directly in the face of 
H eld 's com plaint that subjectivity is ignored in the social sciences.
K holberg's m oral stage theory has come under considerable criticism in  
recent years, most notably by Carol Gilligan.15 G illigan's thesis is that 
Kholberg's em phasis on m orality as justice obscures the fact that m any 
subjects phrase (and presum ably experience) their m oral concerns in term s of 
compassion, em pathy, and  care. (Gilligan objects as a scientist conducting
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scientific research, bu t despite H eld 's stated antipathy tow ards science's 
incursions into m orality, she m akes m uch use of G illigan's distinction 
betw een justice and care j  This criticism am ounts to saying that Kholberg has 
d isregarded  his own "assum ption of phenom enalism " and im posed 
parochial norm ative conclusions on his data. We w ill retu rn  to the 
relationship betw een the descriptive task of psychology, on the one hand, and 
norm ativity on the other, but it should be clear that subjective experience 
plays a large role in defining the dom ain and explaining behavior in  moral 
psychology.
3. Therefore
It is clear, then, that H eld 's characterization of the sciences she criticizes 
is based on a caricature. H er description of these sciences as focusing 
exclusively on the "properties of indiv idual entities" is m isguided. While it 
is true that both seek causal accounts, it is not the case that they do so in the 
simplistic w ay that H eld implies, as though social norm s, m oral beliefs, 
judgm ents, and actions were billiard balls that simply strike and bounce off 
one another. The new  m ovem ent in  cognitive science tow ards 
acknow ledgm ent and theorization of the situated, em bodied character of 
cognition and  action mitigates the criticism. The accounts w ill still be causal 
in a broad sense, but the focus on the em bedded character of thinking and 
action involves a recognition that the causal strands involved are indefinite 
in num ber and complexity because they extend well beyond the brain  and 
into the environm ent. Moral psychology is m oving tow ards a sim ilar 
recognition of complexity, and appropriately restrains itself to m apping what
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regularities it finds, regularities which take social groups, not merely 
"indiv idual entities," as crucial to explanation.
The objection that the sciences cannot account for subjective experience 
is more complex. It is certainly false that cognitive science and moral 
psychology have no place for subjective experience in  their explanations.
Since em bodied cognition involves "not principled separation bu t all sorts of 
close coupling and functional unity" (MEE 33) of m ind and w orld, and since it 
acknowledges that m ind does not create m eaning bu t rather m ove and acts 
w ith in  it, the subjective appropriation of m eaning is central to any 
explanation of cognition. Cognition is not a form al structure that can be 
abstracted from  situated experiences, but rather an em ergent product of those 
experiences; thus, subjective experience plays a central role. A nd moral 
psychology, as we have just seen, gives the subject's point-of-view a central 
role as well, since especially in the area of m oral reflection and action, the 
subject's first-person judgm ents and intentions are crucial because "m orality 
essentially, that is, by definition, depends on the agent's subjective 
perspective" (HSP 59).
These debates center  on subjectivity, on first-person experience, despite 
H eld 's characterization of the sciences. Now, H eld m ight still say the 
following: "yes, the subject's verbal reports are taken into consideration, but 
these are then  treated as objective data  and studied from  third-person 
perspective." If the point is that scientists necessarily function as observers 
and not participants, then the point is undoubtedly (and trivially) true. But if 
this alone disqualifies scientists from  having legitim ate things to say about 
m orality, then we are left w ith the following conclusion: only those who are 
subjectively, actively involved w ith a m oral problem  m ay participate in 
debate or theorizing about it, and in doing so they give the voices of other
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subjectively, actively involved agents complete priority. They set the agenda 
for m oral theory and determ ine how m uch if any em pirical data  will be 
involved in  it. As I will argue shortly, this insistence on the hegem ony of the 
first-person perspective is unpalatable.
Ethical Naturalism and Its Relation to the Sciences
If H eld 's characterization of the sciences is m isleading, her 
characterization of EN is alm ost parodic. Again, it is difficult to determ ine in 
specific cases w hether this is due to ignorance or hostility. In the following, I 
w ill review  some of the statem ents she makes about EN and explain why 
they are m isleading. Since "ethical naturalism " is an um brella term  that 
covers several not entirely consistent theories, I will adopt as my exem plar of 
EN O w en Flanagan's conception. I do this for two reasons: first, I find 
F lanagan 's the m ost sensible and consistent version that I have encountered; 
second, Flanagan's program m atic statem ent of EN -  his essay "Ethics 
N aturalized: Ethics as H um an Ecology"16 -  appears less than thirty pages 
prior to H eld 's essay in M ind and Morals. She attended the conference where 
the paper was presented and cites it in her ow n essay. If she is to be held 
accountable for some knowledge of EN, why not hold her accountable to a 
clear statem ent in  close proximity?
H eld writes:
Ethical naturalism  has lately been presented as a view... that avoids 
such m etaphysically peculiar entities as m oral norm s or norm ative 
properties. Ethical naturalism  is seen as having w hat is taken as the 
great advantage of being consistent w ith science and metaphysical 
m aterialism . But as Jean H am pton usefully rem inds us, such a view is
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hardly  new; it has already had an eloquent exponent in Hobbes. She 
show s how  even Hobbes "cannot keep norm ative standards of value 
and  reasoning out of his theory"17 and argues that since contem porary 
naturalists employ objective norm ative standards for such m atters as 
instrum ental rationality and coherent, healthy preferences, they have 
no defensible grounds for dism issing objective m oral norm s.
A n additional reaction m ight be that since so m any theorists and 
students of ethics recognize the reasons to move beyond H obbes's 
naturalistic reduction of the moral to the empirical, they should be able 
to see how  sim ilar argum ents apply to contem porary versions of 
ethical naturalism . (WA 71-72)
This passage is characteristic of H eld 's argum ent. It runs together several 
im portant distinctions and dam ns contem porary EN by association w ith 
Hobbes, w ith  no textual support for the assertion that the two are 
substantively identical. Since this passage reflects comm on suspicions of EN, 
it is w orth  deconstructing.
H eld says that it is a purported  strength  of naturalism  that it "avoids" 
m etaphysically suspect entities like ("real") m oral norm s and properties. But 
this is ambiguous. If by "avoids" she m eans that it does not depend for its 
plausibility on their existence, she is surely right. But if she m eans that EN 
positively denies  the existence of such entities, she is wrong. Flanagan 
explicitly states that "ethical naturalism  im plies no position on the question 
of w hether there really are, or are not, m oral properties in  the universe in  the 
sense debated by m oral realists, antirealists, and  quasi-realists. The im portant 
thing is that m oral claims can be rationally supported, not that all the 
constituents of such claims refer or fail to refer to 'real' things" (EN 23). As a
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pragm atist, Flanagan is concerned w ith the ability of norm s to effectively 
guide practice, not their m etaphysical status.
H eld then says that EN is "consistent w ith" science and materialism , 
and this is "thought to be" an advantage. But, unless she proposes some form 
of theism  or dualism  (which, to my knowledge, she does not), it is unclear 
w hat this is m eant to contrast with. She repeatedly condem ns "scientism" 
and says that science is bu t one w ay of looking at the w orld, but she never 
points to her proposed alternative or says exactly in  w hat "scientism" consists. 
The im plication in the passage above seems to be that the existence of ("real") 
objective norm s is incom patible w ith scientific m aterialism , bu t if this is 
indeed the implication, then H eld is contradicting the view s and experiences 
of a w hole host of thinking people who are m aterialists and  who believe in 
m oral norm s, and w ho see no contradiction.
The im plication is m ade clear in the sentences that follow. W ithout 
support, contem porary EN is equated w ith  H obbes's naturalism , and it is 
poin ted  out that Hobbes "cannot keep norm ative standards of value and 
reasoning out of his theory." Nor, says Jean H am pton, can today 's naturalists. 
But exactly w hat kind of norm s can they not avoid? The phrase used is 
"objective norms," but again, this is am biguous. If "objective" m eans "real 
apart from  hum an beings or their projects," as the m etaphysical realist w ould 
have it, then EN implies no particular position, including denial (EN 23). If 
"objective" m eans som ething like "intersubjective and  rationally defensible," 
then EN does not attem pt to "dism iss" such norm s; on the contrary, it 
embraces them  (it is difficult to m ake intelligible the notion of avoiding any 
and all norms, whatever Hobbes may or m ay not have said).
So, EN certainly uses norm s to guide its reasoning, and discusses the 
m ost fruitful m ethods of determ ining norm s as well. W hat Flanagan does
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claim  is that the ethical naturalist w ill not claim to have deduced  m oral 
norm s, not from  truths of reason or logic like the rationalist, nor from  
descriptions of the world like some m oral realists. EN m akes no use of, nor 
does it try to establish, any "dem onstratively moral" norms: "[The ethical 
naturalist] points to certain practices, values, virtues, and  principles as 
reasonable based on inductive and abductive reasoning" (EN 23). Moral 
norm s are not special or particular in  this respect; they are underdeterm ined 
by their prem ises, but his in no w ay distinguishes them  from  epistemic, 
scientific, or other types of norms. (This requires some defense, bu t that will 
have to w ait for the next chapter.)
H eld finishes the passage by w ondering why contem porary ethical 
naturalists are so dense as to not have noticed that "Hobbes's naturalistic 
reduction of the m oral to the em pirical" failed. This is at the heart of most 
fears w ith  regard to EN: that it reduces the m oral to the em pirical or, pu t 
another way, that it equates w hat is (now) w ith w hat ought to be. But it is 
w ildly inaccurate to univocally characterize EN as having this goal; there are 
those w ho defend it, but Flanagan is more representative of the new  ethical 
naturalist m ovem ent in  clearly rejecting it.
As he says on the second page of his essay, naturalized ethics, like 
naturalized epistemology (and, I w ill argue later, naturalized economics, 
anthropology, sociology, etc.), has two components: a descriptive- 
genealogical-nomological ( d /g /n )  com ponent and a norm ative com ponent 
(EN 20).18 The d / g / n  component
will specify certain basic capacities and propensities of Homo sapiens, 
such as sym pathy, em pathy, egoism, and so on, relevant to m oral life. 
It w ill explain how people come to feel, think, and act about moral 
m atters in the way(s) they do. It w ill explain how and in w hat ways
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m oral learning, engagem ent, and response involve the emotions. It 
w ill explain w hat m oral disagreem ent consists of and why it occurs, 
and it will explain w hy people sometimes resolve disagreem ent by 
recourse to agreem ents to tolerate each other w ithout, however, 
approving of each other's beliefs, actions, practices, and  institutions. It 
w ill tell us w hat people are doing w hen they m ake norm ative 
judgm ents. And finally, or as a consequence of all this, it w ill try to 
explain w hat goes on w hen people try to educate the young, im prove 
the moral climate, propose moral theories, and so on. (20-21)
The norm ative com ponent w ill explain "w hy some norm s -  including those 
governing choosing norm s -  values, virtues, are good or better than  others" 
(21). Different strategies for selecting, systematizing, defending, and 
propagating norm s w ill be "evaluated pragm atically" (ibid). W hatever one's 
opinion of this conception of the role of norm ativity, it could hard ly  be m ade 
m ore clear that the ethical naturalist is not attem pting to "reduce" the 
norm ative to the descriptive. Indeed, the norm ative is given a distinct and 
indispensable place in  the theory.
At the end of an extended attack on cognitive science which, again, 
accuses it of trying to "reduce hum an experience to w hat can be explained 
scientifically," H eld states that "[t]he domains of literature and art, in 
facilitating im aginative identification w ith others, and in  provid ing  vicarious 
m oral experience, are at least as relevant to ethics as is science.... If ethics m ust 
choose betw een the perspectives of science and art, it should not reject art" 
(WA 75). This passage is rather rem arkable in that H eld comes very close to 
claim ing outright that ethics should reject science -  in  her essay, she 
progresses from  saying first that ethics should center on experience, second 
that the view points of science and experience (which art and literature
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provide vicariously) are incom patible, and third that if ethics has to choose, it 
"should not reject art." She cannot bring herself to reject science outright, but 
the sentim ent hovers about her essay.
Does EN ask us to choose betw een art and science? Consider this 
passage from  Flanagan:
Overall, the norm ative com ponent [of EN] involves the im aginative 
deploym ent of inform ation from any source useful to criticism, self 
a n d /o r  social exam ination, form ation of new or im proved norms, and 
values: im provem ents in  m oral educational practices, train ing of 
m oral sensibilities, and so on. These sources include psychology, 
cognitive science, all the hum an sciences, especially history and 
anthropology, as well as literature, the arts, and ord inary  conversation 
based on ordinary everyday observations about how  individuals, 
groups, communities, nation-states, the com m unity of persons, or 
sentient beings are faring. (EN 21-22)
Or: "W hat is relevant to ethical reflection is everything we know, everything 
we can bring  to ethical conversation that m erits attention: data  from  the 
hum an sciences, history, literature and the other arts, from  playing w ith 
possible w orlds in im agination, and  from  everyday com m entary on everyday 
events" (EN 35). This seems, on the surface, to be a clear statem ent that 
science is bu t one of m any sources of material for m oral reflection tapped by 
EN. H eld, however, sees through  such talk.
Philosophers influenced by cognitive science seem  to say we do not 
need to choose: we can use art and literature and anything else to 
provide data for m oral beliefs. But they in terpret a rt and literature as 
providing m aterial to be studied by science, w hereas an aim  of art may 
be to express a unique perspective or to escape scientific explanation.
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A nd art m ust often reflect a subjective point of view  not open to any 
observer. I agree we should not choose betw een art and  science, but 
that requires us to live w ith  incompatible views, not to reduce art -  or 
ethics -  to w hat can be studied by science and "accounted for" by causal 
explanation. (WA 75)
H eld give absolutely no support to the contention that ethical naturalists 
interpret art and literature as "providing m aterial to be studied  by science;" it 
is unclear w hat this can even mean. Science may attem pt to explain what 
goes on at the neural or cognitive level w hen someone "im aginatively 
identifies w ith  another" through  im m ersion in  art or literature, but no 
scientist claims to be able to explain the arts themselves. Indeed, this passage 
raises several questions that H eld makes no attem pt to answ er. H ow w ould 
one study a w ork of art "scientifically"? Exactly how w ould an artist set about 
creating a w ork of art w ith the aim  of "escaping scientific explanation," and 
w hat evidence is there that any artist has expressed such an  aim? And, how 
is it possible that art could reflect a point-of-view "not open to any observer"
-  does the production and dissem ination of art not by definition make the 
artist7s point-of-view accessible, at least to a degree? Isn 't that the point of art?
In the above passage it becomes p lain  that H eld is determ ined to view 
science as fundam entally at odds w ith subjective hum an experience and to 
view EN as scientistic, despite textual evidence to the contrary. But as the 
preceding passage by Flanagan should m ake clear, the ethical naturalist has 
no desire to "reduce" anything to scientific terms; in  fact, the goal is to draw  
from as broad a range of sources as possible, including but not limited to 
science, in the process of ethical reflection. The m aterial from  these sources 
will not exhaust the naturalist's moral theory, despite H eld 's claim -
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Flanagan states again and again that the descriptive underdeterm ines the 
norm ative, and that the norm ative is  indispensable.
W hen H eld engages actual thinkers, her strategy is no more charitable. 
First she spends a section refuting the "m oral realists" Peter Railton, Richard 
Boyd, and  Nicholas Sturgeon (WA 75-78). None of these thinkers refers to 
him self as an ethical naturalist, bu t Held labels them  as such anyway. She 
takes their strategy of inferring the metaphysical reality of m oral properties 
from  their usefulness in explanation as typical of EN, despite the fact that 
none of the avowed naturalists in Mind and Morals endorse the strategy.
W hen engaging authors who make specific cognitive scientific claims, 
her tactic is to either say "we already knew that" (in response to Alvin 
G oldm an's w ork on em pathy in  m oral behavior and  M ark Johnson's w ork 
on the use of m etaphor in  m oral reasoning) or "that doesn 't provide 
anything norm ative" (in response to G oldm an's and  Johnson's work, and to 
Paul C hurchland 's m oral netw ork theory of m oral learning) (78-82). She 
never explains why further scientific w ork should not be done in  these areas 
or why, despite their lack of norm ativity in  them selves, they cannot 
contribute to norm ative reflection.
Moral Philosophy
H eld thinks that there is and  should be a sharp  distinction betw een 
em pirical fields that describe phenom ena and m oral philosophy, which 
m akes recom mendations. The two should not be confused: "ethics is 
norm ative rather than descriptive" (WA 69, m y italics). She envisions a host 
of fields concerned w ith norm ativity; "In addition to ethics in its most 
general form, we need inquiries in all the more specific areas where ethical
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considerations should guide us.... we ought to have inquiries we could call 
m oral sociology, m oral psychology, m oral economics, m oral political science, 
m oral health  sciences, and  so on" (ibid). She concedes that the descriptive 
and  the norm ative w ill "interm ingle" in  these areas, and  that philosophers 
involved in them  should  be aw are of the relevant em pirical realities, but 
insists that in  these areas m oral philosophy "should set its ow n goals and 
recom m end that in  all these various fields we not only include a norm ative 
com ponent along w ith  everything else that is to be explained but that we give 
priority  to our norm ative aims.... The key is w hether w hat is prim arily being 
sought is causal explanation or m oral guidance" (70). M oral psychology, for 
instance, either seeks to explain how we d o develop m oral attitudes and 
m ake m oral judgm ents or it deals with how  we o ugh t to do so. If the latter, 
then it is not a branch of psychology, but rather, "it is a branch of moral 
philosophy... it is m oral philosophy of a particular kind..." (ibid).19
But we should be suspicious of this sharp a separation. It seems post 
hoc, m otivated m ore by H eld 's antipathy tow ards science (scientism?) and her 
eagerness to distance her occupation from  it than by close consideration of the 
actual w ork of m oral reflection and  recom m endation. To say that moral 
theory "sets its ow n agenda" and that any attem pt to recom m end lands one 
w ith in  m oral philosophy im plies two dubious suppositions: one, that 
em pirical inquiry  involves value-neutral description, and two, that m oral 
inquiry  involves fact-neutral recom m endation. We w ill take a closer look at 
these suppositions in  the next section. First, let's take a closer at H eld 's 
characterization of m oral philosophy and its sources.
I begin w ith a broad  thesis: there are two sources on which we can draw  
in  m oral reflection, the im m anent and the transcendental. The im m anent — 
the w orld, nature, stuff -  we describe in term s of our experience of it, and
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em pirical science is one form of such description.20 The transcendental -  
Reason, God, Truth, all the usual capitalized suspects -  is in  ill repute in 
today 's "disenchanted," "post-metaphysical" (pick your buzzw ord) world. 
Regardless of w hether the transcendental exists or w hether we can deduce 
practical m oral advice from  it, H eld presum ably has no w ish  to seek her 
justification there.
H eld responds to these kinds of considerations in  the following way. 
The distinction betw een "natural" and "supernatural" (what I have called 
"im m anent" and "transcendental") is "m isleading" and other distinctions are 
more useful: i.e., "the distinction betw een that w hich is specifically hum an 
and that w hich belongs to a natural w orld that w ould be m uch as it is w ith no 
hum ans in it, or the distinction betw een the subjective point of view of the 
conscious self and the objective point of view of the observer studying nature 
and the hum an beings in  it and seeking explanations of its events" (WA 85). 
Thus, she m ight say, we have a th ird  source for m oral inquiry  that I have 
missed: m oral experience, w hich is "distinctively hum an" rather than 
natural and  subjective rather than  objective.
As to the form er distinction: one tru th  that science from  D arw in 
forw ard urges on us is that the capacity for conscious experience is emergent 
from, and continuous with, low er level processes that are m ost certainly 
natural (even in  H eld 's sense). Furtherm ore, a central insight of EN, 
supported by empirical results in the natural and social sciences, is that moral 
experience is continuous w ith other kinds of experiences, including 
experiences (fear, territoriality, fellow-feeling) that are no t  distinctively 
hum an. It is (almost) certainly true that the self-conscious deliberation of 
homo sapiens is unique in the natural w orld; nevertheless, it seems odd to 
think that we can learn nothing about m oral experience from  the scientific
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study of the hum an animal. Moreover, it seems odd to think that know ledge 
about how  and  w hy we have m oral experiences w ill not help us im prove 
ourselves and  ou r m oral environm ent.
As to the latter distinction: H eld holds that practice should inform  
theory as w ell as vice versa, that sometimes "gut reactions," or im m ediate 
m oral im pulses, should lead us to revise ou r principles. She holds that "the 
m oral experience of disapproval or approval m a y  sometimes be independent 
of our beliefs, including our moral beliefs, at any given time, and that, indeed, 
we ought to decide w hat moral theories to believe  in conjunction w ith  the 
in dependen t  m oral experience to w hich such theories should be subjected" 
(FM 25). This is a form of Rawls' reflective equilibrium , but rather than 
balancing im m ediate judgm ents and principles, it balances im m ediate 
intuitions and principles. It am ounts to saying that we should trust our 
ethical im pulses, that we know in  our gut m ore than we can capture in  our 
stated beliefs. In other words, objective m oral norm s are beholden to 
subjective m oral experiences.
But the fact that our m oral experience extends beyond w hat we m ay be 
able to adequately capture in  linguistic form ulas is itself an objective 
empirical fact, one open to study. Indeed, Paul C hurchland's w ork on m oral 
netw orks gives a convincing explanation for w hy experience has this 
character.21 H eld w ould say of C hurchland 's neurobiological w ork that "it 
can give a causal account of our m oral experience, but it cannot provide 
anything norm ative." But the existence of subjective m oral experience 
provides nothing norm ative either, not in  itself. The fact that we have gut 
reactions does not in itself council us to heed them. If we decide to heed 
them, we ought to do so because we have good reason to think they will 
guide us effectively in practice, which is itself an empirical m atter. If there is
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an  em pirical scientific account that tells us how and w hy they exist, should 
we not learn  from  it? More generally, can we not learn about subjectivity 
through  objective empirical inquiry?
H eld 's division of the natural into the "as it w ould be w ithout 
hum ans" and the "distinctively hum an" m ay be useful for some purposes, 
bu t it obscures m ore than it reveals. M any of the vital philosophical insights 
of the last half of the 20th century (in, e.g., philosophy of m ind and language) 
are rooted in  the D arw inian acknowledgm ent that we are anim als, that the 
"distinctively hum an," which for centuries was taken to be metaphysically 
unique, is built on and constrained by a foundation of m uch older and more 
deeply rooted adaptive features that we share w ith creatures close to us on the 
phlyogenetic tree. H ow  "distinctively hum an" m oral experience may be is an 
em pirical m atter; H eld 's a priori disjunction betw een the hum an and the 
natural is unconvincing in and of itself, particularly as a m eans of excluding 
biology, evolutionary theory, and ethology from  m oral theory.
As for the distinction betw een subjective consciousness and objective 
scientific description, it is also useful for some purposes — for instance, it 
helps focus attention on the "hard problem " of consciousness itself — but it 
does not, in  itself, give us a principled reason to heed one and disregard the 
other in developing a m oral theory. To be fair, H eld acknowledges that we 
m ust, in  N agel's words, "hold the opposition clearly in  [our] m inds w ithout 
suppressing either element" (qtd. in  WA 73). But this "opposition," if 
in terpreted too strongly (as both Nagel and Held do, in  m y opinion) obscures 
the fact that hum an experience is a whole, not two m utually  exclusive 
perspectives, and  w hat we learn from  one perspective inevitably informs and 
affects the other. Despite her "m ore useful" distinctions, H eld has given us 
no reason to reject Flanagan's proposal that we should adm it "everything we
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know" into ethical discussion. In an attem pt to defend it from  dimly 
perceived threats, H eld defines moral philosophy too narrow ly, as no t  this or 
that other discipline, and thereby cuts it off from  the very sources that give it 
purchase in  the w orld  around us, the one w orld  we describe from  all our 
perspectives.
Descriptions and Recommendations
N ow  we can re tu rn  to the assum ption that seems to underlie H eld 's 
sharp division of the descriptive and norm ative fields of inquiry, or at least 
w ithout w hich it cannot stand as it is presented. That is the assum ption that 
they are functionally separable, that there exist norm -free descriptions and 
fact-independent recom m endations. Held agrees "that the line betw een fact 
and value is neither sharp  nor stable," bu t she holds that "there are im portant 
differences betw een clear cases of fact and clear cases of value" (WA 71). But 
this is a potentially m isleading way to phrase the issue. The contention of the 
pragm atist is not that there is a fuzzy, m oving line betw een tw o distinct 
categories, factual description and valuative recom m endation, bu t that the 
two are necessarily im plicated in each other.
1. Values in Facts
Any descriptive ontology or typology is m otivated by an interest, a 
purpose -  there are an indefinite num ber of w ays to d ivide reality, and doing 
so in one w ay rather than another reflects a value structure. This statem ent 
will trigger a variety of negative responses, so it requires some qualifications 
and explication.
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There are several things that I do n o t  m ean by this. I am  no t  
recom m ending idealism . The w orld that we d iv ide is real, bu t the fact 
rem ains that both  physiological structure and  socialization render certain 
features, boundaries, processes, and so on salient and  others invisible. 
M etaphysical realism  is compatible w ith  the realization that we are lim ited 
w ith regard  to the facets of reality of which we are capable of becoming aware.
I am  n o t  defending the notion of a "conceptual scheme" so w ell 
debunked by D onald Davidson.22 The notion w as m eant to capture 
differences am ong hum an cu ltu res/parad igm s, w hile the point I 'm  m aking is 
broader. W hat I am  highlighting is the relatively benign insight that different 
natural creatures live in  different quality spaces, spaces constrained in 
im portant w ays by physiological and (in some species) social traits. A  pigeon's 
color space is tetra-chrom atic; a hum an 's is tri-chromatic. M inute differences 
in w ind  currents go unnoticed by hum ans; bats take them  quite seriously (if I 
can presum e to guess w hat it's like to be a bat). Some species are highly aware 
of and responsive to the behavior of other m em bers of the species; some 
species' m em bers live lives of self-contained isolation.
A nd finally, I am  not  com m itting som ething analogous to H anfling 's 
"voluntaristic fallacy." We do not "decide" to inhabit one quality space rather 
than another; or, p u t another way, we do not decide w hat our fundam ental 
interests will be. (Again, this m ilitates against the notion of 
incom m ensurable conceptual schemes.) For instance, objects on a vertical 
axis are more perceptually salient to us than  objects on a tilted axis because we 
have a long-standing interest in  noticing objects (e.g., big hairy beasties) 
loom ing above us. O ur basic interests greatly predate our capacity to decide 
anything; centuries of evolution have "hard-w ired" certain traits and 
capacities into us, thereby fixing the param eters of our quality space. (Of
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course, sim ilar interests m ay lead to vastly different traits and quality spaces — 
contingency plays a large and frequently underappreciated  role in  evolution.) 
It m ight be objected that it is unwise to call these biologically-based interests 
"values;" the latter term  seems to im ply deliberative endorsem ent. But I 
m ean "values" in  a broad sense, as "regarding that w hich is better or worse 
relative to our well-being;" these values exist apart from  any conscious 
recognition or endorsem ent. In this sense, our descriptions of our 
environm ent are not value-neutral. Even the m ost seem ingly value- 
indifferent descriptions, such as those of astronom y, are traceable to (or side- 
effects of) discrim inations the capacity for w hich w as of use in  survival; this 
follows, I believe, from  evolutionary theory.23
H um ans are rem arkable, not only because our social spaces -- shaped by 
interests and  values about w hich we can make decisions — are so large and 
im portant in our lives, bu t because we are capable of suppressing or 
redirecting hard-w ired  interests (e.g., avoidance of pain) through force of will 
or unhappy socialization. We are not so rem arkable, how ever, that we can 
will ourselves to sm ell w ith the olfactory range of a dog or navigate by sonics 
like a bat — though hum ans are also rem arkable in  their ability to expand 
their quality spaces w ith scientific instrum ents.
The preceding is an  elaborate way of restating the basic philosophical 
point, now w idely accepted, that descriptions of reality are necessarily 
perspectival, situated in  a biological, cultural, and historical context. And, 
since our perspectives are conditioned by our interests, purposes, and values - 
- biological, social, and intellectual -- any description w ill be, in  a loose sense, 
"value-laden" (or "theory-laden," w hich am ounts largely to the same thing). 
Science's goal is to reduce this valuative elem ent as m uch as possible.
Thom as Kuhn became famous by pointing out that it is inelim inable, dashing
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the u top ian  hopes of (some) positivist philosophers of science.24 Of course, 
the debate still rages over w hether or how  closely hum ans can reach 
"objective" (construed as value-neutral) tru th  in  science. I p lan  to avoid this 
debate because 1) I do not believe that the theory-ladenness of our 
descriptions is particularly alarm ing or exciting, and 2) I th ink  it is clear that, 
w hatever the status of the "hard" sciences, the social sciences, as w ell as 
everyday "folk" descriptions, are clearly value-laden, and they are w hat is of 
m ost (n o t  exclusive) relevance to ethics, w hich is my focus here.
So, it seems clear that fact and value are implicated in one another, to 
varying degrees, more so w hen it comes to ethics. Held holds that there are 
differences betw een clear cases of fact and  clear cases of value. It is m ore 
appropriate  to say that descriptions of fact range from those arising from  
universally  shared  values25 to those that rest on more controversial values. 
Take H eld 's  example: "To know  the caloric intake per day that a child needs to 
survive is different from deciding that we m orally ought to provide these 
calories" (WA 71). It w ould be difficult indeed to find a hum an being who 
w as no t m otivated to distinguish  "enough food to survive" from  "less than 
enough." Nevertheless, we pick this fact out because we value (i.e., have an 
interest in) survival -- again, we do not "create" the fact in  a m etaphysical 
sense, nor do we "decide" to notice it, so it serves functionally as a "bare fact," 
bu t this should  not lead us to the conclusion that it is value-neutral. 
Furtherm ore, the fact that we are built to value survival is obviously relevant 
to (not, pace H eld 's caricature of EN, determ inant of) w hether we help 
another survive. I do not m ean to im ply that the two -  know ing m inim um  
caloric intake and deciding to provide it — are not different. It is true that they 
are different; the im portant question is how  so. What I am  claim ing is that 
the difference does not m ap onto a strict disjunction betw een fact and value.
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It w ould  be better to describe it as a difference between, in  Flanagan's terms, 
natural and  social psychological values im plicit therein.
So what? Will the natu ra l/socia l interest-reflection distinction not do 
the same w ork as H eld 's fact/value distinction? H eld 's concern is that values 
not be reduced to facts. If we rephrase the concern as desiring to avoid the 
reduction  of m ore controversial social interests to natural interests, is the 
concern not functionally the same? The answ er is yes and  no. We should 
keep in m ind that social interests are problem atic, debatable, subject to 
conversational and  theoretic alteration, while natural interests are, for 
practical purposes, fixed. EN should avoid the tem ptation to cast social 
interests as fixed in the same w ay as natural interests, as some radical m oral 
realists attem pt to do. But at the same time, rephrasing the distinction as one 
betw een natural and  social interests em phasizes the fact that w hat is at issue 
is not a dichotom y -- even one w ith an indistinct, shifting line separating the 
two -- bu t a continuum .
O n this continuum , social interests m ay lie at varying distances from  
fixed natu ra l interests. For instance, consider the com m unitarian concern 
that hum an beings require a (relatively) hom ogenous social fabric w ith  
shared traditions to flourish because persons are in  part constituted by the 
projects and  values represented in that fabric. A n overly heteronom ous or 
fragm ented fabric, the com m unitarians contend, w ill lead to disjointed, 
unanchored, m ildly schizophrenic persons. This is a socio-political concern, 
but it is tied to "facts," that is, the developm ental requirem ents of a healthy 
person arising from  natural psychological interests. A n example of a more 
shallow  social concern ("shallow" not in  the sense of unim portant, but 
sim ply closer to the social end of the natu ra l/socia l continuum ) is w hether or 
not handguns should be available to the public. It w ould be pointless to argue
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that banning  (or m aking available) handguns w ould violate natural 
psychological interests. The debate w ill m ake reference to practical, 
psychological, or social consequences, not to deep psychological traits or 
interests. H ow  m uch relevance our natural interests have to any particular 
norm ative concern is an em pirical m atter; it w ould  be m isguided, and indeed 
m orally irresponsible, to m inim ize factual, em pirical accounts of hum an life 
in  m oral theory on the basis of an a priori distinction betw een facts and 
values.
2. Facts in Values
H eld points out that "m oral assum ptions are necessarily being 
sm uggled into the social sciences unacknow ledged m uch of the tim e" (69), 
bu t she fails to note that the sm uggling trade thrives in  her ow n discipline as 
well. Empirical contraband finds its way into philosophy as well. Moral 
theory is a perspicuous example. Flanagan points out that v irtually  all noted 
m oral theories of the past have included testable em pirical assum ptions, 
beginning w ith Socrates' "he w ho know s the good does it" and proceeding all 
the way to the com m unitarians' notion that persons are constituted in  part by 
the goals and values of their com m unities (EN 21). In other w ords, a credible 
m oral theory has a d / g / n  as well as a norm ative com ponent. It is difficult to 
im agine a m oral theory that involves no such assum ptions, just as it is 
difficult to im agine an em pirical theory that involves no 
theoretical/ valuative assum ptions. O r rather, it is possible to im agine a 
m oral theory w ith m inim al em pirical assum ptions, bu t such a m oral theory 
w ill inevitably verge on vacuity.26 In fact, I will argue in the follow ing 
chapter that a m oral theory is useful just in so far as its d / g / n  com ponent
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reflects current and complete empirical understandings. To the extent that a 
m oral theory is independent of em pirical facts, it is correspondingly vacuous 
and unhelp fu l in  the m oral trenches.
III. C onclusion
I have argued that EN of the variety described by Flanagan escapes the 
criticisms traditionally leveled against it, criticisms generally based on the is- 
ought distinction. I have said that the logical objection — that is-statem ents 
and ought-statem ents are different in  logical k ind and thus im properly 
conjoined in  argum ent — is bankrupt, based  on an outm oded positivist 
conception of language as having a form al structure that prim arily  reflects or 
represents reality, though I have not argued overm uch in  support of this 
contention. I have argued more extensively against the pragm atic objection 
that m uddying  the distinction betw een is and ought is a bad  idea. In  doing so, 
I have focused on H eld 's essay "W hose Agenda?" While it m ay seem  that I 
have been picking on Held, and perhaps there is some tru th  to this, I have 
done so because I believe that her objections are reflective of w idely shared 
concerns about EN.
D ewey said that "m oral science is not som ething w ith a separate 
province. It is physical, biological, and historic know ledge placed in  a hum an 
context w here it will illum inate and guide the activities of m en" (qtd. in  EN 
35).27 Read charitably, this is a fine statem ent of m etaethical naturalism . It 
w ould  no doubt infuriate Held, first for its reference to a "science" of 
m orality, second because it seems on a surface reading to "reduce" m oral 
know ledge to empirical knowledge. Indeed, she says that
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D ew ey's ethics rem ain fundam entally unsatisfactory... because he 
thought m oral theory w as the sort of theory to w hich sciences like 
cognitive science could provide answers, He wrote as if m oral 
problem s sim ply present themselves and as if the tasks of m orality are 
to find em pirical solutions to such problem s. M oral problem s, 
however, do not sim ply present themselves. We decide to m ake 
certain em pirical situations into m oral problem s, to in terpret them  as 
m oral problem s. (WA 84-85)
Two things are w orth  m entioning here. First, H eld w rites as if empirical 
situations are static and  value free, and thus that the "decision" to 
problem atize an area comes de novo from a flash or m oral insight or 
revelation. The exam ple she gives is the confinem ent of w om en to 
household roles. Forty years ago, she says, very few people saw  this empirical 
situation as a m oral problem . Then "a few persons, later joined by others, 
m ade the norm ative as distinct from  em pirical judgm ent that it w as unjust," 
and things changed (85).
But this, it seems to me, is precisely the kind of simplistic, blinkered 
picture that results from  ignoring the way that em pirical realities are 
in tertw ined  w ith m oral space and create openings w ith in  it. To paint an 
adequate picture of the w om en's movem ent, one w ould  have to m ake 
reference to the vast num ber of w om en who entered the w orkplace in  WWII, 
to the prosperity that follow ed the w ar and the im proved educational and 
m aterial circumstances it b rought a generation of wom en, to the tension and 
successes of the civil rights m ovem ent, to the pop culture m ovem ents that 
em erged in  response to the Vietnam  War and other global upheavals, and to 
an  indefinite num ber of o ther complex em pirical circum stances.
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These "em pirical situations" -  economic, political, technological, and 
otherw ise — were fluid and rapidly  changing, not static. In  any society, 
particularly  one that has m oved at our speed for the past century, there are 
tensions as new  practices and mores begin to chafe the old. This friction 
creates new  problem s, challenges, and opportunities, m oral and otherwise. In 
the context of an extraordinarily complex and friction-filled era, (some) 
w om en became aw are of a grow ing tension betw een their economic and 
political freedom  and their confinement to the household. In  other words, 
w om en 's confinem ent began to present itself to some women as a problem, 
and they found and helped expand a social space for protest. Let me 
em phasize that I do n o t m ean to dow nplay the courage and m oral integrity of 
the heroines of the w om en's movem ent. It is sim ply the case that m oral 
practice is intim ately in tegrated w ith  "em pirical situations." One does not 
have to be a M arxian m aterialist or a determ inist to acknow ledge that moral 
judgm ent does not appear de novo; it arises in  dialectic w ith  m aterial 
circumstances, as often ad hoc or post hoc as initiatory. This suggests that the 
m orally aw are and concerned w ould do w ell to m ake them selves intim ately 
fam iliar w ith  em pirical circumstances.
The second thing w orth  m entioning is that, in  the passage from  Dewey 
quoted above, everything turns on w hat is m eant by placing physical, 
biological, and historic know ledge (to w hich Flanagan adds know ledge from 
the social sciences, from art and  literature, and  from  everyday conversation) 
"in a hum an context." H eld interprets this as m eaning that know ledge from  
these other areas will "provide answers" to m oral questions, w hich are 
em pirical in nature, and she takes this to be a reduction of the norm ative to 
the empirical. But the "hum an context" is one of open-ended possibility; in 
recom m ending our future course, we are always faced w ith a range of
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possibilities that accord w ith w hat we know empirically. We need 
em pirically-tested norms, to be sure, but the empirical w ill always 
underdeterm ine the norm ative. This is why Dewey says empirical 
know ledge "illum inates" conduct — illum ination and determ ination are 
crucially different. That this is so clearly true makes H eld 's  w orry over the 
alleged disappearance of the norm ative seem peculiar, particularly as a 
m otivation to isolate m oral theory from the disciplines w ith w hich it 
desperately needs to engage in dialogue. It may be that the arrangem ent of 
disciplines in the academ y needs reordering, but this w orry is more structural 
than m oral theoretical (perhaps Held needs to have a talk  w ith  her dean).
My argum ents in this chapter have been prim arily  negative. I have 
attem pted to defend EN against common objections, and in  doing so I have 
focused almost exclusively on w hat EN is not. First, I argued that the sciences 
of w hich EN makes use are not the cold-hearted, positivistic, anti-social, anti- 
subjective beasts that H eld paints them  as. Second, I argued that EN's 
relationship to these sciences is not one of uncritical servitude; it draw s on 
them  (along w ith other sources) in form ulating its d / g / n  component, but it 
retains a space for distinctively norm ative reflection on  the conviction that 
em pirical descriptions underdeterm ine valuative conclusions. Third, I 
argued that, in response to a dim ly-perceived threat to the very existence of 
the norm ative, H eld  distinguishes m oral philosophy too sharply from  other 
types of inquiry; in  fact, she has given us no good reason not to draw  on 
sciences to the degree that seems appropriate. W hat degree that is will be 
determ ined by m ore fine-grained considerations -- the question should not be 
decided on the basis of an a priori distinction betw een the "distinctively 
hum an" and the natural or betw een the subjective and the objective. Finally, 
I argued that H eld presents too large a chasm betw een description and
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recom m endation, betw een facts and values. Facts and values are in  fact 
im plicated in  one another to varying degrees, both in  em pirical descriptions 
and in  m oral recom m endations. M oral philosophers should be aw are of this 
but not disturbed by it. The dialectic betw een facts and values is characteristic 
of hum an experience, and  the relationship is intim ate and potentially 
m utually  fruitful.
In the following chapter, I w ill present a more positive picture of what 
EN is. I will attem pt to m ake it an attractive and viable option, arguing that 
naturalism  in ethics is both more realistic and m ore pragm atic. Com pared to 
classical m oral theory, EN more closely reflects our situation in  the w orld  and 
is productive of more helpful and fine-grained strategies for 
recom m endation .
C hapter Two 
Ethical N aturalism  in  A ction
In the preceding chapter I defended EN against common 
objections: that it (allegedly following the physical sciences) disregards 
subjective experience and that it reduces the norm ative to the 
empirical. Everything rides on w hat is m eant in  this latter phrase by 
the term s "reduce" and "empirical." H eld takes "em pirical" to m ean 
that w hich is studied by science, in which phenom ena are accessible to 
any observer, effects are replicable, and conclusions are quantifiable.
O n this interpretation of "empirical," the charge against EN is sim ply 
false. Flanagan explicitly points out that EN draw s on "everything we 
know," from  science to art to ordinary conversation. A nything 
relevant to the problem s an agent or com m unity faces in  attem pting to 
live well is taken into account in  m oral reasoning. If "em pirical" is 
in terpreted m ore broadly, in James' "radical” sense, to m ean 
som ething like "of experience," then the em pirical is indeed the sole 
source and focus of the ethical naturalist's claims. It is only in situated 
experience that problem s and problem -solving skills emerge; this fact 
deflates the special status that m odem  m oral philosophers gave to 
transcendental forces, structures, and principles. EN holds that 
reasoning, m oral and otherwise, emerges in and is conditioned by 
biological and social history; it is context-bound, not transcendental. 
M orality is not based on ahistorical features of hum an nature or of 
reality, features that we access and obey in  opposition to our natural, 
evolved anim al instincts -- we are entirely anim als, and w hatever 
skills we use in gaining and applying moral know ledge are skills
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available to anim als like us. If "empirical" is in terpreted broadly  as "of 
experience," then EN does not object to the charge that it "reduces" 
m orality to the empirical — though reduction is a m isleading way to 
describe it, since little is lost bu t transcendental m oorings.
In this chapter, I will not give an exhaustive account of EN, first 
because such a task requires more space than I have and second because 
EN can not easily be sum m arized as a set of principles. It is 
illum inated in  action, in application. Thus, in this chapter I w ill 
review a case, an application of EN, in the hopes that it w ill show more 
than a sum m ary could. I w ill focus on Paul Church land 's "m oral 
netw ork theory" (MNT — the nam e comes from  Flanagan), w hich is an 
excellent example of the kind of account of m orality favored by the 
naturalist. The chapter will proceed as follows: first, I w ill briefly 
recount the role of rules in m odern m oral philosophy and their 
subsequent slide into ill repute; second, I will review  some recent 
cognitive science — and C hurchland 's application of it to ethics — that 
casts serious doubt on both the epistemological and regulatory role of 
rules in m oral action; and third, I will defend EN against some general 
philosophical objections and. MNT against some m ore specific 
objections. The first section is m eant sim ply to point out the 
bankruptcy of m odern moral philosophy. The second is m eant to 
serve as an example of the interplay betw een m oral theory and 
cognitive science, and in a m ore ancillary way, the interplay betw een 
m oral theory and other areas of inquiry generally. The th ird  is m eant 
to circum vent criticisms that MNT elicits in  order to pave the w ay for 
the following chapter, in  which I w ill explore w hat I take to be some of 
the consequences of MNT and EN generally.
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I. R ules in  M odem  M oral Philosophy
In her sem inal 1958 paper, "M odern M oral Philosophy,"28 
G.E.M. Anscom be advances the thesis that philosophers should  cease 
doing m oral philosophy until it can be done profitably. She says that 
the differences am ong (English speaking) m oral philosophers from  
Sidgwick on  are insignificant and that the entire prevailing fram ew ork 
of m oral philosophy should be jettisoned. W hence come these 
provocative theses?
Anscom be points out that m odern  m oral philosophy is centered 
around the concepts of m oral duty and m oral obligation, w hich are 
closely tied to rules; rules imply duties and create obligations. Duty and 
obligation acquired a distinctively m oral sense in  the following way: 
'T h e  ordinary  (and quite indispensable) term s 'sh o u ld / 'n e e d s / 'o u g h t/ 
'm ust' acquired this special sense by being equated in the relevant 
contexts w ith  'is obliged/ or 'is b o u n d / or 'is required to /  in  the sense 
in  w hich one can be obliged or bound by law, or som ething can be 
required by law" (MMP 5). Anscombe traces the use of du ty  and 
obligation (in the "special" m oral sense) in m oral philosophy to 
Christianity and  its notion of divine law, borrow ed from  the Torah.
"In consequence of the dom inance of Christianity for m any centuries, 
the concepts of being bound, perm itted, or excused became deeply 
em bedded in our language and thought" (ibid). Belief in  divine law  
has w aned, Anscombe says, but the notions of m oral duty and 
obligation live on.
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In civil law, the state is the law-giver. But who or w hat is the 
law -giver in  the m oral dom ain? Anscombe spends her article 
canvassing alternatives. The Christian god fell into d isrepu te  during 
the E nlightenm ent and  rem ains there, so m odern m oral philosophers 
have attem pted in various w ays to find a source for the m oral law, the 
m oral ought, outside of the divine. Anscombe discounts the major 
alternatives, from  Butler's conscience to K ant's self-legislation (an 
internal vote that always has a 1-0 result) to M ill's p leasure principle. 
She concludes that the notion of m oral obligation has sim ply outlived 
the legalistic fram ew ork that m ade it coherent, as though  "the notion 
'crim inal' w ere to rem ain w hen criminal law  and crim inal courts had 
been abolished and forgotten" (6). "Ought" has become "a w ord 
retaining the suggestion of force, and apt to have a strong psychological 
effect, but which no longer signifies a real concept at all" (8). Hum e 
d isturbed m any m oral philosophers by show ing that m oral obligations 
could not be derived from  facts, bu t as Anscombe points out, "this 
w ord 'o u g h t/ having become a w ord  of mere m esmeric force, could 
not, in  the character of having that force, be inferred from  anything 
whatever" (8). It is "because 'm orally w rong' is the heir of [the concept 
of divine law], but an heir that is cut off from  the fam ily of concepts 
from  w hich it sprang, that 'm orally w rong' both  goes beyond the mere 
factual description^] a n d  seems to have no discernible content except a 
certain compelling force, which I should call purely psychological" (18, 
italics in  original).
Several m oral philosophers since have noted the same feature 
of m odern m oral theory. In a discussion of categorical im peratives, or 
"binding" m oral commands, Philippa Foot explores how  such
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im peratives come to acquire the "special dignity and necessity" that 
Kant ascribed them .29 Philosophers continue to speak of 
"unconditional requirem ents;" "they tell us w hat we have to do 
w hatever our interests or desires, and by their inescapableness they are 
d istinguished from  hypothetical im peratives" (HI 308). Like 
Anscombe, Foot concludes that none of the standard ways of 
explaining the inescapableness of m oral rules is convincing, and like 
Anscom be, she concludes that the force of m oral com m ands has 
become prim arily  psychological (311-312). As agents come to perceive 
the em ptiness of the claim that m oral rules are "categorical," as m any 
in  contem porary m oral philosophy are, they m ay also come to 
disrespect m oral theory entirely. Thus, she says, we should abandon 
the persisten t fantasy that m oral judgm ents have some intrinsic, 
inescapable claim  on our attention.
The conclusion we should d raw  is that m oral judgm ents have 
no better claim to be categorical im peratives than  do statem ents 
about m atters of etiquette. People m ay indeed follow either 
m orality or etiquette w ithout asking why they should do so, but 
equally well they may not. They m ay ask for reasons and m ay 
reasonably refuse to follow either if reasons are not to be found. 
(312)
Richard Taylor follows Anscom be in  tracing the m odern  m oral 
notions of du ty  and obligation to religious divine law .30 "In the 
absence of legal prohibitions one can commit hom icide, bu t not 
m urder; one can enter upon, but not trespass; can occupy, but not own; 
can take, bu t not steal. All such pairs of actions differ, it is obvious, 
on ly  w ith  respect to the existence or non-existence of law s prohibiting
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them " (AWMF 61, italics in  original). However, m odern  moral 
theorists continue to refer to m oral rules w ithout citing the authority 
from  w hich these rules issue. This, Taylor asserts, happens because "it 
is fair to say we do n o t  know  where they are supposed to come from or 
how  they are to be know n" (62, italics in  original). In  the absence of 
some authority, "it is difficult to see how  the m oral law s or principles 
upon w hich such distinctions m ust rest can be presum ed to exist at all" 
(63). Taylor again follows Anscombe in concluding that m odern moral 
philosophy is bankrupt.
Philosophers can, to be sure, make up m oral principles, to their 
hearts' content, and have in  fact done so w ith  great abandon.
The result is that w e have a wide selection from  w hich to 
choose, ranging from  the categorical im perative of Kant to the 
greatest happiness principle of Mill. Or we can do w hat these 
authors have done and fabricate some new  ru le  of our own, one 
that w ill enable us to praise as 'm orally righ t' those actions we 
happen  to approve of and to condem n as 'w rong ' those we 
happen to dislike. But to note this is, I believe, equivalent to 
saying once more that, there is no such thing as philosophical 
ethics, if that discipline is supposed to be concerned w ith the 
ideas of moral right and wrong and m oral obligation. (Ibid, 
italics in  original)
W hat, then, is to be done (assuming we still w ant to do m oral 
philosophy)? Anscombe hints at two different avenues for moral 
philosophy to take. The first is that we use the w ord  "ought" "in a 
non-em phatic fashion, and not in a special 'm oral sense'" (MMP 15); 
the second is that we look to hum an virtues and vices for moral
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guidance rather than rules distinguishing "right" action from  "wrong" 
(14-15).
Taylor adopts the second suggestion and advocates a retu rn  to 
the m oral philosophy of the ancients; in this, he echoes a host of 
contem porary virtue theorists. Virtue theorists reject rule-based 
m oralities, for (broadly speaking) two reasons. The first is described 
above: rules m ake no sense w ithout rule-givers, and there is no 
plausible candidate for the role of m oral rule-giver. The second reason 
is that the m oral dom ain includes both the public and the private; that 
is, it includes considerations of how to balance com peting interests, 
d ivide resources, and adjudicate conflicts, as well as considerations of 
how  to understand oneself, how  to relate well to one's friends and 
family, and how to be, in a broad sense, happy.31 In short, the moral 
dom ain embraces the whole hum an life. Even aside from  the 
difficulties w ith  rules discussed above, rules plausibly apply only to the 
interpersonal sphere. No one has offered or defended universal rules 
w ith regard  to how  to understand  oneself, how to integrate one's self- 
image w ith  descriptions of oneself offered by others, or how  to make 
and keep good friends. M odern m oral theorists focused exclusively on 
rules only by excluding the private; thus, according to virtue theory, 
rule-based m oralities are radically insufficient.
EN follows virtue theory in  conceiving of the m oral dom ain as 
inclusive of hum an life generally. It also follows virtue theory in 
focusing prim arily on character, on the physiological, psychological, 
and  social prerequisites of a morally praiseworthy person. As Aristotle 
pointed out, a person w ith  a virtuous character has the practical 
w isdom  to perceive the proper course of action in a broad variety of
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situations. A nd finally, EN echoes virtue theory 's suspicion of rule- 
based m orality, particularly the variety that offers universal rules. 
Abstract rules inevitably fall short of the flexibility, usefulness, and 
situation-sensitivity of practical wisdom . These features of EN w ill 
become clear in the following two sections.32
W hat of Anscom be's first, less-fully-articulated suggestion, that 
we use the w ord "ought" "in a non-em phatic fashion, and not in  a 
special 'm oral sense"' (MMP 15)? Philippa Foot explores this option in 
her article "M orality as a System of H ypothetical Im peratives." As the 
title indicates, she suggests that we abandon the notion of a "categorical 
im perative," conceived as a m oral rule that is exceptionless, 
inescapable, and intrinsically reason-giving. Instead, she says, w e 
should  conceive of m oral rules as hypothetical imperatives, practical 
principles for action that are tied, like all practical principles, to the 
. achievem ent of goals or fulfillm ent of interests. Kant found this 
alternative unthinkable because, as he p u t it in  Critique of Practical 
Reason, "all m aterial practical principles are, as such, of one and the 
same kind and belong under the general principle of self love or one's 
ow n happiness" (qtd. in  HI 313). Kant believed that all non-m oral 
principles are self-serving and hedonistic. This belief has persisted 
under the surface of almost all m oral philosophy since.
However, this psychological profile of hum anity is false — it is 
belied not only by contemporary psychology, but by simple observation 
of art, literature, and day-to-day life. It is evident that people have 
interests and goals that extend beyond narrow  self-interest: the welfare 
of family, friends, and communities, hum an and biotic. It is sim ply 
im plausible that the psychological force of m oral comm ands (recall
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Anscombe and Foot's point that psychological force is the only way of
explaining the perceived inescapableness of such commands) has alone
led to actions on behalf of comm unities beyond the self. H um an
beings have w hat H um e called "fellow -feeling/' w hat W ilfrid Sellars
calls "we-intentions," intentions that necessarily involve social
coord ination .33 O n Foot's conception of m orality, m oral rules will
reflect "w hat we do" and will presum e that the subject shares "our"
group intentions, values, and goals. M oral progress will involve
expanding our m oral comm unity, extending our fellow-feeling to
those that have been heretofore excluded.34 This notion causes anxiety
am ong those attracted to transcendental foundations for morality.
They fear that w e cannot depend on others sharing our benevolent
intentions; they w ant the concept of "duty" to do the w ork that we-
intentions cannot do. Foot replies: "Perhaps we should be less troubled
than we are by fear of defection from the m oral cause; perhaps we
>
should even have less reason to fear it if people thought of themselves 
as volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against 
inhum anity and oppression" (HI 315-16). This suggests, like 
Anscom be's second suggestion, that we pay close attention to and 
cultivate the virtues, for it is a virtuous person that cares about and  for 
her com m unity.
In the fourth section, I will argue that m oral rules and 
principles, construed as hypothetical im peratives, do and should play 
an im portant role in  our collective m oral life. I argue this in contrast 
to some strains of virtue theory and, indeed, in contrast to some strains 
of EN. The place of rules and principles in  m oral life should be 
reconceived, but not trivialized. Before that, however, I will review
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some w ork in  cognitive science that lends support to Anscombe's 
condem nation of rule-centered m orality.
II. Prototypes: Reasoning as Pattern Recognition
There has been a small explosion in recent years of w ork at the 
intersection of cognitive science and ethics.35 Like any fledgling area of 
philosophy, this w ork is characterized by alternating m om ents of 
hesitancy and bravado, pervaded by high hopes. Cognitive scientific 
discoveries about the role of em pathy, sim ulation, and  im agination in  
cognition and learning have been applied to m oral theory, w ith  m ixed 
results. I w ill not attem pt a review  of all the literature, w hich is 
diverse; rather, I w ill focus on the recent speculations of Paul 
Churchland, specifically w ith regard to m orality. Since thoroughly 
sum m arizing the details of connectionist cognitive science w ould  take 
up  a prohibitive am ount of space, at some points I w ill refer the reader 
to outside literature. My intent here is suggestive rather than 
dem onstrative. I w ant to show how  EN m akes use of know ledge from  
other inquiries; the plausibility of EN should not be seen to rest on the 
plausibility of C hurchland 's conjectures.
Connectionist Networks
C hurchland 's m oral speculation is based, like m uch w ork in 
current cognitive science, on connectionism .36 A ndy Clark offers this 
brief sum m ary of connectionist, or parallel d istributed processing 
(PDP), networks:
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[Connectionist] netw orks consist of a complex of units (simple 
processing elements ) and  connections. The connections m ay be 
positive or negative valued (excitatory or inhibitory). The 
features of a stim ulus are coded as num erical values 
(corresponding to the intensity of the feature or the degree to 
w hich it is present) across a designated group of units. These 
values are then differentially propagated through the netw ork 
courtesy of the positive or negative connection weights. A good 
assignm ent of w eights is one that ensures that activity in 
designated output units corresponds to some target input-output 
function. Several layers of units m ay intervene betw een input 
and output. The activity of the units in each such layer will 
generally correspond to some kind of recoding of the input data 
that simplifies further processing. It is often fruitful to take each 
unit of such an intervening ("hidden") layer as one dim ension 
of an acquired representational state space and to investigate the 
way the system  responds to specific inputs by creating patterns of 
activity that define locations in this space (h idden unit 
activation space).37 
Connectionist netw orks of this type have been built, w ith  positive 
results that outstripped expectations.38 Learning rules have been 
developed that allow them  to alter their ow n connection weights, and 
thus, in  a sense, to learn from  experience. They differ from  the 
"classical" m odel of cognitive architecture in several ways. For one 
thing, representations are d ispersed throughout the netw ork, not 
w ritten  out in a program m ing language. Processing is not serial, w ith 
one operation being perform ed at a time — the von-N eum ann m odel,
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on w hich all personal computers are based at present -  but parallel, 
w ith d ispersed connections being altered in  tandem . A nd the netw orks 
learn by practice, by comparing outputs w ith target outputs, rather than 
having explicit rules program m ed into them  by their creators. Based 
both on philosophical considerations and experim ental results, there is 
good reason to believe that the hum an brain  works on the m odel of 
massively parallel distributed processing.39
The learning process engaged in  by such a netw ork results in 
"high-dim ensional state spaces w ith  associated semantic metrics" (CPS 
112). The state space is high-dim ensional in that the connections and 
levels of connections possible in a netw ork  increases exponentially 
w ith the num ber of sim ple processing units. (The num ber of possible 
connections betw een neurons is estim ated to exceed the num ber of 
atom s in the know n universe.) The term  "sem antic m etric" is m eant 
to em phasize the geometric nature of representation; roughly, it refers 
to a m ulti-dim ensional pattern  of connections that is com pleted or 
extended by new  inputs. A path  across state space is a "vector."
W ith  this picture in  m ind, we now  tu rn  to reasoning. Clark 
notes four features of the learning process that results in such high­
dim ensional state spaces.
1. It is exem plar-driven.
2. It is not bound by the sim ilarity metric on the input vector.
3. It yields prototype-style representations.
4. It treats inference and reasoning as vectorial transform ations
across state spaces. (CPS 112)
First, connectionist netw orks are exem plar-driven. A netw ork 
designed for the recognition of facial expressions, for instance, does not
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operate according to rules regarding recognition — e.g., "partially-closed 
eyes indicate sleepiness." Rather, it learns through repeated exposure 
to faces. It begins — first random ly, unless it is built w ith  initially biased 
connection w eights40 — to encode features of faces as patterns, or state 
spaces, and offer output. It then proceeds by com paring its actual 
output to the targeted output and altering its synaptic connections to 
move the two closer. This is not speculation; EMPATH is a facial 
recognition connectionist netw ork developed by G arrison Cottrell and 
Janet Metcalfe. Churchland sum m arizes the results:
On a training set of (8 emotions X 20 faces =) 160 photos in all, 
and after 1000 presentation of the entire training set, the network 
reached high levels of accuracy on the four positive emotions 
(about 80%), bu t very poor levels on the negative emotions, w ith 
the sole exception of anger, which was correctly identified 85% of 
the time. (ERSS 125)
Though EMPATH is a poor perform er relative to an  average hum an, it 
is w orth pointing out that its strengths (the positive em otions and 
anger) and weaknesses (the negative emotions other than  anger) m ap 
isom orphically onto those of the average hum an.41 Here, the point is 
that EMPATH was not provided w ith any rules to follow in executing 
its task; it learned purely through exposure to exem plars and feedback 
about its perform ance.
Second, the netw ork is "not bound by the sim ilarity metric on 
the input vector." This m eans that the netw ork can learn to store 
sim ilar inputs (think of the attractive person across the room  smiling 
at you versus smiling at the person behind you) into drastically 
different categories, or dissim ilar inputs (think of a custom er bursting
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in  w ith  a shotgun versus slipping you a w ritten  robbery dem and) into 
the same category. 'T he  state space defined by the h idden  units m ight 
thus come to reflect a m oral metric, whereas the input space depicted a 
visual one" (CPS 113).
Third, the netw ork "yields prototype-style representations." 
Prototypes are discussed in  the following section in  some detail, as they 
are central to Churchland's account.
Fourth, in a PDP netw ork, inference and reasoning are 
conceived of as "vectorial transform ations across state spaces." One 
associates a pattern  w ith another pattern  by connecting the tw o in  
representational space. That is to say, reason and inference are 
"processes of pattern  completion and pattern  extension" (114). 
Intelligent, situated reasoning involves skillfully m oving from  one 
state space to another and linking appropriate spaces together into 
higher-level associative patterns (think of learning to associate a 
certain type of crispness in the air w ith coming rain). Reasoning is 
decisively n o t , on this model, a process of applying rules to situations 
that fall under their scope. Instead, it is a process of beating dow n a 
neural pa th  through the underbrush  (as it were) betw een one pattern  
of features and another, and thereby developing the practical skills to 
recognize patterns and respond appropriately.
Prototypes
W hat of prototypes? Prototypes are best understood in contrast 
to concepts on the "classical view," as it is know n in cognitive science. 
The classical m odel of concepts holds that w ords/concepts are
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characterized by definitions "that specify individually  necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions for the application of the w ord" (ECS 338). 
On this m odel, an instance either is or is not subsum able under a 
particular concept, depending on w hether it has the necessary and 
sufficient features. But the prototype m odel suggests that the edges are 
fuzzy. Over a period of exposure, the netw ork "extracts the so-called 
central tendency of the body of exemplars, that is, a complex of 
common, co-occurring features" (CPS 113). Such a complex constitutes 
a prototype.
Prototypes are constructed according to the frequency, or 
"typicality," of certain central features. A particular exemplar, then, can 
fall closer or farther away in state space from  the prototype, depending 
on the num ber of features the exem plar shares w ith  the "central 
tendency." That concepts have this structure is supported by 
experim ental results in cognitive science. So-called "typicality ratings" 
"predict perform ance in  a wide variety of tasks. If subjects are asked to 
decide as quickly as possible w hether an item  is an instance of a concept 
(e.g., I s  a fig a fruit?')/ they are faster the m ore typical the instance. 
A nother task is m em ory retrieval. If asked to generate from  memory 
all instances of a concept, subjects retrieve typical before atypical 
instances" (ECS 339). As Goldm an points out:
These typicality effects seem inhospitable to the classical view. 
They suggest that not all instances of a natural kind concept are 
equal; yet equality is w hat one m ight expect if every instance met 
the same definition of the necessary-and-sufficient-conditions 
type. This argum ent is strengthened by the additional finding 
that virtually all the properties listed by subjects as relevant to a
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concept are not strictly necessary, for example, the property  of 
being sweet for fru it or the properties of flying and  singing for 
bird. (Penguins don 't fly and vultures d o n 't sing.) Similar 
findings apply to other concepts, including artifact concepts such 
as "furniture" or "clothing."
A single netw ork can sim ultaneously encode for several such 
complexes of features; these complexes, or prototypes, are "each coded 
for by distinct patterns of unit activation and hence determ ine different 
locations in a general state space whose dim ensionality corresponds to 
the num ber of processing units" (CPS 113).
A prototype should not be confused w ith  an exem plar in  the 
norm ative sense — that is, an excellent particular specim en. N or 
should it be confused w ith "the ideal specimen." It is a bundle  of 
features, some of which, in some cases, may be im possible to realize 
sim ultaneously in the same instance. It groups features by their 
frequency (and thus their repeated role in w eight-adjustm ent); thus, 
two features that are equally frequent bu t never co-existent m ay lie 
equally close to the center of the prototypical state space. Again, it 
should be em phasized that a prototype is different in  significant ways 
from  a concept in  the classical sense, the most im portant for the 
present purpose being that an exemplar is not recognized by applying a 
rule regarding certain necessary and sufficient conditions. It is 
recognized by its proxim ity to a prototype, a pattern  of m ost-frequent 
features; "this, after all, is the point of having concepts: to allow  us to 
deal appropriately w ith  the always novel bu t never-entirely-novel  
situations flowing endlessly tow ard us from  an  open-ended future" 
(E R S S145).42
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Moral Network Theory
It is easy to see the application of connectionist-style learning to 
cases such as a subm arine radar learning to identify and avoid mines, 
and  perhaps even for a hum an being learning to identify and avoid 
poisonous plants. But w hat of morality? W hat of a hum an being 
learning to  identify  and avoid, say, em otional m anipulation? O r 
disrespect, or injustice? C hurchland's som ew hat startling theses are 
first, that
...an exam ination of how neural netw orks sustain scientific 
understand ing  reveals that the role of learned prototypes and 
their continual redeploym ent in  new  dom ains of phenom ena is 
central to the scientific process. Specific rules or "laws of nature" 
play an undeniably im portant bu t nonetheless secondary role, 
m ostly in the social business of com m unicating or teaching 
scientific skills. One's scientific understanding  is lodged 
prim arily  in  one's acquired hierarchy of structural and  
dynam ical prototypes, not prim arily in a set of linguistic 
fo rm ulas.43
The second thesis is that gram m atical know ledge m ay also be 
em bodied in a hierarchy of prototypes, rather than a list of gram m atical 
rules (NRSW 100).44 (After all, children learn language w ith or 
w ithout instruction in  its formal rules.) The th ird  thesis is that m oral 
perception and m oral behavior also operate on the prototype m odel.
W hat follows from  these three theses is a unified picture of 
hum an perception and behavior; w hether in the scientific,
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gram m atical, or m oral dom ain, the neural netw orks deployed by 
hum an beings extract patterns from  their environm ent and  encode 
them  in  high-dim ensional representational space. Both effective 
perception and effective action involve initiating the p roper prototype 
vector.
Before I fill out C hurchland 's MNT in  m ore detail, it is w orth 
noting two broad philosophical characteristics. First, it is thoroughly 
pragmatic: "the quality of one's know ledge is m easured not by any 
uniform  correspondence betw een internal sentences and external facts, 
bu t by the quality of one's continuing performance;" w hat the child 
learns th rough  m oral experience is "the structure o f  social space and 
how best to navigate one's way through it. W hat the child is learning 
is practical w isdom : the wise adm inistration of her practical affairs in a 
complex social environm ent."45 Proper m oral action is tied directly to 
practical affairs, in contrast to m odern m oral philosophy 's sharp divide 
betw een prudential considerations — w hich were taken to reflect self- 
interest only — and m oral concerns. On this m odel, m oral skills are 
among, and  the same in  kind as, other skills necessary for "wise 
adm inistration of practical affairs." Secondly, MNT is thoroughly 
naturalist. M oral reasoning is conceived as a natural skill that makes 
use of evolved biological and social capacities.
H ow  m ight the prototype m odel of perception and  action be 
applied to morality? Children acquiring m oral skills learn, on the 
m odel of MNT, not from  being taught rules of conduct, bu t from  being 
exposed to a variety of social situations.
Children come to see certain distributions of goodies as a fair  or
unfair distribution. They learn to recognize that a found object
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m ay be som eone's property, and that access is lim ited as a result. 
They learn  to discrim inate unprovoked cruelty , and to dem and 
or expect punishm ent for the transgressor and comfort for the 
victim. They learn to recognize a breach o f promise, and to howl 
in protest. They learn to recognize these and a hundred  other 
prototypical social/m oral situations, and the ways in  which the 
em bedding society generally reacts to those situations and 
expects them  to react. (N P  299, italics in original)
In other w ords, children come to recognize features of social space in 
the same way they come to recognize features of physical space, and 
learn to navigate social space accordingly.
W hat does this reveal about linguaform  rules and principles? It 
reveals that
...our indiv idual moral know ledge and reasoning m ay not be 
fully reconstructible in the linguistic space afforded by public 
language, moral dialogue, and  discussion.... Given the size of the 
brain 's resources, the expressive capacity of biologically realistic 
inner systems looks unim aginably huge. The attem pt to 
condense the moral expertise encoded by such a system  into a set 
of rules and principles that can be economically expressed by a 
few sentences of public language m ay thus be w ildly optimistic, 
akin to trying to reduce a dog 's olfactory skills to a small body of 
prose. (CPS 114)
As Churchland points out, the preceding point is not only true of our 
m oral know ledge. Consider facial recognition: hum an beings are 
experts at reading one another's faces, bu t who am ong us can 
sum m arize in a body of guidelines the complex feature-recognition
61
skills at work? Churchland contends that this "cognitive priority of the 
preverbal over the verbal shows itself, upon  exam ination, to be a 
feature of alm ost all of our cognitive categories" (ERSS  144).
The point has significant im plications for m orality. The hum an 
neural netw ork  is one of alm ost unfathom able complexity and 
dim ensionality. The space afforded for nuanced know ledge about 
various features of our environm ent is virtually unlim ited. But the 
resources of m oral theory — linguistic sum m ary of m oral know ledge — 
are lim ited in  a host of ways. It is a commonplace of day-to-day life, 
though one that m odern m oral philosophy has led  us to view  w ith  
displeasure, that m oral reasoning "may issue in  judgm ents that are by 
no m eans irrational but yet resist quasi-deductive linguistic 
reconstruction as the conclusion of some m oral argum ent that takes 
sum m ary expressions of m oral rules and principles as its prem ises" 
(CPS 114-15). -When m orality is reconceived as a skill, a m atter of 
know -how  rather than a dom ain of facts reflected in  a body of 
fundam ental premises, the point that language m ay fail to capture 
m oral know ledge is unsurprising. The best carpenters, the best cooks, 
the best dancers, the best basketball players, the best writers, the best 
scientists — none can fully capture w hat it is that constitutes their 
respective excellences in a set of propositions or rules. As a skill, 
m orality is acquired and honed through practice and exposure to 
feedback regarding one's performance.
The inability of linguistic form ulas to reflect the complexity and 
richness of our m oral know -how  has been rem arked on by several 
recent cognitive scientists and  philosophers.46 A com m on observation 
is that this feature of m orality naturally emphasizes upbringing and
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train ing, in accord w ith virtue theory. A nother im portan t im plication 
is that im proper m oral behavior frequently, perhaps m ost of the time, 
does not arise from a lack of know ledge of w hat is right and  w rong, or 
an unw illingness to do w hat is right — that is, from  ignorance or 
akrasia w ith  regard to a rule of conduct. Rather, im m oral behavior 
issues from  m isperception, from  the inability of a m oral netw ork  to 
activate the proper prototype in  response to features in  the 
environm ent. An agent acts in  a m orally im proper way because she 
cannot see what kind o f  situation she is involved in.47
M oral disagreem ent frequently centers on com peting w ays of 
characterizing a situation ra ther than  conflicting m oral rules. The 
abortion debate is an obvious exam ple (cited by Churchland), bu t there 
is no shortage of others. Think of the current debate in  the U.S. over 
handguns: are federal restrictions on the sale and ow nership of 
handguns an im position on the Constitutional rights of citizens, or are 
they legitim ate means of protecting the populace from  a grow ing 
health  threat? O r consider a political argum ent w ith a spouse: is one 
party  sim ply trying to dem onstrate intellectual superiority, or is he or 
she standing  up  for a principle? Giving money to a homeless beggar: is 
it a case of compassion or of encouraging sloth and dependency? 
A llow ing hom osexuals in the m ilitary: an expression of freedom  and 
tolerance or a blow to m ilitary m orale and effectiveness? It is evident 
that parties who agree on the same basic set o f moral principles can 
disagree in  m any concrete situations as a result of conceiving a 
particu lar situation (or set of situations) differently, as different types of 
s itua tion .
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O ur intuitions, w hich reflect w hat M ark Johnson calls "M oral 
Folk Law Theory,"48 tend to resist this way of fram ing disagreem ents. 
We are inclined to insist that, say, an abortion is either  the ending  of an 
innocent life o r an  exercise of a w om an's right to control her body. Or 
that hom osexuality is either  a legitim ate sexual orientation o r a  
perversion hostile to the values of the nuclear family. O ur intuitions 
reflect the fact that m oral theory for centuries has been m odeled on 
propositional know ledge rather than  practical know ledge (i.e., know ­
how). O n the m odern m oral theoretical m odel, m oral know ledge 
reflects a dom ain of m oral facts. The law  of noncontradiction says that 
A  and n o t-A  cannot both be true; m oral knowledge, if propositional, 
obeys the law  of noncontradiction. But if we conceive of m oral 
know ledge as know-how, as a practical skill, a different analogy 
suggests itself.
Consider the game of tennis. If I receive a hard  shot dow n the 
line on my forehand side, should I view it as an  attack to be fought off 
by placing a long shot against the opponent's baseline or an 
opportunity to trick my opponent by changing u p  and laying a backspin 
dropshot just over the net? A host of factors extrinsic to the velocity 
and position of the ball are relevant: Is my forehand stronger than  my 
back hand? Is my opponent the type to expect a defensive game from  
me? Am  I w inning and thus free to take risks, or is the score tied, in 
which case I should play conservatively? Do the psychological benefits 
of doing the unexpected and unsettling m y opponent outw eigh the 
risks of attem pting a dropshot? Kant m ight say that there is a right and 
a w rong way to approach the shot — if we fix the relevant 
circumstances, we will see that the shot falls under some rule (e.g.:
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"w hen behind in  a set-determ ining game and presented w ith  a 
backhand attack, respond defensively"). But prototype-theory suggests 
that the circumstances are of such complexity and situation-specificity 
that we should follow A ristotle in  saying that the proper shot in  the 
situation is simply the shot that an excellent tennis p layer w ould make.
This is another way of saying that the excellent tennis p layer has 
honed her skills by playing a great deal of tennis49 and that she is thus 
adept at doing w hat w orks to w in games. She w ill not perform  the 
cognitive operation of fixing a description and applying a rule; in  fact, 
she w ill m ost likely perform  n o cognitive operations. H er skill at 
tennis is such that she sim ply and unreflectively sees the shot as one of 
a certain kind and responds appropriately. She sees it one way rather 
than  another because doing so has w orked in  the past and  thus w ill 
presum ably w ork again. A nother tennis p layer m ight see the shot in a 
different way; significantly, the dispute will not be settled by debating 
w hich rule applies to the shot bu t by results. If one player is right, it is 
not because her description of the shot more adequately "reflects 
reality" bu t because she plays better.
The same is true of E N 's m odel of morality: m orality is the skill 
of effectively navigating social space. The m orally proper action in  a 
given situation follows from  the skillful perception of and  response to 
prototypical situations. This skill cannot be sum m arized by a body of 
m oral prem ises and rules.
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III. Reflections on M oral N etw ork Theory
The sketch of MNT provided in  the preceding section is just 
that: a sketch. If I have succeeded, enough features of the theory are 
clear to m ake its contrast w ith m odern  m oral theory conspicuous, 
particularly w ith  regard to the place of linguaform  rules and principles 
in m oral reasoning. No doubt, however, the reader has more 
questions than answers at this point. The purpose of this section is 
twofold: first, to respond to some questions and objections w ith  regard 
to EN and MNT (proceeding from  philosophically general to specific), 
and second, to speculatively explore w hat practical consequences m ight 
issue from  C hurchland 's theory.
General Philosophical Objections to EN
1. Circularity
EN is a species of pragm atism . It holds that dispositions, 
judgm ents, and acts are m orally good just insofar as they im prove 
practice, as they help us flourish. This stands in opposition to accounts 
of morality, transcendental and otherwise, that cast m oral know ledge 
as representational, reflecting facts about reality or hum an nature. EN 
em phasizes that m orality is prim arily a m atter of navigating our 
environm ent; it is a m atter of know ing ho w ,  not sim ply or even 
principally know ing that. A n obvious and  notorious objection is that 
pragm atism 's instrum ental view  of m orality is circular. The good is 
that w hich im proves practice, bu t w hat constitutes im provem ent?
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Does any in terpretation of "improve" not already presuppose some 
independent m oral norm ? According to the objection, judgm ents of 
w hat is better or worse practice are purely practical; recourse to practical 
norm s alone cannot adjudicate m oral claims. To do that, we need a 
point-of-view that is independent of any set of practical claims.
The pragm atist response is that the notion of a context- 
independent, neutral point- of-view, m oral or otherwise, is incoherent. 
There is no "natural starting point" (Richard Rorty's term) or 
"A rchim edean point" (Bernard W illiams' term ) that can serve as an 
anchor for m oral reasoning. We may decide to start from some point 
or another — perhaps our basic m oral intuitions — but this w ill be a 
decision, not a discovery. The ethical naturalist presum es no fixed 
point of reference from  which we can adjudicate betw een norm ative 
claims; norm s can be debated, and norm s w ith  regard  to the 
developm ent of norm s can be debated. Particular judgm ents w ith  
regard to good practice are based on what, all things considered, has 
w orked to help a comm unity flourish. The use of "flourishing" as a 
goal of ethics w ill presum ably be fleshed out in  a variety of ways, none 
-  ‘-o f-w h ich  has a claim to final superiority. 'T h e  naturalist is open to 
conversational v indication of norm ative claims, she adm its that her 
background criteria, cashed out, are open to criticism and 
reform ulation, and she adm its that phrases like 'w hat w orks' and 'w hat 
conduces to flourishing' are superordinate terms. Specificity is gained 
in more fine-grained discussion of particular issues" (EN n8). The 
process of "fine-grained discussion" is chaotic, influenced by a host of 
pressures m oral, immoral, and amoral, and  thus is only partially
rational. It is rarely confined to a sim ple disagreem ent over m oral 
rules or principles.50
W hat counts as "working" and "flourishing" depends on a host 
of historic, cultural, political, geographic, and tem peram ental features 
that w ill vary am ong communities. In Japan, an extremely sm all and 
populous island country w ith a history of defending itself from  hostile 
outsiders, it has w orked to inculcate a sense of collective purpose and 
an attitude of form ality of etiquette and deference tow ards elders. In 
the U.S., an  extremely large country w ith  vast open spaces, it has 
worked to inculcate a sense of self-reliance, adventurousness, and 
suspicion of authority. In both countries, the norm s just m entioned 
are under attack from  various quarters, the accusation being that they 
no longer work. Circumstances have changed, new challenges have 
arisen, and  to flourish, both comm unities w ill need to call on their 
citizens to cultivate new  attitudes.
There is no neutral point-of-view, only a vast pa ttern  of 
in terdependent connections. H um an beings possess a web of 
knowledge, each strand of which is held in  place by others, each of 
wKrcft cah-b^ rew oven in theoretical debate or everyday conversation. 
EN needs no fixed point of reference. W hen it says that the focus of 
m orality is social practice, it presum es no im m utable, transcultural 
standards of good or bad practice. This latter point em phasizes the 
need for dialogue betw een moral philosophy and other areas of 
inquiry.
2. Vacuity
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If EN says that morality is tied to practice, bu t offers no uniquely 
m oral standards against w hich to m easure practice, is it not vacuous? 
There are two answers. The first is that norm ative standards are 
extracted from  practice: from  history, science, art, literature, and  every 
other dom ain  of hum an experience. The m oral philosopher does not 
contribute norm ative standards derived from  a uniquely m oral realm  
of facts, for there is no such realm. The task of the moral philosopher 
is syncretic; she gathers insights from  various dom ains of experience 
(and from  those w ho study these dom ains) and  attem pts to use them  to 
illum inate each other and experience as a whole. H er task, then, is not 
separable from  the tasks of other scholars and thinkers generally in the 
way that H eld characterizes it; if it is distinct, it is distinct in  that it 
ranges broadly  across dom ains, not in  that it is exclusively "norm ative" 
as opposed to "descriptive." The m oral philosopher's task is to focus 
on — speculate about, imagine, argue for — w hat works for a 
com m unity or com m unities to flourish.
The second answ er is that EN has no pretensions of being a 
general-purpose m oral theory that provides specific m oral guidance to 
everyone alike. The suggestion that7m orally speaking, we ought to do 
w hat w orks to help us flourish is prim arily a m etaethical one. It says 
that w e should focus on im proving practice rather than on w hat is 
inherently "right" and "wrong" for all tim es and places; this focus, in  
turn, em phasizes that morality is a practical skill rather than a body of 
representational knowledge. EN points up  the im portance of 
im agination and  creativity in m oral reasoning; neither it nor any other 
m oral theory can serve as a substitute for im agination and creativity.
Concrete m oral guidance is found in  fine-grained, situated  reasoning 
and debate, not in  a general-purpose m oral theory.
3. R elativism
If EN focuses on practice, w hich varies from  com m unity to 
com m unity, and  eschews the inherently "right" and  "w rong," which 
are presum ably universal, is it not relativistic? The answ er is yes. The 
search for a general-purpose m oral theory, one that w ill hold for all 
people at all times, has been a colossal waste of time. It am ounts to the 
attem pt to say som ething significant about the comm on feature that 
unites all actions w e describe as "moral." As Richard Rorty pu ts it, 
pragm atists doubt:
...that there is m uch to be said about the comm on feature shared 
by such m orally praisew orthy actions as Susan leaving her 
husband, Am erica joining the w ar against the N azis, America 
pulling  out of Vietnam, Socrates not escaping from  jail, Roger 
picking up  litter from  the trail, and  the suicide of the Jews at 
r , ■ **:: M asada. They see certain acts as good ones to perform , under the
circumstances, but doubt that there is anything general and 
; useful to say about w hat makes them  all good.51 ' ? '
The search for an all-purpose m oral theory is predicated on the 
belief that m orality can be profitably m odeled on the physical sciences, 
which have been characterized by theory convergence and progress. 
("People have, oddly  enough, found som ething interesting to say about 
the essence of Force and the definition of 'num ber'"  (ibid).) That 
m orality differs strikingly from the physical sciences in both respects,
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despite centuries of attem pts to the contrary, should lead us to abandon 
the com parison betw een the two. The difference betw een the tw o is 
not a difference in kind (recall Churchland's theory of inquiry). They 
are both hum an inquiries and m ake use of the same tools. Rather, the 
difference is in the nature of the subject m atter. As Flanagan points 
out,
...the links betw een any inquiry and the convergence a n d /o r  
progress such inquiry yields is determ ined in large part by the 
degree of contingency and context dependency the target dom ain 
exhibits and the way the end or ends of inquiry are fram ed. The 
basic sciences, due to the univocality and consistency of their 
ends, and to the nonlocal nature of the w isdom  they typically 
seek, converge more and give evidence of being progressive in 
w ays that ethics does not. The explanation has to do w ith  the 
fact that the ends of ethics are m ultiple, often in  tension w ith  
each other, and the w isdom  we seek in ethics is often local 
know ledge — both geographically local and tem porally local, and 
thus convergence is ruled out from  the start. (EN 24)
Of course, Flanagan does not m ean to im ply that the ends of science are 
entirely unam biguous or that scientific inquiry is not shaped by 
contingent, contextual forces. He is sim ply pointing out that m oral 
ends display a tension and a contingency that is far greater in  degree, 
and thus that m oral theory should not be expected to y ield 
generalizations of the same scope and context-independence as those of 
the physical sciences.
If we are to compare m orality w ith a science, we should  follow 
Flanagan in  com paring it to ecology (EN); the m oral philosopher
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studies one or m ore social ecosystems, and like the ecologist, realizes 
that each has its ow n character and  that particular generalizations may 
not apply  to each one equally or at all. It is w orth  em phasizing that EN 
places no a priori constraints on the scope of m oral generalizations (a 
point to w hich I w ill return). It sim ply points out that m oral theories 
that have sought to both be universal in  scope and provide specific 
m oral guidance have failed, usually  on both counts.
A com m on fear is that relativity is destructive of m orality, that 
the relativist cannot rationally criticize m oral system s other than  her 
own. But the objection that the relativist cannot condem n evil w here 
she finds it is inevitably unim aginative. As Flanagan points out, 
relativism  is the position that "certain things are relative to other 
things," not that everything is relative to everything else (EN n43).
The fact tha t there is no one "right" answ er to m oral questions does 
not m ean that any answ er is as good as any other. The ethical 
—  naturalist is- a ttuned  to-relationships am ong things that m atter-for 
m orality. By abandoning the quest for absolute m oral tru th , one does 
not give u p  the hum an capacity to com pare alternatives and judge 
some better than others. "Even if there is no such thing as 
'transcendent rationality ' as som e philosophers conceive it, there are 
perfectly reasonable ways of analyzing problem s, proposing solutions, 
and recom m ending attitudes. This is the essence of pragm atism . 
Pragm atism  is a theory of rationality" (ibid).52
The force of EN 's relativism  lies in  its pluralistic attitude. It 
acknowledges that m oral virtue has been achieved by m any different 
kinds of people in  m any different kinds of ways. It acknowledges that
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the virtues necessary for some com m unity to flourish m ay be less 
im portan t in others, and that the same is true of different individuals. 
It is a futile but apparently  well-entrenched attitude that one 
ought to try  to discover the single right way to think, live, and 
be. But there is a great experim ent going on. It involves the 
exploration of m ultip le alternative possibilities, m ultifarious 
w ays of living — some better than others and some positively 
aw ful from  any reasonable perspective. The m ain poin t is that 
the relativist has an attitude conducive to an  appreciation of 
alternative ways of life and  to the patient exploration of how  to 
use this exposure in  the distinctively hum an project of reflective 
w ork  on the self, on self-im provem ent. (Ibid)
Or as James som ew hat more poetically pu t it: "Each attitude being a 
syllable in  hum an nature 's total message, it takes the w hole of us to 
spell the m eaning out completely" (qtd. in  V M P  336).
I have neither the space nor the skill to fully defend EN 's variety 
of relativism  here. It is enough to say that EN closely heeds the results 
of other inquiries, and w hen the historical, anthropological, 
eihological, economic, political, and  psychological da ta  is in, relativism  
is sim ply the m ost realistic conclusion. (Or if one w ere not of a 
scientific tem peram ent, one could simply peruse the great w orks of 
literature and religion.) There are an indefinite num ber of realizable 
hum an  personalities, and am ong those an indefinite num ber of 
personalities that are morally praisew orthy, blam ew orthy, and  every 
shade in between. Furtherm ore, each person w ill find herself w ith  a 
set of fundam ental traits,53 some of w hich she will need to tend and 
develop, others she will need to suppress or redirect. H er m oral task is
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different than  that of someone w ith  different traits. The attem pt to 
develop a unified, all-purpose m oral theory -  either as a rule or an 
algorithm , a la m odern  m oral theory, or as a single set of virtuous 
traits, a la virtue theory -- is bo th  inauthentic and m ore harm ful than  
helpfu l.
Objections to M N T
1. N orm ativity
The m ost com m on and in tuitive objection to M NT is that at 
best, it is purely descriptive, and at worst, it denies the possibility of 
norm ativity. It tells us how  we appropriate and classify novel 
phenom ena, not how  we ought to judge the results of that process.
The accusation is that those w ho purport to apply prototype theory to 
m orality miss "a fundam ental distinction ... betw een how  we represent 
or understand  our m oral concepts and how  w e apply or use them ."54 
According to the objection, it m ay be true that we more quickly and 
- intuitively 'classify; sa y ;a  rob in -asa  b ird  than an ostrich. "Fine. But 
ostriches are no less birds than  robins."55 Similarly, we m ay 
unreflectively classify a husband 's (false) denial of an illicit love affair 
as "m ore of a lie" — that is, closer to the "central tendency" of features 
of the prototypical lie — than his (false) comm ent that he likes his 
w ife's new  haircut. However, upon  reflection, w e judge that both  are 
lies, that m orally speaking, a lie is a lie is a lie. We m ay have an 
internal representation of "lie" that has a prototypical structure, but 
w hen we apply the concept, w hen we morally judge someone w ho has
74
told a lie, we do not characterize their act as "more" or "less" of a lie. 
"W hatever aid in  classification this prototypical structuring lends us, 
we retain  and ... readily utilize underly ing  principles or know ledge that 
provide critical controls on treating these classificatory differences as 
differences in w hat it is to be [e.g., a lie]" (MIR 403).
In essence, the objection states that the use of m oral concepts 
according to the necessary-and-sufficient-condition m odel does not 
presum e that we internally represent them  as having necessary and 
sufficient conditions; rather, the application of m oral concepts 
according to the classical m odel is norm ative — we apply them  so 
because we th ink we ought to. W hen we self-consciously reflect on the 
results of our situated classificatory reasoning, we m ay choose to revise 
the results according to the norm ative principles of science a n d /o r  
m orality. This objection is thought to b lun t M NT's criticism  of 
com m onsense "m oral law  folk theory;" though we reach judgm ents 
based on prototypes, "we have the capability of assessing and  revising 
these judgm ents, w ithout su rrendering  our com m onsense m orality." 
(MIR 402). It may be, then, that rules and principles play precisely the 
self-regulating role that m odern  m oral theory claims for them.
In a brief discussion of MNT, H eld m akes a sim ilar point. H er 
fear is that the process of m oral change and developm ent described by 
MNT is purely  causal rather than rational. Referring to C hurchland 's 
example of the shift from  seeing society as a group of siblings ru led  by a 
father to seeing society as a group of parties to a contract (the latter is 
"m ore arresting" and thus prevailed), H eld objects:
But this is not a process that happens as if by itself. We decide 
w hat prototype to m ake "m ore arresting," that is, w hich to
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consider m orally or descriptively better. We can try to explain 
w hy such transitions have occurred.... But such explanations do 
not tell us w hether the replacem ent of one m oral paradigm  by 
another or one socioeconomic system  by another was or w ould 
be morally justified. (WA 77)
In short, developing new  prototypes is not the same as justifying new 
prototypes. H eld wants to em phasize w hat other critics of MNT have 
pointed out: that m oral reasoning involves the use of self-critical 
standards and norm s, w hich are separate from any given person's 
hierarchy of learned prototypes.
The objection just recounted is complex and tricky. It is difficult 
to disentangle its m erits from  its flaws. It is true that prototype-theory - 
- especially in as brief and sketchy a form  as I have presented — can 
underem phasize the self-reflective and self-corrective capacities of 
reasoning, flirting w ith  reductionism .56 H eld w ants to insist that there 
is m ore than  unreflective (merely neural?) classification going on in 
m oral reasoning. But everything turns on how "m ore" is 
characterized. One way of characterizing it sim ply reflects the Kantian 
distinction betw een causality, and Reason, which transcends causality. 
O n this description, the developm ent and deploym ent of prototypes is 
'a*(causal) neural process w hich can (and should) be am ended through 
the use of Reason, which has access to transcendent standards and 
principles. While neither H eld nor other critics w ould explicitly 
characterize the objection in this way, the echoes are clear.
H eld  is uncom fortable w ith the thought that reasoning 
"happens as if by itself" like a natural, causal process. "Moral 
experience ... requires us to assum e we can choose betw een alternatives
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in ways that should not be expected a priori to be subsum able under 
scientific explanations, w hether psychological, biological, ecological, or 
any other" (WA 72). Somehow, the causal process m ust be regulated by 
som ething else. H eld  is clearly m otivated by the same concern that 
m otivated Kant: that hum ans not act from  irrational causes bu t from  
rational reasons. H um an beings develop their prototype hierarchies 
through socialization, w hich is a causal process for w hich they can not 
be held accountable. Only if there are reasons independent of causal 
processes — reasons to w hich we have access through our deploym ent 
of Reason — can persons be held responsible for their m oral judgm ents 
and actions.
The ethical naturalist decisively rejects this w ay of fram ing the 
issue. The distinction betw een irrational causes (nature) and rational 
reasons (hum an beings) is utterly  m isleading. The naturalist believes 
that hum an beings are natural creatures, and  that na tu re  behaves 
through and through in  a causally lawful way. (It should be 
em phasized that the assum ption that a process is explicable according 
to natural laws does not entail that we have, or ever w ill have, a 
complete scientific account thereof -- systems as complex as hum an 
beings present us w ith  the problem  of a "com binatorial explosion" that 
m ay forever outstrip  our scientific ability). W hatever capacity hum an 
beings have to act rationally, to engage in self-reflection and self­
correction, has em erged in and through the evolution of natural 
creatures. Reason is a natural capacity, not one that transcends nature - 
- this is essential to naturalism . MNT holds that the developm ent of 
norm s regarding m oral perception and action proceeds prim arily  
through the developm ent and revision of prototypes. The claim  is not
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that hum an behavior is purely causal and thus irrational bu t that 
reasoning is both causal and rational.
H ow  can MNT account for criticism in  addition to classification 
and reaction? The examples noted by critics tend to be m isleading, as 
they regard  "natural kinds" — dogs, birds, numbers. For instance, A dler 
points out that "it is less surprising that I m ay find it easier or faster to 
classify the fam iliar collie as a dog than the rare Akita, than it w ould  be 
that I represent the form er as 'm ore of a dog ' than the latter (I know  
that they are both dogs) or that the nature of one is to be 'm ore ' dog 
than the other" (MIR 402-03). There are tw o ways of addressing this 
k ind of example. The first is to note that necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the application of biological natural k ind term s have 
been fixed by biology, and these can be consulted by someone 
attem pting to discern w hether or not a particular anim al is a dog. Over 
time, a com m unity can stipulate necessary and  sufficient conditions for 
the application of a concept; that is, a comm unity can dictate that a 
concept be applied as though it had  classical structure. This is m ost 
evident in the physical and natural sciences, in which the "distinction 
betw een how  we represent or understand  our concepts and how  we 
apply or use them" is necessarily sharp. I w ill discuss the role of fixed 
public concepts shortly, but suffice to say here, many w ho presum e to 
apply cognitive science to ethics fail to acknowledge and  /  or em phasize 
the ability of a linguistic com m unity to give certain concepts 
determ inate (classical) structure.
The second way of approaching the example is to  point out the 
vast difference betw een it and most m oral examples. The biological 
definition of "dog" is fixed and clear, bu t the same can not be said of the
78
m oral definition of a "virtue" or a "right." The subject m atter of 
m orality, as Flanagan points out, is far m ore contingent and context- 
dependent than that of the physical and natural sciences. Moral 
concepts w ill be significantly dependent on contingent features of the 
com m unity or trad ition  in  which they develop. Despite the efforts of 
m odern m oral theorists, we have not discovered anything like 
"natural kinds" in morality. This is evident to a degree even in  our 
basic m oral concepts, for instance, a "person." The abortion debate 
dem onstrates that the very scope of the concept is contentious (thus, it 
surprising neither that we are inclined to classify a child as "more of a 
person" than  a fetus nor that we may explicitly represent it as such).
But the indeterm inacy of our m oral concepts is even clearer on the 
ground, in the trenches as it were. W hen does self-confidence become 
arrogance? W hen does optim ism  become self-deception? W hen does 
contentm ent become complacency? W hen does autonom y become 
em otional isolation? W hen does the desire to protect one's friends and 
family become parochial?
In m oral reasoning, we rarely err sim ply by failing to note that 
an instance falls w ith in  the scope of a concept, because in morality, as 
in m ost situated skill-deploym ent, concepts do not have the classical 
structure that w ould  m ake subsum ption a clear-cut m atter. H ow  then, 
can we be self-critical of our ow n classifications and reactions? 
Churchland 's description of the morally exem plary agent is 
illum inating :
People w ith unusually  penetrating m oral insight will be those
who can see a problem atic m oral situation in more than one
way, and who can evaluate the relative accuracy and relevance
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of those com peting interpretations. Such people w ill be those 
w ith  unusual m oral imagination, and a critical capacity to 
m a tch . The form er virtue will require a rich library of m oral 
prototypes from  which to draw , and especial skills in  the 
recurrent m anipulation of one's m oral perception. The latter 
virtue w ill require a keen eye for local divergences from  any 
presum ptive prototype, and a w illingness to take them  seriously 
as grounds for finding some alternative understanding . Such 
people w ill by definition be rare, although all of us have some 
m oral imagination, and all of us some capacity for criticism.
CERSS 146-47, italics added)
M oral situations are extraordinarily diverse; rarely do any two appear 
w ith  exactly the same features. Remember: the processing of a 
connectionist netw ork "is not bound  by the sim ilarity m etric on the 
input vector;" that is to say, sm all or subtle differences in  the features 
of situations can lead us to classify them  as belonging to drastically 
different prototypes. An im aginative m oral
(scientific/pedagogical/econom ic/chess-playing/etc.) reasoner has a 
broad array of prototypes and the ability to flexibly deploy them  looking 
for the right fit. A self-critical reasoner will be highly sensitive to the 
varied features of a situation, particularly features that are not w ell 
accounted for by the prototype at hand. H istory provides no shortage of 
exam ples of m oral reasoners that have squeezed vast sw aths of 
experience into sim ple categories, often w ith literally violent results — 
Pol Pot classified alm ost every feature of Cam bodia's culture (even 
eyeglasses) w ithin the prototype of "bourgeois elitism." We intuitively 
understand  that this can be done only through a kind of blindness to
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certain types of features, a blindness connected to a pathological 
unw illingness to consider other w ays of view ing a situation or 
situations.
M NT can account for the em ploym ent of norm s in  self-critical 
reasoning, and  thus for norm ativity. N orm s range from  the im plicit 
(and more personal) — e.g., the em bodied skills a kayaker deploys in 
navigating rap ids — to the explicit (and m ore public) — e.g., "do not 
discrim inate according to race." Norm s, on M NT's model, are 
m anifest in a connectionist netw ork as dispositions (patterns of 
connection w eights) to connect certain environm ental patterns w ith 
patterns of response. Self-criticism occurs w hen we sense that the 
prototype th rough  w hich we are in terpreting a situation or situations is 
insufficient, and  perhaps that none of the prototypes we have are 
sufficient. The fear that naturalizing norm ative ethics w ill lead to a 
process of m oral developm ent that is "m erely causal" and w ill tu rn  
m orality into a "m ere pow er struggle" tu rns "on certain genuine 
difficulties w ith  discovering how  to live w ell and w ith a certain 
fantastical way of conceiving of w hat is 'really right' or 'really good.'
But these difficulties have everything to do w ith  the complexities of 
m oral life — of life, period — and have n o bearing w hatsoever on the 
tru th  of ethical naturalism  as a m etaphysical thesis or  on our capacity 
to pursue genuinely norm ative and critical ethical inquiry" (EN 22, 
italics in original).
2. C onservatism
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A related question is the following: how  can we avoid 
unreflective transm ission of parochial or harm ful p ro to types from 
generation to generation, or "m ere" socialization? H ow  can 
socialization be rational? The m odernist m ight say that w e socialize 
rationally by discovering, obeying, and assiduously transm itting the 
correct practical and m oral principles, attem pting to structure our 
com m unity in accord w ith  them . If asserting m oral propositions that 
reflect reality — which "is as it is separate from  hum an  cognitive states" 
— is our goal, radical m oral critique is possible. After all, reality is as it 
is apart from  w hatever prior philosophers m ay have said. It is possible, 
perhaps likely, that the principles w e obey and transm it now  may be 
radically m istaken, and perhaps some philosopher m ay come along 
and prove so w ith a knock-dow n deductive argum ent (such success has 
been  claim ed m ore than  once).
H ow  can MNT prom ise rational rather than  "m ere" 
socialization? Flanagan quotes C hurchland raising the worry:
W hat is problem atic is w hether this process am ounts to the 
learning of genuine M oral Truth, or to m ere socialization. We 
can hardly  collapse the distinction, lest w e m ake m oral criticism 
of diverse forms of social organization im possible. We w ant to 
defend this possibility, since ... the socialization described above 
can occasionally am ount to a cowardly acquiescence in an 
arbitrary and stultifying form  of life. Can w e specify under w hat 
circumstances it w ill am ount to som ething m ore than  this? (NP 
300)
As Churchland points out, the same question applies equally to any 
area of inquiry, including science, since most learning, of m orality or of
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science, is second-hand. The pragm atist holds that our perform ance, 
rather th an  an im agined relationship betw een theories and facts, 
reflects the quality of our knowledge. H um anity 's great successes 
(many accom plished in  "prehistory") in  term s of survival, 
propagation, and civilization indicate that "there rem ains every reason 
to think that the norm al learning process ... involves a reliable and 
dram atic increase in  the am ount and the quality of the inform ation we 
have about the w orld" (301). So too w ith morals:
W hen such pow erful learning netw orks as hum ans are 
confronted w ith  the problem  of how  best to perceive the social 
w orld, and how  best to conduct one's affairs w ith in  it, we have 
equally good reason to expect that the learning process will show 
an integrity com parable to that show n on other learning tasks, 
and  w ill produce cognitive achievements as robust as those 
produced anyw here else. This expectation will be especially apt 
if, as in the case of "scientific" knowledge, the learning process is 
collective and the results are transm itted from  generation to 
generation. In that case w e have a continuing society under 
constant pressure to refine its categories of social and moral 
perception, and to modify its typical responses and  expectations. 
Successful societies do this on a systematic basis. (302)
M oral norm s and skills are shaped by pressure from  the environm ent, 
just as practical skills are. Judged by our success in  navigating our 
environm ent, we should have every faith in  the quality  and am ount 
of our m oral knowledge. Churchland is optim istic about the progress 
and convergence of m oral know ledge, sometimes excessively.57 I will 
offer a som ew hat more tem pered picture (see chap. 3, sec. II).
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A n im portant objection to MNT (and to EN) is that it is allegedly 
conservative. Since it describes the developm ent of prototypes based 
on experience, then people can only be as m oral as w hat they 
experience in  their environm ent, and they can only be m oral in  the 
same way. This pain ts an  uncritical picture in  w hich repressive or 
unjust social and  m oral system s can be (m erely causally) transm itted.
Is there room  in MNT for radical m oral critique?
There are two w ays of approaching the question. The first is to 
recall C hurchland 's description of a m oral com m unity "under constant 
pressure to refine its categories of social and  m oral perception." It is 
im portant to em phasize that this pressure is not exclusively moral  
pressure. A host of interests drive our behavior. Geographic and social 
changes can be sudden  arid drastic; environm ental pressures can shift 
unpredictably. H eld says that we "decide w hat prototype to make 'm ore 
a rresting / that is, w hich to consider morally or descriptively better," 
bu t again, the w ord "decide" is too tidy. It is w orth  em phasizing again 
D ew ey 's point that m oral problem s and tensions em erge from  tectonic 
-  and  som etim es explosive -  shifts in  other em pirical dom ains. Since 
environm ental pressures can shift radically, so too can m oral 
prototypes.
As an example, consider free markets. The ethical naturalist w ill 
be keenly aware of the shifting circumstances brought about by 
economic globalization, and  w ill attune her argum ents for or against 
unregulated  m arkets to those empirical realities. This m ay involve a 
radical critique of either laissez-faire or welfare states. To the m odern 
m oral theorist, this m ight be seen as a discovery — we had  thought free 
m arkets "good," but we have discovered they are in  fact "bad" (or vice
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versa) — bu t the ethical naturalist will see nothing alarm ing in 
adm itting  that free m arkets w ere once appropriate (good) and are now, 
if unrestrained, inappropriate  (bad). EN does not see m oral truths as 
static. Radical critique is possible in part because radically changing 
circum stances are possible.
Again: a response to shifts in environm ental pressures is not 
"m ere" response, like the recoil of a billiard ball. Effective response to 
the environm ent is the essence of rationality.
"But surely there is m ore to collective m oral developm ent than 
response to extra-moral pressures." Yes. The second way of 
approaching the question of radical critique is to poin t out that 
m orality itself is heterogeneous: m oral ends are varied and in some 
cases m utually  exclusive; m oral heroes and exem plars are w ildly 
diverse, virtuous and flawed in  a host of different ways; and 
com m onsense (traditional) m oral principles contradict one another 
w illy-nilly (e.g., "stop and smell the flowers" /  "a day late, a dollar 
short"). EN need not be conservative because it d raw s not only on 
present m oral alternatives, but on all those tested throughout history 
and all those im agined in the arts and literature, past and present.
To judge ideals, it w ill not do sim ply to look and see w hether 
healthy persons and healthy com m unities are subserved by 
them  in  the here and now. We require that current "health" is 
bought w ithout incorporating practices — slavery, racism, sexism, 
and  the like — that can go unnoticed for some time and keep 
persons from  flourishing, and  eventually  poison hum an 
relations, if not in the present, at least in  nearby generations.
(EN n40)
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M oral perspectives are as varied as life is rich, and persons of every 
culture, no m atter how  repressive, have access to m oral perspectives 
other the one that dom inates. This is not to m arginalize or trivialize 
the pow er and persistence of totalitarian regim es, nor the possibility of 
effective propaganda, sim ply to point out that radical critique is 
possible w ithin m orality because the possibilities for reviving, 
reinterpreting, or recom bining the radically different m oral voices 
already singing in  the m oral chorus are effectively limitless. N othing 
in  MNT or EN generally im plies lim its on the revolutionary or radical 
nature  of m oral critique.
If it is still objected that MNT does not allow  for radically n e w  
prototypes — only those to which we have had  or could have exposure - 
- then the response can only be that there is "nothing new  under the 
sun." N ew  m odels do not appear de novo, they grow  over time. But 
this does not set lim its on how striking or com pelling or new- 
sounding a sudden flash of moral insight m ay be. O ur prototype space 
is vast, and the num ber of possible vectors am ong prototypes is 
astronomical. We may, in  the course of m oral life, discover the m oral 
usefulness of a prototype draw n, perhaps recontextualized, perhaps 
recom bined, perhaps in  a strikingly new shape, from  some other 
dom ain of experience. Consider C hurchland 's notion of "context- 
fixers," here discussed by Clark:
Im agine someone trying to solve a problem . To solve i t ... is to 
activate an appropriate explanatory prototype. Sometimes, 
however, our attem pts to access a satisfying (explanatory) 
prototype fail. One diagnosis may be that we do not command 
any appropriate prototype, in  w hich case there is no alternative
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to slow, experience-based learning. But an  alternative possibility 
is that we do comm and just such a prototype bu t have so far not 
called it up. This is where a good piece of context fixing can help. 
The idea is that a bare input that previously led to the activation 
of no fully explanatory prototype m ay suddenly, in the context of 
additional inform ation, give rise to the activation of a developed 
and satisfying prototype by being led to exploit resources 
originally developed for a different purpose. (CPS 116)
The developm ent of prototypes is organic and extended in time; this 
m uch, MNT need not deny. Perhaps, as H eld  and other feminists 
argue, the m etaphor of morality-as-econom ic-exchange should yield  to 
the m etaphor of m orality-as-m aternal-care. W hile this may be a new  
prototype for morality, it is not a new  prototype. But again, for the 
reasons just described, MNT suggests no a priori limits on the intensity 
or radicality of m oral critique. This suggests that the charge of 
conservatism  against EN is, at least on theoretical grounds, 
unsubstan tia ted .
C hapter Three 
Im plications of Ethical N aturalism
In the first chapter, I defended ethical naturalism  against the charge 
that it is a handm aiden  to science, that it reduces the norm ative to the 
descriptive. In the second chapter, I attem pted to flesh out a picture of EN by 
exploring an example, C hurchland's m oral netw ork theory. I concluded the 
chapter by defending EN against further philosophical objections that came 
into clear focus through the presentation of MNT, and by defending MNT 
against claims that it is purely descriptive and that it is conservative. But 
enough defense — in this chapter, I will examine w hat I take to be some 
implications of EN generally and MNT specifically. The chapter will proceed 
as follows. First, I will discuss EN's implications for m oral education. I will 
assert that m oral training is absolutely central, that it is holistic rather than 
confined to institutional settings, and that it necessarily involves a degree of 
hypocrisy. I will conclude the section by applying the insights of EN w ith 
regard to m oral education to a contem porary debate, the debate over 
m ulticulturalism . Second, I will discuss EN 's im plications for m oral theory 
generally. I w ill assert that our hopes for a norm ative m oral theory that will 
guide us in case-by-case decision-making is forlorn, and that this implies a 
central role for trust in moral life. I w ill then attem pt to explain our 
collective m oral failure through a consideration of comm itm ent, both in  its 
role as heritage-preserver and its role as heritage-developer. I w ill conclude 
the section w ith  a discussion of linguaform  m oral rules and principles, 
asserting that they rightfully play a central role in  m oral life, though this role 
is not that given them  by m odern moral theory. This chapter w ill be 
decidedly speculative; EN of the form I favor is young and it rem ains to be
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seen w hether, how  much, or in w hat w ays it will substantially effect moral 
philosophy.
I. M oral Education
W hile Aristotle em phasized the central role of m oral train ing, m odern 
m oral philosophy has not. Kant was famously im pressed by the m orality of 
the "com m on man," sym bolized by the plow m an who has had  no formal 
training of any sort. It is not difficult to see why. If all m oral action is dictated 
by the categorical imperative, then it w ill simply consist in acting such that 
one w ould will that everyone acted according to one's reasons. W hat is 
needed is not prim arily knowledge or experience but will.  A ll hum ans are 
endow ed w ith Reason, w hich provides norm ative dictates, if agents but have 
the fortitude to obey its legislation. The same is true of u tilitarianism . Since 
all hum an beings act for pleasure, w hat they need is the force of w ill to act 
such that pleasure is m axim ized. Both Kantian and u tilitarian  m oral theories 
hold that m orality is based on intrinsic features of hum an nature, though 
they differ on the relevant features, thus both hold that all hum ans (w ith the 
exception of children and the m entally disabled) are equally endow ed with 
the capacity to act m orally. While the preceding is perhaps m ore caricature 
than  judicious sum m ary, it is fair to say that Kantians and  u tilitarians are 
united in  the belief that m oral theory ought to be such that it is equally 
accessible to all who possess the will to obey it.
Holism
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EN deflates this hope and  follows Aristotle in restoring the absolutely 
central role of m oral training. H ow ever, m uch rides on how  one construes 
the term  "m oral training." EN em phasizes that m orality is m ore a skill 
(knowing how) than a body of know ledge (knowing that). M oral training, 
then, should not ~  indeed, can not — be confined to institutional settings.
The m orality that young m inds absorb is not captured in the linguaform  
m oral facts, principles, or theories that enable them  to pass the final exam in 
Introductory Ethics 101. M oral learning is not isolated or autonom ous, but 
holistic. C hildren learn m oral skills from  the m om ent they interact w ith 
other hum an  beings.
MNT holds that learning is a m atter of exposure to exem plars and 
consistent feedback. Children learn  from  their environm ent to see situations, 
actions, and persons as belonging to a certain type and to react accordingly. As 
Clark states, "the successful acquisition of m oral knowledge m ay be heavily 
dependent on exposure not to abstractly form ulated rules and principles but 
to concrete examples of m oral judgm ent and behavior" (CPS 114). Such 
concrete exam ples are present first and  forem ost in the behavior of those 
surrounding a child. These exam ples will be her prim ary source of m oral 
education. As Flanagan em phasizes,
...the total [moral] netw ork com prises m ore than the neural nets that 
contain the moral know ledge a particular individual possesses. 
W hatever neural net instantiates (or is disposed to express) some 
segm ent of moral knowledge, it does so only because it is 'tra ined ' by a 
com m unity. The com m unity itself is a netw ork prov id ing  constant 
feedback to the hum an agent. (EN 30)
Hypocrisy
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It w ould  seem  then that there is little hope in the adm onition "do as 
1/ we say, not as 1 /we do." Hypocrisy, according to MNT, m ight seem  not only 
pernicious but u tterly  im potent. By and large, children w ill see situations 
according the w ays people in  their environm ent see the sam e types of 
situations, and do w hat they see around them  is the "thing to do." If speaking 
disingenuously about one's interests and motives is part of an environm ental 
pattern, it w ill find its way into the prototype space of those w ho are exposed 
to it. We cannot m ediate the ill effects of w idespread im m oral behavior 
simply by m aking our public exhortation to m oral behavior louder and more 
frequent. Actions speak louder than words. But I w ant to suggest that we not 
dism iss the pow er of a certain kind of hypocrisy: the hypocrisy of encouraging 
the expression or representation of m oral prototype hierarchies, or, to drop 
the jargon, value systems to w hich we do not conform, either individually or 
institutionally. W hile our actions m ay show that we do  not norm atively 
endorse these alternative value systems (this is a necessary and  desirable 
condition of coherent socialization), we should nevertheless rem ain devoted 
to the m etaethical value of diversity.
The Debate Over Diversity
MNT suggests that we take seriously the form ative pow er of 
im aginative identification w ith w hat Clark calls "virtual m oral reality" — the 
m oral situations, agents, and actions present in novels, m ovies, w orks of 
history and anthropology, television shows, commercials, pop  songs, 
m agazine advertisem ents, internet pages, and all the varied corners of 
symbolic space, even that small corner called academic philosophy. In
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(suitably diverse) virtual m oral reality, children are likely to be exposed to 
m oral prototypes (sometimes radically) different than the ones at w ork  in 
their present social context, m ore so than  in their day-to-day interactions w ith 
others in  their com m unity. Remember: MNT suggests that m oral excellence 
will be due in  part to an  agent's possessing a large and  diverse library of 
prototypes. Since the total m oral netw ork extends beyond the neural netw ork 
of the agent, it is fair to say that the majority of agents cannot be expected to 
have a w ide variety of prototypes unless there exists a sizable and 
heterogeneous range of exem plars on which to draw . Put m ore strongly: the 
possibilities and resources for social critique increase in  p roportion  to the 
num ber, diversity, and accessibility, not just of m oral theories  b u t of m oral 
examples.
We have reached a point w here w e can profitably apply EN to a 
contem porary debate: the debate over m ulticulturalism , o r as the slogan goes, 
"diversity." W hat EN suggests is that the debate is, or should  be, m etaethical 
ra ther than  norm ative. Critics of the cam paign for diversity are quick to 
po in t out that "diversity" is often used in  a disingenuous w ay, as a guise for 
criticizing the m oral code of the W estern tradition and supporting  the m oral 
codes of other cultures. W hile this is true in  m any cases, a m ore trenchant 
criticism  is that proponents of d iversity  often fram e diversity as an  inherent 
n o r m a t i v e  good. But EN suggests that the prim ary virtue of diversity is 
m etaethical; that is to say, d iversity  of m oral alternatives is conducive to an 
environm ent in which reliable m oral judgm ents can be m ade. D iversity of 
m oral exem plars is a condition of effective m oral reasoning. This leaves the 
question of diversity 's norm ative virtues open. Proponents of diversity, by 
saying, as they frequently do, that "one ought not favor one (our) m oral code 
over others," frame the debate in a diversionary and self-contradictory way.
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Anyone com m itted to one m oral code over others -- or comm itted, as 
com m unitarians are, sim ply to the virtues of com m itting to one m oral code 
or another -  will be inclined to resist this way of presenting the issue. Rather, 
proponents of diversity ought to say that "m oral reasoning, which may or 
may not lead one to favor one m oral code over others, is facilitated by the 
presence of a w ide variety of heterogeneous m oral exem plars."58
For instance, consider the compelling and urgent debate over ritual 
female genital m utilation as practiced in  some Islamic cultures. O n one 
hand, one hesitates to engage in "moral im perialism ," judging the practices of 
another culture from  the parochial perspective of one's own. O n the other 
hand, one hesitates to abandon the possibility of m eaningfully criticizing 
cultural practices (or practices w ithin one's own culture) that one finds 
m orally repugnant — and it is difficult for N orth  A m erican m oral 
philosophers to see genital m utilation as anything b u t m orally repugnant. 
Feminists in  particular are torn  over the issue, as they w ant on the one hand 
to criticize the hegemonic tendencies of patriarchal ethics, and on the other 
hand to defend the health  of young wom en forced against their w ill to 
dam age their bodies and, symbolically, their w om anhood.
W hile the issue cannot be, decided in a sum m ary paragraph, it seems 
that EN suggests the following strategy: w hat we ought to say is not that "it is 
a mistake to judge ritual female genital m utilation w rong from  one's own 
m oral perspective," bu t that "it is a mistake to judge ritual female genital 
m utilation w rong w ithout a relatively thorough understand ing  of the moral 
perspective from  which the practice issues." Or, in the language of MNT, " it 
is a m istake to presum e the superiority of one's ow n m oral prototypes 
w ithout having considered the adequacy of alternative prototypes." Of 
course, the question of w hat if any is the appropriate action to take if one
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judges, under the p roper circumstances, that genital m utilation is morally 
w rong is one that w ill be fought out in the moral trenches (see sec. II).59
As an aside, it is interesting to note that we have draw n a norm ative 
conclusion — "we ought to m ake available a w ide variety of m oral exemplars" 
— from  statem ent of m etaethical fact ~  "the availability of a w ide variety of 
m oral exem plars is conducive to effective m oral reasoning." This supports 
two assertions I m ade in  Chapter One: first, that the distinction betw een is 
and  ought is m isleading, and second, that metaethics strays closer to 
norm ative ethics than  is generally acknowledged.
Conclusion
EN strongly implies that the ability to act m orally, both in 
understanding  diverse m oral systems and adjudicating am ong them , is a 
function of, among other things, adequate m oral training. M orality is not 
sim ply a m atter of referencing a transcendent code or a single foundational 
feature of hum an nature and m ustering the w ill to do w hat it dictates. Moral 
excellence requires a large and diverse library of m oral prototypes, an 
im aginative ability to m anipulate one's perceptions in  term s of those 
prototypes, and a critical ability to closely and carefully discern the varied 
features of situations and their fit w ith  one or another prototype. These are 
developed through m oral training, i.e., exposure to a w ide variety of moral 
exem plars and consistent feedback w ith regard to one's m oral performance. It 
is entirely possible -  in  fact, m ore than likely inevitable — that some agents 
w ill receive better m oral training than others. This is a regrettable but at least 
som ew hat rem ediable fact of our m oral life.
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Furtherm ore, the quality of one's m oral training w ill depend in 
significant w ays on luck. Since one's m oral training will take place in  the 
context of one 's w hole environm ent, not sim ply in  the context of 
institu tional settings, it is unlikely that the quality of m oral training can be 
raised to a uniform ly high standard  sim ply th rough  equalization of 
institu tional educational quality and opportun ity  (though such equalization 
is im portant). Providing all children w ith  uniform ly excellent m oral training 
is pa rt of the larger p roduct of providing them  w ith  uniform ly excellent 
m aterial and  cultural circumstances -  that is, the larger project of im proving 
society as a whole.
II. M oral Philosophy
Though it has historical precedents, EN of the particular variety for 
w hich I have argued is extremely young. The im petus for EN 's re-emergence 
has come from  em pirical disciplines, prim arily psychology and cognitive 
science. If it is to become a viable and healthy presence on the largely 
unhealthy and  culturally isolated landscape of m oral philosophy, it will have 
to extend its scope beyond those disciplines. As I said before, EN is syncretic — 
it gathers the insights of other disciplines and attem pts to paint a broad 
picture of m oral reasoning, perception, and action. A robust EN w ill integrate 
the w isdom  of politics and  economics, history and anthropology, sociology 
and psychology, as well as the w isdom  m anifest in ordinary  conversation and 
debate. It rem ains to be seen w hether EN w ill gain m om entum , w hether or 
how  m uch it w ill influence the practice of m oral philosophy. I believe that a 
healthy dose of naturalism  is m uch needed across philosophical space, 
particularly in ethics, and that those who support naturalism  are, to borrow  a
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bit of pablum  from  our president, on the "right side of history." EN has the 
potential to im pact m oral philosophy in  a host of ways. My intention in this 
section is to speculate on the shape such im pact m ight take.
Normative Moral Philosophy
I have said that EN is prim arily metaethical; it a ttem pts to discern and 
describe conditions under w hich effective m oral reasoning can take place. 
W hat of norm ative m oral philosophy? If w e accept the sharp  division 
betw een m etaethics and  norm ative ethics, EN m ight be construed as 
im plying the follow ing thesis: norm ative m oral philosophy, as an 
autonom ous dom ain  of philosophers, is chim era. M oral reasoning is a form  
of situated reasoning that is highly sensitive to contextual features of the 
environm ent. It is ultim ately geared tow ards the im provem ent of practice, 
an increase in  the quality and  distribution of hum an  flourishing, and  w hat 
this consists in  w ill be im portantly , though not entirely, relative to historical 
and  sociocultural context. Philosophy can tell us w hat effective reasoning 
consists in, bu t it can not reason for us. Or rather: a philosopher can engage 
in m oral reasoning, as any concerned, thinking ind iv idual can, but 
philosophers have no access to tru ths regard ing  transcendent Reason or 
ahistorical facts that w ould  give their situated m oral reasoning a validity that 
is lacking in the m oral reasoning of those outside philosophy.60 O n this 
Rortyan m odel, it is pointless for philosophers to p retend  that they possess 
distinctively "philosophical" tools that give the discipline of norm ative 
m oral philosophy any special claim to validity. M oral philosophers of the 
past, though they have couched their theories in  the raim ents of ahistorical 
deductive certainty, have done little but reflect the m oral assum ptions of the
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trad ition  from  w hich they write. Despite their pretensions, they have not, 
nor could they have, established a norm ative theory that holds for all times 
and places.
W hile I am  sym pathetic to this general line of argum ent, I 
nevertheless th ink  that m oral philosophers can m ake real and  unique 
contributions to norm ative ethics. My reasoning is a follows. Philosophical 
metaethics, as I have said, is syncretic. It takes a broad and inclusive look at 
w hat w e know  about the practice of m orality — m oral perception, action, 
reasoning, debate, education, institutionalization, etc.. From  the fragm ents of 
insight found in  other disciplines and in  comm on practice, it paints a holistic 
picture of effective m oral practice. This w ill consist less in  characterizing any 
particular institution, practice, act, or personality as "right"' or "w rong" than 
in  characterizing the circumstances under w hich situated m oral reasoners can 
effectively m ake such judgm ents. But as I said in section I, m etaethical 
positions are not w ithout norm ative im plications. From  the m etaethical 
position — in  this case d raw n prim arily from  cognitive science -- that children 
learn  to perceive and behave m orally through exposure to exem plars rather 
than  to abstract rules, we m ight draw  the following norm ative conclusions 
(all of which, it should be said, are tentative and require argum ent):
1. We ought to insure that each child, in  his or her crucial stages of 
developm ent, has a m entor or m entors that can serve as an im m ediate role 
model, if not a parent then someone from  the extended family, or if not 
family then  som eone from  the com m unity, or if not that then  someone 
w orking for a socially-concerned charity, foundation, or (least desirable of all) 
governm ent program . The influence of gangs in  economically d isadvantaged 
areas, for example, will not be rem oved through state violence in  the form  of 
arrests and harassm ent. Children find role models, like it or not. Role
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m odels (m oral exem plars) are a necessary elem ent of cognitive and  social 
developm en t.
2. We ought to expose children consistently and from  a young age to a w ide 
variety of arts and  literature, in homes, in schools, and  in  public spaces. 
Publicly funded art, and  educational program s in  arts and  literature, should 
not be thought of as luxuries that we provide w hen extra m oney is available, 
bu t as central and im m ensely im portant tools of socialization. This includes 
w orks of art and  literature that em body m oral prototypes of w hich w e do not 
approve.
3. We ought not p retend  that children can separate "entertainm ent"' from  
"instruction." The m ovies, comic books, television show s, professional 
sports, pop music, and  video games to w hich children are exposed (far m ore 
often than  explicit instruction) contain m oral exem plars just as present 
com m unity practices do. This does not,  in m y m ind, am ount to an  argum ent 
for censorship, bu t rather an  argum ent for adu lt guidance and for diversity. If 
consum er-driven pop  culture provides nothing bu t endless violence and  
loveless sex, and  our com m unity does nothing either to influence its course 
or provide com pelling alternatives, the future looks grim.
There are other m etaethical positions that have relevance to how  we 
construct and conduct social life. I will briefly consider one more. F lanagan's 
Principle of M inim al Psychological Realism (PMPR) asks that w e "m ake sure 
w hen constructing a m oral theory or projecting a m oral ideal that the 
character, decision processing, and behavior prescribed are possible, or are 
perceived to be possible, for creatures like us" (VMP 32). Flanagan 
em phasizes that this leaves room  for norm s tha t are uncom fortable, difficult, 
or even im possible for us at present — we may decide that w e should teach
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our children to be creatures so different from  ourselves that w e can no longer 
relate to them.
Consider, now, w hat at present seems to be our prevailing public moral 
ideal (not in  philosophy, that is, bu t in U.S. culture at large): the citizen who, 
in Bill C linton's rousing and inspirational phrase, "w orks hard  and plays by 
the rules." Of course, this is not to say that the phrase describes our 
prevailing ideal — the citizen w ho works little, doesn 't get caught, and 
becomes fam ous a n d /o r  filthy rich is probably closer to the m ark on that score 
— but sim ply the prevailing moral  ideal. This reflects both the ram pant 
hypocrisy and the m oral anem ia of current public life in  the U.S., bu t I simply 
w ant to consider the ideal itself. Fleshed out, it paints a picture of someone 
who goes to w ork dutifully by day and fulfills her duties; nights (perhaps) and 
w eekends are the allotted time for "recreation," which is to be conducted 
w ithout violating any laws. T hough Marx m ade the point long ago, m any 
recent books have rem inded us that this sharp  separation of life into w ork 
and  play is psychologically debilitating, leaving both w ork  and play w ithout 
larger m eaning. (It has been pointed out that, for m any contem porary N orth 
Am ericans, w ork has become a place to form  relationships, to feel "at home,"
- w hile the hom e has become a place of stress and constant dem ands.) It is 
debatable w hether the complete separation of the spheres of w ork and play is 
psychologically possible, w hether it violates PMPR. But if the .m etaethical 
principle of PMPR is m ade a bit less "m inim al," as I th ink  it should  be, it 
could clearly be used to m ount a norm ative argum ent against the current 
m odel of the m oral life at w ork  in  the U.S.
But, lest I w ander too far dow n the path  of speculation, let me 
sum m arize. According to my interpretation of EN, norm ative ethics should 
not be conceived of as a special branch of philosophy but as a practice at work
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throughout culture, em bodied in  concrete situations, exchanges, and debates 
(in w hich philosophers, of course, should take part). There m ay be those who 
m ake it their life's w ork to engage in  norm ative persuasion, bu t they will not 
do so as academ ic philosophers but as concerned citizens and thinking 
hum an beings. Philosophers do not possess unique (transcendental or 
ahistorical) tools that enable them  to engage in  norm ative debate from  a 
priv ileged position.61 The search for a theory that will dictate w hat to do on a 
case- by-case basis is as m isguided in  philosophy as it is in the sciences, 
physical, natural, or social. However, philosophy, due to the w ide-ranging 
syncretic nature of the discipline, is well-positioned to do m etaethics, which 
can, I have argued, im ply norm ative positions. T hough the bu lk  of 
norm ative w ork w ill be done in the culture at large, philosophers can m ake a 
distinctive contribution. This opens a space, direly needed in  the current 
cultural climate, for academic philosophy to interact fruitfully w ith  the larger 
culture.
Trust
W hat the preceding point — that philosophy can provide no firm  
theoretical anchor for norm ative ethics — im plies is that trust plays a central 
role in ethical life. M odern m oral philosophy is often m otivated by the 
im plicit assum ption that people (non-philosophers), in  the context of their 
day-to-day lives, should not be trusted to reach m oral conclusions and 
establish norm ative ideals w ithout a philosophical theory on w hich to draw . 
Kant him self idealized the m orality of the un tu tored  "com m on m an," bu t his 
faith  in the com m on m an has not persisted in  m oral philosophy quite so 
strongly as his assum ption that "all m aterial practical principles are, as such,
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of one and the same kind and belong under the general principle of self love 
or one's ow n happiness." The assum ption that, in their practical affairs, 
people w ill act at w orst selfishly and at best parochially has lain beneath the 
surface of a great deal of m oral philosophy before and since Kant. Most 
economic theory is explicitly based on the assum ption that agents are, or can 
profitably be m odeled on, self-interest maxim izers. M uch m oral theory has 
adopted this picture, m ore or less explicitly. It is most explicitly evident in 
game theory.
But this psychological picture is decidedly one-sided. My intuition is 
that if it w ere true, hum anity could not possibly have established the 
complexly cooperative social life that it has (despite the elaborate constructs of 
game theory). It is also im plausible that moral philosophy alone has enabled 
us to do so. Pragm atism  holds that morality is itself a practical affair, that all 
affairs are practical in the sense that they are based on and answerable to 
hum an experience. This suggests that people have done all right — or at least 
as well as they have done — w ithout guidance from  facts or principles that 
transcend experience. M oral philosophers should learn  to trust that they will 
continue to do so.
W hat MNT holds is that "w hen such pow erful learning netw orks as 
hum ans are confronted w ith the problem  of how  best to perceive the social 
world, and how best to conduct one's affairs w ithin it, we have ... good reason 
to expect that the learning process will show an integrity comparable to that 
show n on other learning tasks, and will produce cognitive achievements as 
robust as those produced anywhere else" (N P  301). We trust that hum an 
beings learn to conduct their practical affairs well w ithout a faculty of Reason 
that transcends causality, w ithout reference to principles of deductive
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certainty; the philosopher should have com m ensurate trust in our ability to 
learn  to conduct m oral affairs w ell w ithout them.
This trust, if genuine, w ill take the bite out of the deflationary picture 
of m oral philosophy offered in  the preceding section. It w ill also encourage 
tolerance and discourage dogm atism . As Flanagan says: "A ttunem ent to 
contingency, p lu ra l values, and the vast array of possible hum an  personalities 
opens the w ay for use of im portant and  underu tilized  hum an  capacities: 
capacities for critical reflection, seeking deep understanding  of alternative 
w ays of being and  living, and deploying our agentic capacities to m odify our 
selves, engage in  identity  experim entation and m eaning location w ith in  the 
vast space of possibilities that have been and are being tried  by ou r fellows" 
(EN n43). One disadvantage of m odem  m oral theory is that, since it 
conceives of m orality as a deductive affair, it is unfriendly to p luralism  — one 
is either right or w rong, m orally speaking, and  alternative courses of action 
are not sim ply different, bu t im m oral and  thus to be condem ned. This is a 
disadvantage because pluralism  is a perspicuous and  (in my opinion) 
desirable feature of contem porary life. EN conceives of m orality as an 
im aginative skill, and thus acknowledges that there may frequently  be 
m ultiple courses of action in  any situation that are equally desirable m orally, 
or desirably in  m orally different ways. These courses of action cannot be 
adjudicated am ong deductively — none has a decisive claim  to being "right." 
As Flanagan pu ts it, there is a vast experim ent galloping forw ard, and  we 
w ould do better to relax our grip  on the m oral theoretical reins (our firm  grip 
was always illusory).
C o m m i t m e n t
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As the reader has no doubt been eager to point out, the picture of 
collective m oral developm ent offered thus far is excessively rosy. In  the 
discussion of MNT in  Chapter Two, I said that hum anity 's successes w arrant 
the belief that m oral learning is as reliable as scientific learning. But just as 
perspicuous as hum anity 's m oral success is its long, sham eful, and 
continuing record of m oral failure. C hurchland 's picture of m oral learning 
occasionally verges on Panglossian. O ur collective m oral developm ent has 
sim ply not show n the progress and convergence evident in  science. Moral 
virtue rem ains a regrettably rare quality, both in  individuals and in 
com m unities.
In  my discussion of EN 's relativism, I m entioned one reason that 
m ight account for this record of failure: the subject m atter of m orality is 
significantly more contingent and context-dependent than that of science. 
Here I w ant to offer another reason, one that is, in  the spirit of the chapter, 
m ore speculative. I have said that morality is a pragm atic affair, a m atter of 
effectively navigating social space. The purpose of m orality is to improve 
practice, to held us live well together. But how, as pragm atists, can we 
explain the long-standing sentim ent that navigating social space effectively 
- "often involves treating others badly and thus that the purpose of m orality is 
precisely to regulate our natural dispositions in this area rather than to aid 
them? For instance, I m ight th ink that I am better able to navigate social 
space if I have m ore m aterial wealth; thus, for me, and  perhaps for my family 
and friends, effectively navigating social space will involve accum ulating 
w ealth by any means, m oral or immoral. This is w hat Kant had in  m ind by 
practical as opposed to moral reasoning. If I restrict my perspective to the 
flourishing of m yself or those close to me, there seems to be no reason that 
acting to secure our flourishing will involve acting m orally. Indeed, I may
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purchase that flourishing at the expense of others outside m y circle of 
in tim ates.
I said that the psychological picture of hum ans as self-interest 
m axim izers is one-sided, incomplete. While this is true, it is certainly the 
case that m axim izing our ow n (and our fam ily's, friends', and immediate 
com m unity 's) flourishing occupies a large portion of our m otivational space. 
In w hat sense, then, can we say both that morality is practical and that it is 
m eant to regulate the parochial tendencies frequently at w ork  in our practical 
reasoning? The assum ption of the pragm atist m oral philosopher is this: the 
purpose of m orality is to increase flourishing for as w ide a comm unity as 
possible, including hum anity as a whole and, perhaps, the w ider biotic 
com m unity. Moral behavior will serve our interests, and  thus be practical in  
character, bu t the interests that it serves are often, particularly  in  the public 
sphere, long-term, global interests. These interests m ay or m ay not line up 
w ith the interests of any ind iv idual or individuals.62
A concrete example w ill help m ake the point clear. Consider a 
dilemma: in  my younger and less cautious days, I com m itted a felony (one 
that involved no harm  to anyone bu t myself). Now, I find  m yself faced w ith 
an application for a job that w ill lead to a distinct im provem ent in  my 
m aterial circumstances. If I tell the tru th  about my prio r conviction, I will 
more than  likely not get the job. If I lie, I will m ore than  likely get the job, 
and I have good reason to believe the lie will not be discovered. My practical 
interests and those of my family, it seems, are best served by lying. In what 
way can the pragm atist hold that telling the tru th  is also a "practical" 
decision? The pragm atists answers as follows: history has taught us that 
com m unities as a whole function more effectively, are better able to provide 
for the flourishing of their members, if those who constitute it are honest in
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their interactions w ith one another. Being honest serves a long-term  interest 
of the com m unity, and is thus practical. But it is clear that the relationship 
betw een this long-term  interest and my specific act is highly indirect. It may 
seem  to m e that my short-term  interests overw helm  the practical benefits of 
"everyone being honest." After all, no one w ill be directly hurt, and  my 
family w ill be directly helped.
W hat is it, then, that leads us to act m orally even w hen  our im m ediate 
practical interests are not well-served by doing so? The answ er is: 
c o m m i t m e n t  — com m itm ent to the long-term  health  of our com m unity 
(which, in  m ore and more places, will be in tertw ined w ith  the health of the 
global com m unity), both those w ho presently constitute it and  those in  future 
generations. This com m itm ent w ill m anifest in  tw o ways. The first is in a 
resolute determ ination to act in  accord w ith the w isdom  found in  the moral 
principles, rules-of-thum b, proverbs, stories, and  heroes that constitute our 
cultural heritage. This determ ination is based, as I said, on trust in  the 
effectiveness of hum an neural netw orks or, to p u t it a bit m ore 
inspirationally, trust in the collective w isdom  of hum anity. We trust that the 
accum ulated m oral w isdom  of our tradition — and, w hen we encounter 
them, other traditions — is w orthy of our respect, w hich m eans, according to 
the pragm atist, that it is genuinely conducive to the expansion of flourishing 
in both quantity  and quality. The second w ay that com m itm ent will m anifest 
itself is in  a resolute determ ination to use our developing know ledge — 
scientific and m oral — to adapt our cultural heritage to present circumstances. 
This prong of our comm itm ent w ill be critical. We resolve not accept our 
cultural heritage purely on faith, purely on trust. We adopt a certain am ount 
of detachm ent from  our heritage is in order to insure that it grow s is in 
strength  and is in quality. It is in this second prong of our com m itm ent that
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pragm atism  plays a crucial role. Only if we cast our m oral know ledge as 
practical (rather than  categorical or deductively certain) can we achieve the 
distance from  it necessary to facilitate its growth. The two prongs of our 
com m itm ent w ill frequently come into conflict. As I have em phasized 
th roughout this paper, these conflicts can not be resolved sim ply through 
reference to a m oral theory. They are resolved is in  the same w ay that our 
ancestors resolved them , through  situated, open, m essy, fallible conversation 
and debate.
The second answer, then, to the question of w hy m oral failure is a 
persistent and perspicuous feature of our m oral lives is that we frequently 
suffer a failure of comm itm ent. First, we often fail th rough  inadequate 
com m itm ent to the w isdom  of our heritage. This constitutes the failure of 
trust. Second, we often fail through inadequate com m itm ent to our own 
ability to enhance and develop our heritage. This constitutes a failure of 
criticism. The first k ind of failure leads to arrogance, the second to 
dogm atism .
Linguaform Moral Rules and Principles
N ow  we are is in a position to return  to a question that has em erged 
several tim es throughout our inquiry: w hat is the p roper w ay to conceive of 
the role of linguaform  rules and principles is in  m oral life? W hat has been 
said so far should im ply a general picture, one w hich I w ill now  attem pt to 
m ake m ore explicit.
M NT shows us that it is extraordinarily unlikely that the m oral 
know ledge em bodied is in  our connectionist m oral netw orks can be captured 
is in a sum m ary body of linguaform  rules and principles. This is a fact
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acknow ledged by an increasing num ber of those w orking at the intersection 
of cognitive science and ethics. As Clark says, "the rule-based m oral vision, 
according to this em erging consensus, is a doom ed attem pt to reconstruct the 
high-dim ensional space of m oral reason is in a fundam entally  low ­
dim ensional m edium " (CPS 114). Churchland describes the attem pted 
reconstruction: "Any declarative sentence to which a speaker w ould give 
confident assent is m erely a one-dim ensional projection -- through  the 
com pound lens of W ernicke's and Broca's areas onto the idiosyncratic surface 
of the speaker's language -  ... of a [high] dim ensional solid that is an element 
is in his true kinem atical state" (NP  18). These one- dim ensional projections 
are shadow s on the wall of Plato's cave (ibid). Kant thought he had found the 
m oral rule from  w hich all m oral judgm ents are derived; is in  fact, he had 
sim ply skim m ed the rule from  their surface. The w isdom  present is in  any 
hum an m oral netw ork dw arves w hat is found is in  the categorical 
im perative .
As I said is in  the previous chapter, once we conceive of m orality as an 
em bodied skill it is not particularly surprising to find that we cannot 
sum m arize our m oral w isdom  is in  a condensed body of rules. Julia Childs is 
a far better cook than  I, though I have read the instructions is in  her cookbook 
closely. W hen I cook, I pore over her recipes; according to Childs, she rarely if 
ever consults a recipe. Several investors, by all appearances wildly wealthy, 
appear on late-night television offering how-to books on the process of 
becoming w ildly wealthy. Thousands of people buy these books; rarely is 
there a corresponding surge is in the num ber of w ildly wealthy people. 
Cooking is no algorithm , nor is capital investm ent, and  both are far sim pler 
than the sum  process of effectively navigating social space.
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The question is now: w hat are the consequences of our inability to 
capture our m oral know ledge is in the m edium  of language? Is in their 1990 
paper "W hat is M orality? A Phenom enological Account of the Developm ent 
of Ethical E xpertise/'63 Dreyfus and Dreyfus postulate a five stage moral 
developm ental model: novice, advanced beginner, competence, proficiency, 
and expertise. Explicit linguistic instruction plays a prom inent role is in  the 
novice stage; "the instruction process begins w ith the instructor decom posing 
the task environm ent into context-free features w hich the beginner can 
recognize w ithout benefit of experience" (WM 240). Strikingly, linguistic 
instruction plays a decreasing role as the stages proceed, and plays no role 
whatsoever is in the expert stage. The expert, according to Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, acts intuitively and unreflectively; she "does not deliberate. She 
does not reason. She does not even act deliberately. She sim ply 
spontaneously does w hat has norm ally w orked and, naturally , it norm ally 
works" (243). We m ight say that m orality has become "second nature" for the 
expert. O n this m odel, a m oral agent will rely on rules and principles just to 
the degree that she has failed to achieve m oral excellence.
W hat, then, constitutes m oral conflict, if not disagreem ent over 
explicit linguistic form ulas, either their validity or their applicability to a 
particular situation? C hurchland says:
...moral disagreem ents will be less a m atter of interpersonal conflict 
over w hat "m oral rules" to follow, and m ore a m atter of interpersonal 
divergence as to w hat m oral prototype best characterizes the situation 
at issue; more a m atter, that is, of divergences over w hat kind of case 
we are confronting is in the first place. Moral argum ent and m oral 
persuasion, on this view, will most typically be a m atter of trying to 
m ake salient this, that, or the other feature of the problem atic
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situation, is in  hopes of w inning one's opponent's assent to the local 
appropriateness of one general m oral prototype over another. (ERSS 
147)
We m ight rephrase Churchland 's point is in the following way. Prototypes 
are high-dim ensional state space representations of patterns is in  the 
environm ent. But it is a mistake to think that a prototype is like a picture of 
the environm ent, as though, is in  m oral reasoning, someone or som ething is 
in the b rain  has to do the additional w ork of consulting the picture and 
form ulating a response (according to w hich m oral ru le 's necessary and 
sufficient conditions are satisfied by the picture's features).
The w ork of description and the w ork of prescription are not 
accomplished by separate neural processes.64 The activation of a prototype 
carries inform ation about w hat kind of situation is being faced and  the range 
of p roper responses; the two can not be separated. If a fetus is a sm all person, 
then naturally  we should preserve its life. If i t  is a  grow th attached to a 
w om an's body, then naturally we should let the w om an dispose of it as she 
chooses. If a corporation's laying off Am erican workers and subsequently 
opening a factory is in  Mexico is a necessary step tow ards preserving the 
global economic competitiveness of the U.S., then naturally  we should accept 
it. If it is a betrayal of an implicit agreem ent w ith  domestic w orkers done to 
profit a sm all body of stockholders, then naturally w e should socially censure 
the perpetrator. M oral conflict, according to Churchland, is m ost frequently a 
m atter of deciding how best to characterize a situation. (Again, the w ord 
"decide" can be m isleading — a developed m oral netw ork m akes the question 
of w hich prototype to apply explicit and  conscious only under unusual 
circumstances, such as intense moral debate.) Once agreem ent has been
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reached on a characterization, agreem ent on the subsequent course of action 
usually follows as a m atter of course.
The picture of m oral expertise offered by Dreyfus and Dreyfus and the 
picture of m oral conflict offered by Churchland combine to paint a bleak 
portrait of the role of linguaform  moral rules and principles. Indeed, the 
authors just m entioned are united is in their attem pt to m arginalize rules 
and principles is in  moral life. O r rather, they are united  is in  their attem pt to 
m arginalize the place of rules and principles is in our th ink ing  about moral 
life — after all, the authors tell us, rules and principles are already m arginal is 
in actual m oral practice, though not, unfortunately, is in m oral philosophy.
C hurchland goes on to reconceive the place of linguaform  debate is in 
moral life. The place of linguistic rules and principles is to serve as "context- 
fixers" (see my discussion at the end of chap. 2). Clark sum m arizes 
Churchland 's view  as follows: "...moral debate does not w ork by attem pting to 
trace out nom ological-deductive argum ents predicated on neat linguaform  
axioms. But sum m ary m oral rules and linguistic exchanges m ay nonetheless 
serve as"contexhfixing 'descriptions th a t p rom pt others to activate certain 
stored prototypes is in  preference to others" (CPS 117-18). While this provides 
linguistic debate a place is in  m oral life, it is prim arily a m anipulative one, as 
Clark em phasizes: "M oral rules and principles, on this account, are nothing 
more than one possible kind of context-fixing input am ong m any. Others 
could include well-chosen images [think of the pictures of fetuses used by 
anti-abortion advocates; D.R.] or non-rule-invoking discourse. Thus 
understood, language sim ply provides one fast and flexible m eans of 
m anipulating activity w ithin already developed prototype spaces" (118).
M odern m oral philosophers, and rule-based m oral theories generally, 
cast rules and principles as rational reconstructions of proper m oral
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reasoning. MNT deflates this picture; the reasoning that takes place is in  a 
high-dim ensional state space can not be reproduced adequately is in  the one­
dim ensional m edium  of language. But C lark emphasizes that the 
m anipulative pow er of linguaform  rules and principles need not be seen as 
trivial. D raw ing on experiments using the video game Tetris,65 Clark 
postulates the existence of high-level norm ative policies that guide situated 
reasoning. Is in  Tetris, "expert play looks to depend on a delicate and 
nonobvious interaction betw een a fast, pattern-com pleting m odule and  a set 
of explicit, higher-level concerns or norm ative policies" (ibid). The sam e may 
be true of expert m oral skill:
Such com m itm ents — the upshot of individual m oral reflection — may 
help us m onitor the outputs of our online, morally reactive agencies. 
W hen such outputs depart from  those dem anded by such policies, we 
m ay be led to focus attention on such aspects of input vectors as m ight 
help us bring our outputs back into line.... To do so is to allow  the 
natural operation of our on-board reactive agencies to conform  more 
nearly to our guiding policy.... The sum m ary linguistic form ulation, 
on this account, is a rough  m arker that we use to help  m onitor the 
behavior trained-up networks.... Is in  addition to the basic, fluent 
pattern-recognition-based responses exemplified by a trained 
connectionist net, the hum an expert relies on a second skill. This is 
the ability to spot cases is in w hich these fluent responses are not 
serving her well. Such recognition (a k ind of second-order pattern  
recognition) is crucial since it can pave the way for rem edial action. 
A nd it is especially crucial is in the m oral domain. Here, surely, it is 
m orally incum bent on us not to be hostage to our ow n fluent daily 
responses, no m atter how  well "trained" we are. We m ust be able to
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spot situations ... is in which these fluent responses are failing to serve 
us. The effect of form ulating some explicit maxims and guidelines 
provides us w ith  a com parative resource is in  a sense external to our 
ow n online behaviors. This resource is neither b inding or a full 
expression of our m oral knowledge, bu t it can act as a signpost alerting 
us to possible problems. (119-20)
This way of characterizing the pow er of linguaform  rules and principles 
em phasizes com m itm ent, is in line w ith my discussion is in  the preceding 
section. Based on our trust is in  the effectiveness of the m oral reasoning of 
those who contributed to our cultural heritage, we commit ourselves to the 
collective w isdom  that they have condensed into sum m ary rules and 
principles (on the revisable assum ption that the rules and principles w ill lead 
to w idespread, long-term  flourishing). A dhering to these com m itm ents 
involves a "second-order pattern  recognition" — that is, we learn to adopt a 
degree of detached critical perspective on our ow n situated, online behavior, 
and to recognize w hen our behavior does not conform to our higher-level 
- comm itm ents. W hen such a situation obtains, our second-order ~ 
com m itm ents lead us to alter our future inpu t vectors, to lend significance to 
certain features rather than others. (Kant's second practical im perative m ight 
be thus construed: "is in  interactions w ith others, always try to characterize 
situations is in  term s of features relating to others' autonom y and hum an 
dignity.") This suggests that the picture of m oral reasoning offered by Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus is incomplete; linguaform  rules and principles serve a second- 
order function is in  the reasoning of the m oral expert as w ell as the novice.
However, both Clark and I believe that the place of rules and principles 
is in m oral life extends beyond their pow er to m anipulate the function of 
individual trained-up moral networks. The tendency to cast rules and
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principles sim ply as hopelessly inadequate expressions of m oral knowledge 
unw ittingly falls prey to a seductive positivistic picture of language: language 
as a m irror, reflecting reality. The tendency to cast rules and principles simply 
as context-fixing devices used to m anipulate another falls prey to a significant 
danger is in  connectionism  and cognitive science generally: focusing unduly 
on individuals and insufficiently on groups. On both scores, a dose of 
pragm atism  helps. The pragm atist conceives of language as a tool, not a 
m irror, and the tool's function is not confined to the m anipulation  of one 
indiv idual by another. Rather, language plays a central role is in our 
collective  life, is in  our collaborative efforts to adjudicate disputes, develop 
and im prove institutions, enrich and transm it our heritage, and  generally 
structure social space so as to encourage peace and flourishing.
W hat, then, is the role of linguistic exchange is in  our collective moral 
life? Language is a tool, and  using a tool involves a skill, an  em bodied know­
how. O ur linguistic know -how  "consistfs] is in our com m anding a certain 
kind of well-developed prototype space ... that is interestingly second-order is 
in  that the prototypes populating  it w ill need to concern the inform ational 
needs of other beings: beings w ho themselves can be assum ed to command 
both a rich space of basic prototypes concerning the physical, social, and moral 
w orld and a space of second-order prototypes concerning w ays to use language 
to m axim ize cooperative potential" (123).
Is in our collective m oral life, we can point to two broad w ays that 
linguistic know -how  is deployed to "maximize cooperative potential." The 
first is collaborative learning. Is in  the process of collaborative learning 
(which emerges at roughly the same age as "second-order m ental state talk -  
talk about other people's perspectives on your ow n and others' m ental states" 
[121]), we share perspectives, considering and criticizing those of our fellows.
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Crucial features include "discussion, joint planning, critiquing of each other's 
ideas, and requests for clarification" (ibid). Is in  this way we supplem ent our 
perspectives or combine them  w ith others' is in  order to solve problem s that 
we can not solve alone. Is in expressing our m oral perspectives th rough  
sum m ary principles, w e can contribute to the process of perspective 
interaction, the process of finding solutions to m oral problem s that are 
unavailable sim ply through  recourse to any one ind iv idual's  perspective.
The exam ple of collaborative problem  solving Clark uses is how  
children solve the initially puzzling problem  of how  the same volum e of 
w ater fits equally into differently-shaped containers.66 But it is not difficult to 
see how  collaborative problem  solving w orks is in  the context of higher-level 
m oral problem s. For instance, consider the contem porary problem  of 
w idespread social pathology is in economically d isadvantaged inner cities.
One party  is in  the discussion (say, a Republican) may notice that, is in 
general, children socialize m ore effectively is in tw o-parent homes, and may 
thus offer the following m oral principle: "fathers ought to take equal 
responsibility is in  the rearing of children they sire." A nother (say, a 
Democrat) m ay notice that the "D rug W ar" being w aged is in the U. S. has the 
unfortunate side-effect of rem oving m any low er income males from  their 
families and, by im prisoning them , placing them  is in  an  environm ent that 
encourages their disrespect for the law; she m ay thus offer the following 
m oral principle: "d rug  use ought to be treated as a health rather than  a 
crim inal justice problem ; we ought to council and rehabilitate d rug  users 
rather than  im prisoning them." Both m ay have failed to consider the 
perspective of the other; together, they m ay develop a solution to the problem  
that avoids the imbalances of either perspective taken is in  isolation.
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The second w ay that linguistic know-how may contribute to 
m axim izing cooperative potential can be characterized as "practical 
negotiation." Practical negotiation is of use is in  problem atic situations is in 
w hich clashing perspectives cannot be integrated to find one solution 
am enable to all perspectives involved. Here, the goal of sharing  m oral 
perspectives, as sum m arized is in  rules and principles, is not to find 
theoretical bu t sim ply a practical resolution. The purpose of form ulating and 
sharing rules and principles is in  these types of situations is to m ake clear the 
shape of the problem -dom ain: the directions that debate m ay travel and the 
lim its of the possibility-space that solutions may inhabit. This type of 
problem  is a ubiquitous feature of our m ultiethnic, m ulticultural, pluralistic 
society.
For instance, consider the refusal of Scientologists to allow  them selves 
or their children to be treated w ith the tools of m odem  m edical science. One 
perspective (Scientology) casts m edical science as pernicious and  its use as a 
distraction from  our ind iv idual and collective physiological and  spiritual 
powers. The other perspective (just about everybody else) casts m edical 
science as a pow erful force for good and the refusal to use it as a w anton 
endangerm ent of the lives of . children. It is doubtful that either perspective 
can make itself desirable or compelling to the other, or that theoretical 
detente is possible. O ur only recourse is to forge a practical solution, a policy 
that each can view as an acceptable compromise — e.g., in tervening w ith 
m edical science only is in cases of im pending death  or perm anent disability. 
The process of practical negotiation is messy and rarely fully satisfying to any 
single party involved, bu t it is crucial is in contem porary culture, and it is 
well-served by effective skill is in  linguistic exchange, including the exchange 
of sum m ary moral rules and principles.
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Clark sum m arizes the robust role that sum m ary linguaform  rules, 
maxim s, and  principles play is in  m oral life:
The attem pts by each party  to articulate the basic principles and m oral 
m axim s that inform  their perspective provide the only real hope of a 
negotiated solution. Such principles and maxims have their home 
precisely there: is in the attem pt to lay out some rough guides and 
signposts that constrain the space to be explored is in  the search for a 
cooperative solution. Of course, such sum m ary rules and principles 
are them selves negotiable, but they provide the essential starting point 
of inform ed moral debate. Their role is to bootstrap us into a kind of 
sim ulation of the others' perspectives, which is ... the essential fodder 
of genuine collaborative problem -solving activity. No am ount of such 
bootstrapping, of course, can preclude the possibility of genuine conflict 
betw een incompatible principles. But it is the exchange of such 
sum m ary inform ation that helps set the scene for the cooperative 
attem pt to negotiate a practical solution to the problem  at hand. Such a 
solution need not (and generally w ill not) consist is in agreem ent on 
any set of general m oral rules and principles. Instead, it w ill be a 
behavioral option tailored to the specific conflict encountered.... Thus 
view ed, the rules and maxims articulated along the w ay are not 
them selves the determ inants of any solution, nor need we pretend  that 
they reveal the rich structure and nuances of the m oral visions of 
those who articulate them. W hat they do reveal is, at best, an expertise 
is in  constructing the kinds of guides and signposts needed to 
orchestrate a practical solution sensitive to m ultiple needs and 
perspectives. This is not, however, to give such form ulations a 
m arginal or novice-bound role, nor is it to depict them  as solely tools
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aim ed at m anipulating all parties into the activation of a common 
prototype. Rather, it is a m atter of negotiating some practical response 
that accommodates a variety of competing prototypes. (122)
III. Conclusion
Despite the pretensions of m uch rule-based m oral philosophy, 
linguaform  rules, maxims, and  principles do not capture anything but a sliver 
our em bodied m oral know ledge, nor do they reflect the high-dim ensional 
complexity of our m oral reasoning. They are not derived  deductively from 
an unquestionable "A rchim edean point," for there is no such thing. They are 
not beyond question or negotiation, nor do they have a categorical status 
lacking is in practical principles, nor should we expect them  to apply across all 
present or future contexts. They do not determ ine solutions to m oral debates, 
nor do they strictly determ ine a course of action is in  any but the most 
unproblem atic situations. The hope that a m oral theory based on a lim ited 
and fixed set of rules can be adequate to experience is forlorn. As M artha 
N ussbaum  says, "principles are perspicuous descriptive sum m aries of good 
judgm ents, valid only to the extent to which they correctly describe such 
judgm ents. They are norm ative only insofar as they transm it is in 
economical form the norm ative force of the good concrete decisions of the 
wise person and because we w ish for various reasons to be guided by that 
person 's choices."67
However, moral principles, suitably conceived, do play a significant 
role is in m oral life. We ought to conceive of them  as hypothetical 
imperatives, as Philippa Foot urges. They are geared tow ards the satisfaction 
of interests. W hat distinguishes them  from m ost practical principles is not
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that they are "categorical" — such a notion is ultim ately senseless, gaining 
w hatever credibility it has from  the psychological force w ith  w hich it is taught 
and repeated -- bu t ra ther that the interests they serve are often long-term  or 
global interests of the com m unity (which increasingly m eans the com m unity 
of hum anity  or even the global biotic com m unity). Such interests are often 
connected only indirectly to the interests of any particu lar ind iv idual or 
individuals. For this reason, w idespread adherence to m oral principles m ust 
involve an equally w idespread  concern for the fate of the w ider comm unity 
(fellow-feeling), which, to dash the hopes of m odern m oral theory, is a 
thoroughly contingent m atter. We ought to do w hatever we can to cultivate 
such concern for the w ider com m unity, a com m itm ent to its health , even 
w hen  that com m itm ent m eans sacrificing ind iv idual interests. C ultivating 
such concern is a m atter of m oral training, which EN restores to its properly 
central role is in m oral life.
A com m itted ind iv idual w ill treat the m oral principles distilled  from 
her trad ition  as though they are categorical because she trusts is in the 
collective w isdom  of hum anity  and of her heritage particularly; how ever, her 
com m itm ent to her com m unity 's health  w ill involve a equally  resolute 
determ ination to criticize and develop her m oral heritage, on the conviction 
that changing local and  global circumstances dem and it. As M ark Johnson 
says, "to assume, w ithout critical exam ination, that our trad itional concepts 
and standards m ust 'fit' ... new  cases is in  some way is m erely to deny the 
possibility of change is in the character of our experience" (MI 106); however, 
such change is a ubiquitous feature of hum an life.
Pragm atism  urges us to conceive of m oral principles not as fixed 
truths, bu t as tools for coping w ith experience. They are not "recipes for 
action, b u t ... rem inders of w hat one's tradition has found, th rough  its
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ongoing experience and reflection, to be im portan t considerations is in 
reflecting on past actions, courses of action open to us, and the choices of 
people we regard as possessing practical w isdom " (105). The messy 
indeterm inacy of m oral life is ineliminable, and  the difficult w ork of coping 
well w ith new  experiences is accomplished is in  the m oral trenches, is in  
situated experience, not is in  a moral theory. This suggests that m oral 
philosophy has no claim  to priority is in  norm ative debate. N orm ative 
m orality is an ongoing process d istributed throughout the comm unity, not a 
special province of m oral philosophy. Each of us has a responsibility to fully 
engage our m oral tradition and  our m oral circumstances. As Dewey said: 
...the object of m oral principles is to supply standpoints and m ethods 
w hich will enable the individual to m ake for himself an analysis of the 
elements of good and evil is in the particular situation is in w hich he 
finds himself. A  m oral principle ... gives the agent a basis for looking 
at and exam ining a particular question that comes up. It holds before 
him  certain possible aspects of the act; it w arns him  against taking a 
short or partial view  of the act. It economizes his thinking by 
supplying him  w ith  the m ain heads by reference to w hich to consider 
the bearings of his desires and purposes; it guides him  is in  his 
thinking by suggesting to him  the im portan t considerations for w hich 
he should be on the lookout.68 
I w ould  add  that the object not only of m oral principles bu t of m oral theory 
itself is not to dictate bu t to sim ply to inform  and im prove the m oral agent's 
situated m oral reasoning. The hope that it can do m ore is a relic of 
discredited philosophical doctrines w ith regard to transcendent faculties and 
facts, im m utable features of hum an nature, and the ahistorical nature of 
Truth. EN urges us to abandon that hope along w ith  those doctrines. O ur
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hopes for m oral theory will thereby be more tem pered bu t m ore realistic. 
Realism is a form  of authenticity, itself a w orthy m oral goal.
Conclusion
The central insight of EN is that "our m oral understanding  is complex, 
m ultidim ensional, messy, anything but transparent, and utterly resistant to 
absolutes and reductive strategies. This is not to say that we shou ldn 't seek as 
m uch clarity, determ inateness, and stability as we can realistically manage, 
bu t only that we m ust never be fooled into thinking that our form alizations 
can stand in for our em bodied, ongoing, historically situated, and  im aginative 
m oral experience" (Ml  260). I hope (perhaps against hope) that I have gone 
some w ay tow ards breaking the spell of totalizing m oral absolutism . O ur 
m oral life is characterized by the presence not only of m ultiple m oral systems 
and theories, but of an  irreducible plurality of virtues, goods, and ideals in 
each individual life. The giddy hopes and revelry of Enlightenm ent-based 
m oral thinking have left us w ith  an unfortunate hangover: we are still 
inclined to think that there is one ideal m oral life, or one ideal m oral 
personality, or one ideal m oral course of action in any situation, or one ideal 
m oral goal tow ards w hich all cultures should proceed. But these thoughts are 
belied not only by the historic inability of m oral philosophers to come to final 
agreem ent, bu t also by our own situated experience. We are all fam iliar w ith 
the tug  of m oral options, the choice of w hich of our traits to nurtu re  and 
-which to suppress or redirect, the tim e-pressured and ad hoc character of our 
m oral reasoning. Indeterm inacy, contingency, and  historicity are constitutive 
features of moral life.
As Dewey pointed out, hum an experience is characterized both by 
stability and by change. Balancing the two is w hat allows us to develop rather 
than stagnate or accelerate into chaos. The search for a fixed, all-purpose 
m oral theory reflects the hum an need for stability, bu t in the dom ain of
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morality, we have become unbalanced. We are now  inclined to reject a moral 
theory that does not offer timeless stability and guidance. We have forgotten, 
in other w ords, that change is as characteristic of the m oral dom ain as it is of 
any dom ain of experience. As Dewey said:
W hen w e observe that m orals is a t hom e w herever considerations of 
the w orse and better are involved, we are com m itted to noting that 
m orality is a continuing process not a fixed achievement. Morals 
m eans grow th of conduct in m eaning; at least it m eans that kind of 
expansion in m eaning w hich is consequent upon  observations of the 
conditions and outcome of conduct. It is all one w ith  growing.... In the 
largest sense of the w ord, morals is education. It is learning the 
m eaning of w hat we are about and em ploying that m eaning in 
action.69
The fact that m orality is a continuing, creative endeavor, responsive to 
experience, indicates that m oral theory m ust take into account the 
circumstances found and the insights gleaned in  other dom ains of experience; 
"the need for constant revision and expansion of m oral know ledge is one 
great reason w hy there is no gulf dividing non-m oral know ledge from that 
which is tru ly  m oral. At any m om ent conceptions w hich once seem ed to 
belong exclusively to the biological or physical realm  may assum e moral 
im port."70 The process by which they "assume m oral im port," as I have said, 
can not sim ply be characterized as a "decision" on our part, as Held 
characterizes it. Consider the once morally inert fact that some diseases are 
caused by genetic rather than environm ental factors. Once we develop the 
ability to detect the relevant genetic indicators in  the wom b, a w om an will 
have the option of term inating a pregnancy if her child is likely to have a 
debilitating disease — a distinctly moral decision. Thus, the genetic origin of
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the disease takes on m oral im port. M oral problem -space does no t have static 
borders.
The prim ary task of m oral theory, I have urged, is understanding,  not 
guidance. M oral theory can provide us w ith  a rich and fine-grained 
understanding  of the m oral dom ain, bu t it can rarely "tell us w hat to do" in a 
problem atic situation. The process of negotiating environm ental obstacles 
involves a situated, real-time skill; know ledge and training can m ake us 
adept at negotiating obstacles, bu t no rule or principle w ill transform  the 
process into an algorithm . O ur creativity, im agination, trust, and  
com m itm ent all p lay an inelim inable role. These are not static, ahistorical 
qualities of H um an  N ature, present in  equal degrees in all hum an  beings. 
Each is developed (or not) through training, and training is a contingent 
affair, dependent on a host of cultural, social, economic, and  geographical 
circumstances — dependent, in short, to a significant degree on luck. If m oral 
philosophy expects to contribute to the creation of a m oral com m unity, it w ill 
have to do m ore than  fix the "correct" theory. It will have to engage fully in 
the culture-w ide project of socialization.
EN is a m oral theory that integrates the insights just described. It 
em phasizes, above all, that m oral philosophers m ust shun the ivory tower.
A good m oral theory will be empirically inform ed. It will learn  from  
neurobiologists about the physical locations and connections of m oral centers 
in the brain; from  biologists and evolutionary psychologists about our traits 
and capacities, w here each lies on the continuum  from  natu ra l to social; from  
cognitive scientists and psychologists about the nature of effective m oral 
reasoning, w hat it is and w h en /h o w  it fails; from  anthropologists and 
sociologists about the social circumstances u n der which w idespread  rational 
socialization and  effective com m unity adap tation  are facilitated; from
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economists and (maybe som eday) politicians about social structures and 
institu tions conducive to effective m oral training, open cultural criticism, 
and continuing rational developm ent.
A nd, last bu t assuredly not least, it will learn from  people.  The 
opposition that H eld sets up betw een causal explanations in science and first­
hand m oral experience is a false one. Both contain inform ation relevant to 
the practice of morality. Science is only a part of our total knowledge, still a 
relatively small part w ith regard to morality, for two reasons. The first is that 
our know ledge from  all the empirical dom ains described above is highly 
fallible, due  not only to the natal status of some of the sciences, but to the 
contingent and context-bound character of some of the subject m atter and the 
indeterm inacy created by the heterogeneity of cultural forces and interests at 
w ork in the course of inquiry.
The second reason is that m uch m oral w isdom  is em bodied in our 
high-dim ensional m oral netw orks, m anifesting in habits of perception and 
behavior that do not lend them selves to sum m ary linguistic form ulation 
(particularly in  a type of philosophical discourse that m odels itself on the 
sciences). The w isdom  implicit in  such habits can not be form alized, bu t it 
can be transm itted from  generation to generation because it can be embodied  
in  ordinary  (and not-so-ordinary) interaction, self-expression, conversation, 
and debate, and  represented  in works of art and literature, cultural and 
religious m ythology, and some kinds of philosophy — th ink  Plato's dialogues, 
N ietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra, or A yn Rand's Atlas Shrugged (better 
yet, don 't th ink of Ayn R and's Atlas Shrugged). A  significant degree of m oral 
socialization is accomplished through exposure to both em bodied and 
represented m oral exemplars. EN draw s on everything we know, and m uch 
of w hat w e know  in m orality is im plicit in our perception and behavior,
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form ing a extraordinarily complex, evolving web of tacit m oral know-how. 
Despite H eld 's  fear, EN does not privilege scientific discourse a priori over 
direct m oral experience.
EN is m et w ith resistance a n d /o r  hostility across a w ide sw ath of 
philosophical space. Many of the fears I have attem pted to m itigate over the 
course of this paper: that EN is a slave to science; that it is deaf to the voices of 
moral experience; that it is purely explanatory, accounting for causal change 
but not for norm ativity, the activity of justification; that it is conservative, 
w ith no space provided for radical critique of social structures.
Some fears, however, I have not attem pted to m itigate. The fear that 
EN is significantly relativistic is well-founded, as is the fear that it is, in a 
sense, circular. These are fears that no pragm atic naturalist w ill attem pt to 
mitigate; rather, she w ill urge the philosophical and w ider com m unity to 
o verco m e  them . These fears are related to hopes and expectations that our 
tradition has em bedded in our thinking. We have been led to expect that a 
m oral theory will provide consistent, uniform , transcontextual guidance to 
all hum an beings alike. We have been led to hope for a fixed, ahistorical 
- foundation upon w hich m oral reasoning can be constructed. But we have 
been led to hope for and expect things that do not exist.
EN is relativistic because m orality seeks the flourishing of hum an 
beings, and  w hat flourishing consists in depends on a host of contingent, 
context-specific features of hum an life. These features include both those 
specific to com m unities — historical, geographic, environm ental, and 
economic features — and those specific to individuals — idiosyncratic features 
of one's psychological configuration. Different virtues and  principles w ill aid 
in the flourishing of different com m unities and individuals. W hile EN sets
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no a priori lim itation on the universality of particu lar m oral judgm ents or 
know ledge, experience suggests that m uch if not m ost m oral know ledge w ill 
be local, not global. W hat is certainly a mistake is to dem and that moral 
know ledge m u s t  be universal in order to qualify as moral.
Furtherm ore, there are m ore m oral personalities possible than are 
dream t of by m an or wom an, and far more m oral ideals possible than have 
been advocated or attem pted. It m ay be that sim ilar comm unities or 
individuals flourish in w idely different ways, and that w e need not force a 
m oral decision betw een them  w hen none needs to be made. Indeed, it is 
rightfully thought to be a good thing that individuals and  comm unities 
explore different tracts of m oral space, as they w iden the options available to 
succeeding generations. Relativism is appropriate in  a w orld of endless and 
m agnificent natural and social complexity.
EN is "circular" as well, but notice that the label carries its force purely 
through contrast to its alternative: "linear." A circle begins from  all points, or 
rather, from  no point, while a line begins from  a distinct point. The 
accusation that EN is circular sim ply reveals that there is no point in its 
m oral reasoning that is im m une to  revision or refutation. M orality is geared 
tow ards hum an flourishing, but any description of flourishing is as subject to 
revision as any description of how  to achieve it.
EN asks in  response: in  w hat could such a point consist? To the 
naturalist, the notion of such a point is incoherent — all points are in and of 
nature, in  and of history. The charge of circularity carries force only if 
contrasted to reasoning that is linear, that is, derived from  an A rchim edean 
point. Since there is no such point, circular reasoning is just reasoning, for 
better or worse. There is no anchor or foundation w aiting to be discovered. 
Like it or not, w e're w inging it.
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The fear of relativism  and  circularity is based on the desire for 
som ething else, som ething that cannot exist. Relativism, of course, does not 
m ean "anything goes." It m eans that "w hat goes" is relative to certain 
features of hum an life, not relative to anything and everything. O ur moral 
reasoning is constrained by a host of contextual features, some present in all 
present hum an contexts (e.g., lim ited natural resources), some present in a 
subset of contexts (e.g., devotion to Yahweh), some present only in  the context 
of a particular individual (e.g., deep-seated subconscious fear of rejection).
The task of m oral philosophy is not to dictate a priori transcendental or 
conceptual constraints, bu t to find, empirically, w hat constraints actually 
operate on our natural, situated reasoning.
N or does circularity m ean "anything can count as reasonable." 
Particular strands in  our web of m oral reasoning are held  in  place through 
tension w ith  others; not just any arbitrary strand will fit the web. "Anything 
goes" and "anything counts" m ake sense only in the im agined absence of 
som ething that determines  w hat goes, that determines  w hat counts. But w e  
determ ine these things. We should  not hope or expect to be freed from  that 
responsibility.
We ought to abandon the fruitless hopes and expectations that our 
heritage has bequeathed us. Indeed, we owe it to our heritage to do so. Our 
com m itm ent to m oral life should involve a resolve not only to respect 
tradition bu t to criticize it. Indeed, criticism is a form of respect, the respect 
we pay a tradition  that is still living and breathing, still a vital force.
But we should not proceed w ith glum  disappointm ent. The hope for 
w hat can not exist is no virtue; abandoning such a hope is not an occasion for 
regret. There are no certainties in  m oral life, no fixed points of reference. We 
are engaged in an epic history of creation: of social life and  of the w isdom  to
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sustain and im prove it. We will not discover who we "really" are through 
philosophy, nor w hat we should "really" do. We are in  the process of 
creating ourselves and  our life together, a process in  w hich philosophy plays a 
significant bu t not a privileged role. Such a process should not be undertaken 
w ith  fear and  insecurity, but w ith  exhilaration,
... the exhilaration that can come from  seeing the hum an project as a 
creative one, of seeing ourselves as actively involved in the process of 
m aking ourselves who we are, w ith  the resources available in  our 
vicinity. In  addition, this way of seeing things, and living one's life, 
seems better than the alternative of devoting oneself to the 
w rongheaded project of trying simply to discover one's essence or 
aw aiting passively its inevitable unfolding. The idea that our project 
is, or can be, a creative, aesthetic one, but one w ith extremely high 
personal and  ethical stakes, is daunting. But the picture of us as 
individually  and collectively m aking ourselves into m any of the 
different kinds of beings we can be, and of bringing philosophical 
criticism to bear on these projects of self-creation, seems to me the best 
w ay, given the facts of our case, to see the glass as half full rather than 
half empty. (VM P  335)
The glass of m oral philosophy is filled half .way. Once we thought it was full, 
b u t i t  w as a trick of the light? Nevertheless, we are hum ans first and 
philosophers second. If we tear our gaze from  the glass we will notice -- 
rem em ber — that outside, it is raining.
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1 Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock, May 15,1931, in Holmes-Pollock Letters: The 
Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Sir Frederick Pollock 1874-1932, vol. 2, ed. Mark 
DeWolfe Howe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 287.
2 This characterization is drawn from the editors' "Introduction" to Mind and Morals: Essays on 
Ethics and Cognitive Science, eds. Larry May, Marilyn Friedman, and Andy Clark (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), 1-15.
3 Owen Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 32. Hereafter cited in the text as VMP.
4 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
5 The article appears in Philosophy  72:282 (Oct. 1997), 537-48. Hereafter cited in the text as 
IOVF.
6 I can only gesture at what such an argument would look like. The logical objection to is-to- 
ought inference involves a positivistic hangover; it conceives of language as having a 
determinate formal structure, as being designed primarily to represent (mirror, map, etc.) 
reality. Descriptive statements, on this conception, represent states of affairs in the world, 
while normative claims represent -  depending on the philosopher -  either subjective mental 
states (preferences, desires), social constructs, or necessary facts about the world (provided 
either by God or Reason). Whatever the case, normative claims and descriptive statements are 
logically different in kind, so any inference from one to the other is fallacious. But we ought not 
to accept the positivistic picture. Instead, we should conceive of language as a practical tool 
used by embedded, embodied natural creatures, a tool that is contingent, historical, and in many 
ways continuous with other practices. It is a tool used for communication and for the extension 
of cognition. If we adopt this more pragmatic conception of language, the force of Moore's 
logical distinction fades. Perception and judgment are inextricably intertwined in our daily 
interaction with our environment, and our language, as a tool used in that interaction, reflects
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between facts and values will have to do more than point out an a priori logical distinction.
7 Virginia Held, "Whose Agenda? Ethics vs. Cognitive Science," Mind and Morals: Essays on 
Ethics and Cognitive Science, eds. Larry May, Marilyn Friedman, and Andy Clark (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), 1-15. Hereafter cited in the text as WA.
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Ho (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1995). Hereafter cited in the text as MEE.
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debates," see Andy Clark, "Minimal Rationalism," M ind  102:408 (Oct. 1993), 587-611.
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connectionism or for embedded cognition (though I am sympathetic, to some degree, with both) 
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12 Haugeland, op cit., is one of the more radical presentations of this view. For other sources 
less radical but still sympathetic with the general insight — that mind /cognition "just ain't 
(only) in the head" — see L. Suchman, Plans and Situated Actions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) on situated cognition; R. Beer, Intelligence as Adaptive Behavior (New 
York: Academic Press, 1989) on real-world-robotics; E. Thelen and L. Smith, A Dynamic 
Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994) on 
child development; E. Hutchens, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge: MTT Press, 1995) on 
collectives of agents; and R. McClamrock, Existential Cognition (Chicago: University of
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Mass.: M U  Press, 1991), R. Wilson, "Wide Computationalism," Mind 103:411 (July 1994), and 
Clark, op cit., for sympathetic philosophical treatments. These references are largely culled 
from Clark, op cit.
13 Hume, of course, would say that the laws of physics are no different; they point out "constant 
conjunctions" in experience, but it is illicit to go on to infer "causality" underlying those 
conjunctions. On this conception, the psychological generalizations just listed are different from 
the laws of physics only in degree. This is a debate in philosophy of science that I am not going 
to touch with a ten foot pole.
14 Augusto Blasi, "How Should Psychologists Define Morality? or, The Negative Side Effects 
of Philosophy's Influence on Psychology," The Moral Domain: Essays in the Ongoing Discussion 
between Philosophy and the Social Sciences, ed. Thomas E. Wren (Cambridge, Mass.: M U 
Press, 1990). Hereafter cited in the text as HSP.
15 See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982) for an introduction. For an extensive list of 
references to works criticizing Kholberg's moral stage theory, see Flanagan, VMP, 185. 
References to works on the general debate between Kholberg and Gilligan are scattered 
throughout Part III of VMP.
16 Owen Flanagan, "Ethics Naturalized: Ethics as Human Ecology," Mind and Morals: Essays on 
Ethics and C6gmfiye-ScieMce,--eds.-Larry May> Marilyn Friedman, and Andy Clark (Cambridge, 
Miass.: M U  Press, 1996). Hereafter cited in the text as EN.
17 The quote is taken from Jean Hampton, "Hobbes and Ethical Naturalism," Philosophical 
Perspectives, vol. 6, Ethics, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1992).
18 As Flanagan says in a footnote, it is not clear whether there are anything like "laws" of the 
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19 Held is a step ahead of many moral philosophers, in my view, in acknowledging that moral 
philosophy should attend to particular areas and that many if not most norms are domain- 
specific. This is an application of the general pragmatist insight that there is no such thing as 
philosophy in itself -  or rather, there is, but it is confined to trivial constructs of deductive 
logic or some form of rationalism. Philosophy should be about something, some problem or area; 
there should only be philosophy o f  this or that, not philosophy an sich. This is not to advocate 
narrow compartmentalization of the variety that unfortunately characterizes analytic 
philosophy today — John Dewey's work is as unified and broad in scope as any philosopher's -  
nor is it to say that unity and integrity of one's worldview is not a worthy goal. It is simply to 
say that the philosopher should attend to the specific empirical realities about which she 
speaks. The more philosophers pay close attention to the complex empirical details of the 
domains about which they write, the less willing they will be to generalize willy-nilly across 
domains. When we believed in a transcendental Reason, we could get away with global 
generalizations; now, I think, we are appropriately wary of them. ............
20 Most philosophers have defined "empirical" far too narrowly, as something like "of the 
senses." Philosophical empiricism, coupled with this definition, leads to science worship. A 
more adequate empiricism would be closer to William James' "radical" version, which focuses 
on human experience as a whole, not just "raw sense data" (that great positivist myth). Human 
experience includes affect, evaluation, deliberation, awe, existential angst, transcendence, and 
everything else described in the long history of art and literature, not just "that's hot" and "red 
there." Held makes the same point (WA 72), but seems to think that any and all experience 
that extends beyond sense data is beyond the scope of science. Leaving the question of science's 
scope aside, let me just point out two things. First, Held ignores the fact that EN looks to every 
source that has something to say, not just the sciences, and second, she ignores that empiricism 
comes in forms (e.g., James') far more broad than that of the positivistic straw man that she 
continually attacks.
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21 See Paul Churchland, "The Neural Representation of the Social W orld/' Mind and Morals: 
Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science, eds. Larry May, Marilyn Friedman, and Andy Clark 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), which is excerpted from Paul Churchland, The Engine of 
Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1995).
22 Davidson's argument appears in "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Inquiries Into 
Truth and Interpretation (New York: Clarendon Press, 1984). He concludes, via reflections on 
the nature of language and translation, that humans share a common and direct connection to 
the world that is not mediated by any "scheme" of concepts. I am inclined to agree, with 
qualifications. First, I think the point could be made without reference to language, simply by 
reflecting on the immense evolutionary history and near-identical genetic structure that all 
humans share. It is simply improbable, given these wide commonalities, that we could end up 
with fundamentally different ("incommensurable") "ways of seeing the world." Second, the 
fact that our connection to the world is direct and^nm ediated by;concepts does not mean that it 
is not conditioned by physiological and psychological traits, which in turn  reflect interests 
ranging from "natural" to "social" (in Flanagan's terminology). In other words, our reports on 
reality may be true, but they only report on a sliver of the truth, and in many cases, which 
sliver that is makes a big difference. Third and relatedly, I think Davidson overstates his 
conclusion. While the conceptual differences among human beings only make sense in the 
.context of a_wider shared reality,.the differences tend to be over the very things that are most 
significant to the quality of human life. They are not epistemically significant, perhaps, but 
they are quite significant ethically.
23 My discussion here is indebted to the work of Daniel Dennett, particularly his notion of the 
"intentional stance." From this stance, we interpret the behavior of other creatures as 
reflecting basic interests and values, whether or not the creatures are aware of them, or indeed, 
whether or not they are aware of anything. Dennett has presented and defended this view in
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numerous articles and in each of his books. The view is presented most comprehensively in The 
Intentional Stance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/A  Bradford Book, 1987). The view's relation 
to evolutionary theory is explicated in Darwin's Dangerous Idea (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1995). Further references can be found in both books.
24 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962). Kuhn's book is perhaps the most widely read and widely misread work of philosophy in 
the past half century. The notion of a "paradigm" that conditions how we view reality has 
been misappropriated by a wide variety of thinkers. However speculative this paper may be 
otherwise, I think I am safe here in simply pointing out that Kuhn made clear that the raw, 
uninterpreted (i.e., value-neutral) sense data that were to anchor the "unity" and linear 
development of positivistic science are a myth. Of course, the idea was around before Kuhn, 
even among the logical positivists themselves, but Kuhn has become its public face.
25 By "universal" I do not mean "ahistorical" or "necessary" or "intrinsic to human nature" -  the 
universality to which I refer is a contingent result of a historical process of evolution. These 
values reflect what Flanagan calls "natural" as opposed to "social" psychological traits; that 
is, "features which turn up in some recognizable form regardless of cultural context and 
historical time, and therefore are taken to lie closer to our basic biological and cognitive 
architecture than certain other traits" (VMP 41). Flanagan follows this distinction with a 
characteristic series of careful qualifications and disclaimers; I will leave it to the reader to 
seek them out if he or she desires. They do not alter the basic gist, which is clear.
26 James Sterba's essay "Justifying Morality and the Challenge of Cognitive Science," which 
also appears in Mind and Morals, is seemingly an example of moral theory which assumes 
nothing empirical. His thesis is that rationality requires morality, where morality is 
conceived of as a balance between self-interest and altruism. The conclusion of his essay is that 
the startling and counterintuitive results produced by recent cognitive science are compatible 
with his conception. But it is difficult to imagine what empirical results would not be
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concrete moral guidance might follow from it.
27 The quote is from John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1988), 204-05.
28 G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy  33:124 (January 1958).
Hereafter cited in the text as MMP.
29 Philippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," Philosophical Review 
81:3 (July 1972). Hereafter cited in the text as HI.
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Alisdair MacIntyre thinks that the central question of moral life is personal: "what kind of 
person shall I become?" Others, such as Kurt Baier, hold that public questions of moral 
obligation should be supplemented, not eclipsed, by questions of character. For an introduction 
to MacIntyre's version of virtue ethics, see After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1984). For Baier's thoughts on virtue theory, see "Radical Virtue Ethics,"
Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Volume XIII. Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, eds. 
Peter French, Theodore Uehling, Jr., and Howard Wettstein (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1988).
32 The relationship of EN to virtue theory is an interesting topic in its own right, one which I 
have somewhat regretfully decided to leave for another time. I have heard EN described as a 
variant of virtue theory, but I do not think that such a description is accurate. For a discussion 
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introduction and Part IV.
135
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Journey into the Brain (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), esp. ch. 6 [hereafter cited in the text as 
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Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993) 
[hereafter cited in the text as MI]; George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What 
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and Morals, eds. Larry May, Marilyn Friedman, and Andy Clark (Cambridge: M U Press, 1996). 
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41 Churchland calls EMPATH an "existence proof" of connectionist networks that can learn to 
discriminate socially relevant behaviors (E R SS127). For the full story of EMPATH, see 
Garrison Cottrell and Janet Metcalfe, "EMPATH: Face, Emotion, and Gender Recognition Using 
Holons," Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, vol. 3, eds. Lippman, Moody, and 
Touretzky (San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, 1991).
42 For a more complete picture of prototype-effects in cognition than the one provided here, see 
Eleanor Rosch, "Natural Categories," Cognitive Psychology 4 (1973), and "Human 
Categorization," Studies in Cross-cultural Psychology, ed. Neil Warren (London: Academic 
Press, 1977); Cognition and Categorization, eds. Eleanor Rosch and B. B. Lloyd (Hillsdale, N.J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978); Edward E. Smith, "Categorization," Thinking, ed. D. N. Osherson 
and E. E. Smith (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990); J. Fodor, M. Garrett, E. Walker, and C. M. Parkes, 
"Against Definition," Cognition 8 (1980). For a more general critique of the classical model of 
concepts, see Lakoff, op cit.
43 Paul M. Churchland, "Neural Representation of the Social World," Mind and Morals: Essays 
on Ethics and Cognitive Science, eds. Larry May, Marilyn Friedman, and Andy Clark 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). Hereafter cited in the text as NRSW. Churchland cites 
Kuhn in support of his contention that science is prototype-driven.
44 For a critique of Chomskyan grammar from this perspective, see Clark, "Minimal 
Rationalism."
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45 Paul M. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the 
Structure of Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), p. 300, italics in original. Hereafter cited in 
the text as NP.
46 See Goldman, op cit., Churchland, op cit., and Johnson, op cit.
47 In "Modern Moral Philosophy," Anscombe says something similar about Kant and Mill: they 
did not understand the significance of the fact that a situation can be described in various 
equally valid ways, sometimes invoking contrary moral rules (thus the enduring difficulty 
with Kant's ethics: which maxim to universalize in a given situation). Depending on the way a 
situation is described ~  or rather, the way it is perceived -- it will invoke differing response 
patterns. Interestingly, Plato, long a foil for naturalists and pragmatists, seemed to have 
something like this in mind when he asserted that to know the good is to do it. If we conceive of 
moral skills as practical, we might rephrase Plato this way: the excellent moral agent will 
learn to perceive situations such that the moral course is the obvious one to take, the one for 
which there are the most and best reasons. When she learns to perceive situations in this 
manner, it makes sense to say that, in her case, knowing the good and doing it are strongly 
connected. Of course, this picture is too pat and too rosy, like Plato's, but it captures and gives 
some support to his intuition.
48 "The Moral Law Folk Theory:
Human beings have a dual nature, part bodily and part mental. It is our capacity to 
reason and to act upon rational principles that distinguishes us from brute animals. The free 
will, which humans possess but animals do not, is precisely this capacity to act on principles we 
give to ourselves to guide our actions. Therefore, our freedom is preserved only in acting on 
principles our reason gives to us. There is a deep tension between our bodily and mental aspects, 
because our bodily passions and desires are not inherently rational. That is why we need reason 
to tell us how we ought to act in situations where our actions may affect the well-being of 
ourselves and other people.
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Reason guides the will by giving it moral laws -- laws that specify which acts are 
morally prohibited, which are required, and which are permissible. Universal reason not only 
is the source of all moral laws but also tells us how to apply those principles to concrete 
situations. Moral reasoning is thus principally a matter of getting the correct description of a 
situation, determining which moral law pertains to it, and figuring out what action that moral 
law requires for the given situation." (MI 7)
Johnson points out that, for this theory to be true, it also has to be true that each 
situation m ust have one correct conceptualization, that there must be "literal concepts with 
univocal meanings," and that each situation must be conceptualizable according to a fixed list 
of features (which determine whether they fall under a moral rule) (8). Prototype-theory 
challenges each of these corollaries, and thus Moral Law Folk Theory as a whole.
49 The player's skill will obviously not result purely from practice. Some players are more 
naturally gifted than others. If morality is a skill, then the same is true of moral practice: 
some moral agents, through no doing of their own, have natural endowments that make them 
more likely to be moral and to succeed in navigating social space. For an interesting discussion 
of moral luck, see Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981).
50 Too often, cultures or systems of morality are conceived as static, stable, and internally 
coherent — as nouns rather than verbs, billiard balls rather than clouds. When we think of 
them this way, we tend to see their interaction as a collision in which that with the most 
momentum triumphs. Discomfort with the purely causal nature of this process is connected with 
the desire to discover a purely moral perspective from which to decide which billiard ball is 
right. (Kant said that it is only in reason that we transcend causality — we are the only 
intelligent billiard balls.) But cultures and moral systems are less like billiard balls than 
clouds, less like nouns than verbs. They are patterns in the process of being enacted by their 
constituents. They interpenetrate and mutually influence one another in a host of subtle ways.
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Sometimes each retains its shape and integrity; sometimes one or both is given a new shape; 
sometimes they merge. Saying that a human being is a vast collection of billiard balls (i.e., 
entirely w ith in  causality) is compatible with saying that she behaves rationally. As the 
ethical naturalist emphasizes, rationality is a situated skill — moral claims will be decided in 
the trenches, in situations, in practice, not all at once through reference to a transcendent 
standard.
51 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1982), xiii.
52 "We expect our fellow discussants to be consistent in their beliefs and attitudes, and thus we 
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of reasons may yield conviction in the skeptic or in someone whose life form lies too far from our 
own. But this in no way distinguishes normative life from the rest of life." (EN n30)
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How does the way concepts are represented bear on moral philosophy? In many areas 
of moral philosophy there is much controversy over whether a certain item is an 
instance of a certain concept. For example, on the issue of abortion it is controversial 
whether a fetus is an instance of a person (or a human life). Often people try to settle 
this issue by trying to find necessary and sufficient conditions for being a person. This 
seems to presuppose, however that such a definition is in principle forthcoming, that 
we (tacitly) represent the concept of a person in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. (ECS 340)
But as Adler might respond, it seems that the debate could continue even under the assumption 
that we do represent "person" prototypically. The debate might be conceived as being over 
whether we ought to establish  (by community fiat, as it were) necessary and sufficient 
conditions for falling under the concept "person." Whether or not prototype-theory is 
descriptively true, there might still be legitimate normative debate over whether we ought to 
apply concepts as though they had classical structure. This is an instance where the ethical 
naturalist ought to take pains to avoid the reductionism of the normative to the descriptive 
with which she is frequently charged.
57 Flanagan criticizes Churchland for excessive optimism in "Ethics Naturalized." Much of my 
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58 The point that moral theory ought to focus on the metaethical conditions of effective moral 
reasoning rather than normative assertions is made by philosophers ranging from Rawls to 
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seems to me to open a space for integrating liberal and communitarian insights. However, I 
have no intention of wading into a debate that continually grows more deep, complex, and 
nuanced, not to mention weighty in terms of sheer pagination.
59 Another interesting application of the metaethical argument for diversity, the extended 
treatment of which I will leave to another time and place, is to the trend towards increasing
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homogeneity in popular American entertainment. The trend is driven in part by the fact that 
the outlets of public entertainment are increasingly owned by a shrinking number of global 
mega-corporations, and that global mega-corporations have less connection to any culture than 
to the bottom line. It would be interesting to see whether EN could mount an argument in 
support of, for instance, controversial or "offensive" publicly-funded art (national or local) on 
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that they might. Yet our theories in physics do inform our approach to doing physics, 
and thus they do influence our practice.
Do psychological theories tell us how to be better people, or more fulfilled 
people, or people whose lives have more meaning? Not directly, yet knowledge of the 
nature of cognition, motivation, development, learning, and so forth, can have some 
bearing on how we live our lives. Such knowledge will not, however, give us rules for 
living.
Do sociological theories tell us how to behave toward other people? Not in any 
direct way: that is, they do not give us general laws about how to interact in groups.
Yet the more sociologically well-informed we are, the more likely we are, on the 
whole, to understand the subtleties of group dynamics and to be more socially astute.
Moral theories are just like these other types of theory. Their purpose is not,
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rather, about the nature of moral problems, moral reasoning, and moral understanding. 
They help us explore our moral traditions to see how they arose, what their standards 
of justification are, and what their limitations are. They inform us about what is 
common and what is different in moral traditions around the world and throughout 
history. They give us knowledge of the imaginative structure of our moral concepts and 
the reasoning we do with them.
A theory of morality, then, should be a theory of moral understanding." (MI 
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arguments are directed against modern moral theory's tendency to cast moral goals and
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